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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Debate 
Due to mounting financial problems and increased pressure from bilateral and 
international aid organizations, there was an increased use of non-government industries for the 
provision of historically government-provided services throughout the developing world in the 
1980s (Cowan, 1990). Initially, much of this growth began in the health and transportation 
sectors with the non-government provision of the education sector lagging behind. This primary 
focus on non-merit goods (i.e. goods that are provided based on an individual’s ability and 
willingness to pay (Musgrave, 1959)), followed the pattern of privatization in advanced countries 
that began decades, and in some cases centuries, earlier. As a matter of fact, many economists 
argue that the private sector should not and cannot be responsible for the provision of merit 
goods such as education, particularly in developing countries (Roth, 1987).  For example, Lewin 
(2007) contends that basic education is a human right that only states can deliver. This argument 
holds that states have the moral and legal responsibility to protect minorities, promote equity and 
diminish exclusion. Roth (1987) supports this assertion by noting that some economists believe 
that only the state can provide an education system that promotes national unity and social 
cohesion. Additionally, Lewin (2007) claims that if non-subsidized providers in low-income 
communities depend on community revenue, including tuition, they are essentially drawing 
down the community’s wealth—thus forcing poor families to choose between educational 
services and other necessities such as food and health services. Accordingly, Watkins (2004) 
asks, “Should the world’s poorest people really be expected to choose between health and the 
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education of their children? And what is the market rationale to suggest that such choices make 
sense for the rest of society?” (p. 9).  
Another argument against the expansion of non-government schools for low-income 
families in developing countries is that the claims of greater efficiency, lower cost, higher quality 
and higher relevance in the non-government sector can only be true under certain conditions. 
These include “informed choice, transparent accountability, adequate regulation and an effective 
legal framework,” and these rarely, if ever pertain to the reality of the poorest households in 
developing countries (Lewin, 2007, p. 44). Opponents of non-government schooling claim that 
without sufficient information (e.g. informed choice) low-cost private schools will simply be 
taking advantage of poor parents (Probe, 1999; Watkins, 2004). A fourth argument against the 
use of non-government schools that is raised in the literature is that relying on non-government 
schools can undermine the public education system. Parents often choose to enroll their children 
in non-government schools because of shortcomings in the public system. While this may prove 
to be an appropriate (short-term) fix for the students who move, “failure to address the challenge 
through increased public investment and improvements in service delivery will inevitably 
undermine public education” (Watkins, 2004, p. 10).  
The final two arguments against this sector are that even low-cost private schools will 
never be able to accommodate the poorest households and that no OECD or rapidly developing 
country has depended on non-government provision to achieve universal attendance in basic 
education (Lewin, 2007; Probe, 1999; Rose & Adelabu, 2007; Srivastava & Walford, 2007; 
Watkins, 2004). 
Despite these arguments and concerns, the trend toward privatization in education in 
developing countries became apparent in the mid-1990s and the rise of low-fee private schools 
 3 
has been evident ever since (Phillipson, 2008; Srivastava & Walford, 2007). One of the major 
arguments for the expansion of this sector is that with scarce government resources and a need to 
provide a unified education system (often without the ability to specialize for students with 
differentiated demands for language of instruction or religion) there is ultimately a limit to what 
the public education sector can provide in developing countries (James, 1993). British professor 
and researcher James Tooley further argued in a 2004 commentary that: 
Government schools cannot provide quality education for all. If the goal of 
education for all is to be achieved, the private sector must be encouraged and not 
squeezed out. Development agencies need to wake up to this because large-scale 
government education leads to failure on a large scale that can cause serious harm 
to the poor. (p. 4) 
   
Over the past few years, with a continued expansion of low-fee schools across developing 
countries, international and bilateral aid agencies have indeed begun to evaluate the role of the 
sector in assisting countries to meet their Education for All goals. However, much work remains 
to be done. Little is known about the quality of the low-cost private school sector in most 
countries and even less research has focused on why certain countries have larger private sectors 
than others. The purpose of this dissertation is to address both of these gaps in the private school 
literature via three distinct but interrelated studies on private schooling in developing countries. 
History of Low-fee Private Schools 
At one time or another, non-government schools have played a role in nearly every 
country’s educational history. Throughout the world, schools not controlled (or funded) by the 
government provided the first formal educational opportunities for children—whether begun by 
individuals, the private sector or religious organizations. However, these were often elite private 
schools, only accessible to the country’s wealthiest citizens. The visible nature of elite private 
schools has given rise to the common misconception that all non-government schools are for the 
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wealthy, thus making the mere possibility of low-fee private schools in developing countries 
seem paradoxical to some. In the modern education age, however, when nearly all nations have 
accepted that education is a basic human right that should be made available to all, ‘private 
schools for the poor’ have become a distinct reality in nearly all developing countries (Tooley, 
2004; Tooley and Dixon, 2005; Verspoor, 2008). 
While the relative size, support and impact of low-fee private schools vary by country, I 
posit three primary reasons for the rise of the sector in developing countries. The first reason 
(paper one) is that inadequate or uneven distribution of government finance leads to demand for 
schooling that non-government schools can fill (Colclough, 1997). The second reason (paper 
two) is low quality and/or inefficient public education (Tan, 1985). The third (paper three) 
addresses the issue of a public education system that fails to meet the diverse, differentiated 
needs of its students. These needs could include anything from parental demand for teaching in 
an international language or particular religious emphasis to smaller class sizes and more 
personalized teaching (James, 1993).  
Arguably the greatest contributing factor to the rise of low-cost private schooling is a 
movement that began, ironically, to ensure that children in all countries had access to free, high-
quality basic education. Beginning in 1948, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated 
that “everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall by compulsory”. More than 40 years after the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international agencies, NGOs and 
government officials came together in Jomtien, Thailand for the World Conference on Education 
for All. Motivated by the fact that more than 100 million children worldwide had no access to 
primary schooling and an estimated 960 million adults across the globe were illiterate, attendees 
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at this conference adopted the World Declaration on Education for All—which proclaimed, once 
again, that education is a fundamental human right and stated that basic education was to be 
provided to all children, youth and adults. Ultimately, the declaration pledged that by the year 
2000 all countries should have achieved universal access to quality education. However, unlike 
the UDHR it did not call for free education for all. Over the next decade, a large gap stubbornly 
persisted between the ambitious commitments of many countries and their actual enrollment and 
literacy rates. With this in mind, governments and organizations met once again at the World 
Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal (2000), to reaffirm the vision set by the World Declaration 
on Education for All. The Dakar Framework for Action established six new goals for meeting the 
basic educational needs of all children, youth and adults around the world by 2015. The most 
relevant goal for this study is goal two, which aimed to ensure “that by 2015 all children, 
particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, 
have access to, and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality” (WEF, 
2000, p. 15). Furthermore, this most recent declaration of Education for All stated that “for the 
millions of children living in poverty, who suffer multiple disadvantages, there must be an 
unequivocal commitment that education be free of tuition and other fees” (p. 15). While this 
proclamation reaffirmed the views expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (i.e., 
free primary education), it represented a departure from the original EFA goals established in 
Jomtien. Along with the fifth and sixth goals proposed in the Dakar Framework (eliminating 
gender disparities by 2005 and achieving gender equality by 2015, and improving all aspects of 
the quality of education, respectively), this new Education for All commitment lies at the heart of 
the current debate on the role of private basic education in developing countries. 
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Progress toward EFA has been made since 2000 but it has been slow and inconsistent. 
The reasons for this include: 1) lack of government capacity and, on occasion, commitment; 2) 
short-term decreases in donor support/funding; 3) the recent global economic crisis; and 4) the 
prevalence of post-conflict states (UNESCO, 2010). As a result of this sluggish progress, many 
countries have turned to the private sector to meet their needs (Musani, 2008; Tooley, 2009; 
Verspoor, 2008). As Cowan (1990) notes, privatization is a country-by-country choice—with 
governmental support lying at the crux of the decision. 
Governmental Support 
While some governments have opposed (or even forbidden) the private education sector, 
others have historically supported it. In Bhutan, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Aruba, and 
Trinidad and Tobago, among others, governments appear to have fully accepted that the private 
sector is necessary and that it can fulfill a role that the public system cannot (or will not)1. 
Perhaps best known is the large-scale Chilean voucher program in which the government 
provides per-pupil vouchers for students to attend private schools (both those owned by private 
franchises and those independently owned) (Arenas, 2004; Elacqua et al, 2009; Hsieh & 
Urquiola, 2006; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Somers et al, 2004).  There is a smaller scale, more 
selective voucher program in Cameroon, where the government provides per-student subsidies to 
faith-based private schools, although not to non-religious private schools, which assists faith-
based schools in targeting lower-income students (Backiny-Yetna & Wodon, 2009). In 2009, 
India adopted The Right To Education Law, which requires that 25 percent of the first grade 
places in non-government schools be offered to children from low-income families. The 
government promises to reimburse the cost of tuition for these low-income students. About 10 
                                                      
1 In cases such as Haiti, Aruba, and Trinidad and Tobago, private primary enrollment rates are upwards of 70-80 
percent.  
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percent2 of India’s children in lower primary and about 25 percent in upper primary attend non-
government schools (Ahmed and Govinda, 2010, p. 372). 
Taking a less direct approach, the government of Bhutan conducted extensive school-
mapping in order to assess the public system’s shortcomings and subsequently worked with 
communities to set up non-government schools to account for the under-supply of public school 
spaces (Bray, 2002; Kitaev, 2004). In Trinidad and Tobago, the government has taken to 
purchasing seats in private schools in order to meet excess demand for education (Kitaev, 2004). 
After an eight-year voucher program that served 125,000 low-income students, the Colombian 
government instituted a similar plan of purchasing private school seats—although the country’s 
newest approach has consisted of the government contracting out to ‘concessionary schools’ 
(privately run) that are required to accept any student from the lowest two socio-economic strata 
(Angrist et al, 2002; Bettinger, 2005; Cox & Jimenez, 1990; Uribe et al, 2006; Villa & Duarte, 
2005).  
At the other end of the spectrum are countries like Barbados, Mauritius, Nepal and 
Uzbekistan. All of these countries (in addition to several other transitional economies) have 
governments that strongly believe the delivery of education to their nation’s children is the sole 
responsibility of the state. Prior to 1990, most socialist countries of eastern and central Europe 
forbid the use of non-government schools. Today, one of the most extreme examples of 
opposition comes from Nepal. The non-government education system in Nepal has faced 
extreme adversity from the Maoist movement, often in the form of demonstrations against the 
unfair advantage provided by high-tuition private schools in Kathmandu (Caddell, 2007).  
                                                      
2 This figure is likely to change with the Right To Education Act, which stipulates that 25 percent of seats in primary 
school are to be reserved in private schools. 
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The majority of developing countries in the world fall somewhere between these two 
categories—with government support and regulatory measures ranging from clearly delineated 
and strictly enforced to non-existent. Ultimately, decisions about privatization in education 
appear to revolve around public funding, governmental support, differentiated demand and 
public school capacity. However, no studies have examined the political, demographic and 
economic factors that lead to differing rates of private enrolments across countries since the 
educational landscape began to change so dramatically nearly twenty years ago. The study 
undertaken for the first paper of this dissertation has been specifically designed to address this 
gap. 
Paper One  
The most recent comprehensive study of factors impacting the differences in public and 
private provision of education across countries was produced by Estelle James in 1993. As noted 
throughout this introduction, much has changed in the education of developing countries since 
that time. For example, James (1993) finds that the private secondary school sector in developing 
countries is nearly twice that of advanced countries and finds that one of the most significant 
predictors of this difference is low public spending on education in developing countries. While 
this finding was important at the inception of the Education For All movement, it no longer holds 
today. Based on my analyses in Chapter II, I find that there is no longer even a statistically 
significant difference in the private secondary school enrolment rates between advanced and 
developing countries. Moreover, with increases in both public spending and private enrolment 
rates, public spending is no longer a significant predictor of private enrolment rates across any of 
the models examined. This finding is important for policy makers who disagree about the role of 
public versus private schooling in developing countries. More specifically, if increased public 
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spending decreased private enrolments (thus increasing public enrolments), as found in James 
(1993), this would provide continued support to those who argue that public schooling is 
underfunded and that providing additional resources to public sector is the best approach for 
assisting countries to reach education for all (Lewin, 2007). However, since public spending is 
no longer predictive of private (or public) enrolment rates, it now appears as though providing 
additional resources to the public system may well be a misguided approach. While this paper is 
not designed to assess the merits of public versus private schooling, the findings are instrumental 
for policy makers and aid organizations interested in supporting the growth of either the public 
or private education sector in developing countries.  
Accordingly, paper one uses longitudinal data from 2002 to 2009 in order to answer two 
important questions: 1) What are the demographic, economic and political factors that impact the 
provision of public versus private education in primary/secondary schools across advanced and 
developing countries? 2) At what level of economic development do we find changes in our 
significant predictors of private enrolment rates? 
 The data for this study have been obtained and/or calculated from a variety of sources 
and provide information on 128 countries over the span of 8 years. For more than just simply 
updating the data used by James (1993), this paper also provides significant revisions and 
expansions to the modeling approaches and variables used to asses the impact of spending on 
private schooling rates. First, I conduct longitudinal analyses in addition to cross-sectional ones, 
which allows for the estimation of coefficients as covariates change over time. Additionally, 
while James focused only on the secondary school sector, I conduct all analyses for both primary 
and secondary schools. Also, this study introduces a variety of covariates into the model that 
were unavailable in James’ dataset. For example, population growth as well as state fragility and 
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government corruption indexes are tested as potential predictors of private enrolment rates. 
Ultimately, these new models provide us with groundbreaking findings that contradict the 
conventional understanding of the interplay between spending and privatization. The inclusion 
and operationalization of all variables, as well as sample and modeling choices are all discussed 
in detail in Chapter II.  
Low-cost Private School Quality Studies 
While being able to understand the political and economic environments that are most 
conducive to the expansion of a private schooling sector is important, it is equally important to 
examine the quality of the private sector that’s expanding. If low-cost private schools are on the 
rise and they are found to be more effective than their public school counterparts, they may 
warrant further investigation and/or increased support from governments and international 
aid/development agencies. If, however, these schools are failing to provide any educational 
benefits above and beyond that of the public sector, it would likely be necessary to find a new 
approach for assisting countries to meet their Education for All goals. 
An increasing number of studies have examined the quality of low-cost private schools 
over the past decade. Several of these studies have been groundbreaking and most have been 
beneficial for advancing the field and this line of inquiry. Unfortunately, few (if any) of these 
studies have provided convincing approaches to account for concerns about selection bias which 
are inherently problematic across the school choice literature. [Specific studies, along with their 
limitations are discussed in detail in Chapter III.] 
Papers two and three in this dissertation were designed to assess the quality of low-cost 
private secondary schools in two countries with distinctly different private school sectors, while 
using modeling techniques that were designed to reduce selection bias. Paper two examines 
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secondary schools in Brazil—a country that fits a more traditional model of moderate private 
enrolments (approximately 14%) and relatively low public spending on private schools (less than 
10%), with a history of private schools serving the wealthy. Paper three examines secondary 
schools in Indonesia, where nearly 40% of students are enrolled in private schools and 
approximately 40% of private funding comes from the public sector. 
Paper Two 
Only a few decades ago, secondary schools in Brazil were considered to be the forgotten 
education sector (Brock & Schwartzman, 2004). The focus of the government was 
predominantly on primary education with an additional emphasis on supporting those who were 
fortunate enough to make it to higher education. In recent years, however, the Brazilian 
government has more than doubled its investment in public secondary education. Specifically, 
the government increased the public expenditure per pupil as a percent of GDP per capita on 
secondary education from 9.5% in 1999 to 19.5% in 2008 (World Bank, 2012). However, during 
these same years, enrolments in private secondary schools increased slightly from 12% to 13% 
(UNESCO, 2012). With such significant increases in public investment, the question is why is 
the non-government sector still expanding. The simplest answer is that there is a perception that 
private schools are of higher quality than public schools. While this is a rational argument for 
high-tuition schools based on the large literature of private school quality across the globe, the 
concerns raised in the beginning of this introduction call this assumption into question with 
regard to low-tuition schools.  
 Accordingly, in order to understand why there is still such a large demand for private 
schools despite increased governmental support to the public system, this paper examines the 
types of students who transfer to low- and high-tuition private schools as well as how they are 
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achieving compared to their public school counterparts. This study takes advantage of a 
comprehensive dataset on secondary school students in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil to answer 
the research questions: Do students who attend (low-fee) private schools perform better than they 
would have had they remained in the public system? Furthermore, do these results help to 
explain the demand for private education in the face of increased government support for public 
education?  
The original model for this study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with 
baseline test scores and demographic information as controls, transfer to a public school as 
treatment and test scores on an end of high school exam as the outcome. More specifically, this 
analysis examines the differences in academic achievement test scores between those who 
transfer from a public to a private school and those who remain in the public sector. Since there 
are factors other than test scores and demographic information that are likely to impact both the 
decision to transfer as well as a student’s eventual outcome, this study also employs three 
different matching methods in order to mitigate against selection bias. Additionally, a Heckman 
selection model and the introduction of an unobserved confounder are tested in order to assess 
the robustness of my findings. All sample and modeling decisions, as well as the 
operationalization of covariates are discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
Paper Three 
As indicated in the governmental support section above, private provision of services 
does not mean that there is no government role whatsoever. In many cases, there is a mix of 
public and private funding, management and/or oversight (Roth, 1987). Furthermore, 
privatization can take many forms: full transfer from the public to the private sector; partial state 
retention of ownership; leasing or franchising or contracting (e.g. vouchers and concessionary 
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schools); public private partnerships with regard to funding and/or provision of services (Cowan, 
1990). Many voucher programs have been researched extensively and a traditional model of near 
full transfer of responsibility (for funding and provision) from the public to private sector is 
assessed in the Brazil case study in paper two. This paper alternatively examines a far more 
unique situation in private educational funding, provision and achievement.  
The private education sector in Indonesia is distinctive in many ways. First, private 
schools can be registered with either of two central government ministries: the Ministry of 
National Education (MONE) or the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). Additionally, private 
schools accepting government operational funding are not permitted to charge tuition nor are 
they allowed to use the money to pay for teacher salaries. Yet, the public sector ultimately only 
covers about 40% of the funding for private schools. Finally, while approximately 40% of 
secondary students in Indonesia attend private schools, they tend to perform significantly lower 
on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) than their public school 
counterparts (OECD, 2012). The question then is why they attend. By supplementing 
information from interviews recently conducted in Indonesia with analyses of PISA 2009 data 
for public and private school students, this paper answers the questions: Given significantly 
poorer performance on PISA exams, why are private secondary schools in Indonesia in such high 
demand? Additionally, what implications does this have for international education policy? 
PISA data was first used in this study to examine the demographic and socioeconomic 
differences between public and private school students. Subsequently, analyses were conducted 
to determine the impact of attending a private school on reading achievement. Since the same 
selection bias concerns that were discussed in paper two are also relevant for this study, an 
approach beyond simple OLS is necessary. In order to address these concerns, this study also 
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uses a variety of matching algorithms to balance across treatment and control groups. Further 
explanation of these models, as well as the matching approach can be found in Chapter IV.  
After analyzing the data and obtaining an accurate estimate of the effect of private 
schooling on reading achievement, information obtained from interviews with ministry officials, 
aid organizations, private foundations and school personnel was used to explain why Indonesia 
appears to have a poor performing private education sector as compared with other developing 
countries and why students are still enrolling in such high numbers.   
Contribution and Significance 
Despite increased governmental efforts to reach the goals set by the Education For All 
forums in 1990 and 2000, the past few decades have also seen a shift toward non-government 
provision and funding of services in developing countries. This has caused an interesting 
phenomenon of increased public spending on education with concomitant increases in private 
enrolment rates, including an expansion of a burgeoning low-fee private schooling sector across 
the developing world. The three studies in this dissertation have been developed to address this 
new trend and to answer three broad questions that have strong policy implications. 
Paper one examines the non-government provision of education across the globe and answers 
the question: Does public spending on education really matter? Paper two analyses low-tuition 
private schools in Brazil and addresses the question: Why don’t public spending increases 
decrease private school enrolments? Paper three draws upon research on private secondary 
schools in Indonesia in order to answer the question: Why are there continued high enrolments in 
private schools despite poor performance?  
Ultimately, this dissertation is composed of three high-quality studies, each of which has 
potential to impact policymakers from governments and aid organizations by addressing 
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questions about why private schools, particularly those for the poor, expand across the globe in 
spite of major increases in opportunity in public schools. 
A Note on Terminology 
 The term ‘non-government schools’ was specifically chosen for the title of this 
dissertation due to the complexity of the term ‘private’, as well as the connotation that private 
often means elite and/or for-profit. However, the terms ‘non-government’ and ‘private’ are used 
interchangeably throughout this dissertation. These terms are used in a broad sense to mean “the 
production or provision or delivery of services by the private sector in one or more ways” 
although specific definitions are provided for each of the three main papers in the dissertation 
(Roth, 1987, p.1).  
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CHAPTER II 
PRIVATE PROVISION OF EDUCATION ACROSS COUNTRIES: A GLOBAL APPROACH 
Private schools have played a continued role in the educational systems of both 
developing and advanced countries for centuries. Given this, researchers have conducted studies 
on nearly all aspects of the private schooling sector across the globe. However, it appears that 
there is one aspect that has been virtually overlooked in the literature. While there is no shortage 
of high-quality studies on the impact of private schools in developing countries (including 
examinations of both inputs and outcomes), little research has been conducted on why countries 
have different mixes of public and private provision of education. Although government policies 
in some countries impose significant constraints on the private sector, it is still unclear why 
countries with similar policies and views on privatization may differ in the rate of expansion of 
private schools. This question is of increasing importance due to the shifting landscape of 
educational spending and private enrolments in developing countries over the past few decades. 
For example, while more than 100 developing countries have made commitments to increase 
public spending on education (coupled with assistance from aid organizations) as a result of 
Education for All, many of these countries are seeing a concomitant expansion of their private 
schooling sector—especially at the primary level (WEF, 2000; UNESCO, 2012). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that the conventional understanding of the interplay between public funding and 
private provision of education (i.e. higher levels of public funding are associated with lower 
levels of private enrolments) is no longer a sufficient explanation for assessing educational 
privatization across countries in today’s educational climate. This study posits a range of 
national-level predictors for the private provision of education (such as government stability, 
corruption, economic growth, population growth and distribution of wealth) in order to answer 
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two main research questions: 1) What are the demographic, economic and political factors that 
impact the provision of public versus private education in primary/secondary schools across 
advanced and developing countries? 2) Is there a particular level of development below which 
public spending on education is predictive of private enrolment rates? While this study is 
intended to provide some much needed information to development agencies and governmental 
organizations across all countries, the secondary question is arguably of even greater importance. 
If the level of public spending on education is predictive of private enrolment rates in a subset of 
the most economically disadvantaged countries, this work could have a significant impact on 
targeted aid to education—particularly for those organizations interested in increasing public 
enrolments.  
Background 
 There has been a global trend toward the privatization of services over the past few 
decades. However, this trend has been even stronger in developing countries than it has been in 
advanced economies. For example, Table 1 shows that while there was a negligible decrease in 
the proportion of GDP coming from state-owned enterprises (SOE) in high-income countries 
between 1980 and 1997, the percent of GDP coming from SOEs in low-income countries 
dropped to one-fifth of what it was in 1980.  
Table 1: Change in Percent of GDP from State-owned Enterprises (1980-1997) 
Countries (by Income Group) 
 
1980 1997 Change 
Low Income Countries 15% 3% -12% 
Lower Middle Income Countries 11% 5% -6% 
Upper Middle Income Countries 10.5% 5% -5.5% 
High Income Countries 6% 5% -1% 
Source: Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 1999 
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 Although it is unclear whether this change was more the result of an expansion in the 
number of private enterprises or simply a growth in the size of existing enterprises, the 
underlying message remains the same: the private sector (particularly in developing countries) is 
playing an increasingly important role in the provision of services as compared with the public 
sector. Since there is a dearth of literature on the factors impacting privatization of educational 
services, it is useful to examine the broader economic literature in order to frame the current 
study3. 
Understanding Privatization  
 Privatization is a term that is commonly used in economics literature but its meaning can 
vary significantly from study to study. For example, Brada (1996) offers that there are four main 
types of privatization: 1) privatization through restitution (e.g. returning publically-seized land to 
its original owners); 2) privatization through the sale of state property (e.g. direct sales of SOEs); 
3) mass or voucher privatization (e.g. individuals bidding for a share in SOEs); and 4) 
privatization from ‘below’ (e.g. start-up of new private enterprises). Megginson & Netter (2001) 
argue that while this taxonomy is useful, there are many other types of privatization that do not 
fit into one of these four categories. For example, they note that privatization in the United States 
typically refers to the contracting out of the production of goods and services to private 
institutions. In addition to the transfer of ownership through sales of assets and the franchising or 
contracting out of the provision of services previously supplied by the public sector, Andersen 
(1992) posits a third type of privatization: “Liberalization of market entry to previously regulated 
markets (which falls into the deregulation category)” (p. 180). It is this definition of the 
liberalization of market entry and the deregulation of services that is most appropriate for 
                                                      
3 There is a large literature base on school choice—which offers extensive examinations of the benefits and 
drawbacks to private education—but this work does not provide information about the national and/or economic 
factors that lead to the privatization of services. 
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understanding the changes in privatization across developing countries over the past few 
decades. For instance, many countries have loosened constraints on entry into the market and 
have provided opportunities for community organizations, NGOs and individual entrepreneurs to 
open private schools in order to provide basic educational services to both primary and 
secondary school children (Phillipson, 2008; Srivastava, 2013). Additionally, competition and 
deregulation have been found to be more important than more extensive forms of privatization or 
governance changes for improving performance (Yarrow, King, Mairesse & Melitz, 1986; Kay 
& Thompson, 1986; Bishop & Kay, 1989; Vickers & Yarrow, 1991; Allen & Gale, 1999). 
However, it should be noted that while some deregulation is a regular occurrence, full 
deregulation is quite rare. Andersen (1992) notes in the case of transportation that “the main 
reason for not introducing such a system has been a strong interest and political will to continue 
a system of integrated public transport with a uniform fares system for local public transport” (p. 
189). This argument appears only to be strengthened when applied to a merit good such as 
education, which many argue is ultimately the state’s responsibility to provide, or at the very 
least monitor and regulate, such services (Lewin, 2007). 
Factors Impacting Privatization 
A common theme across the literature is that privatization is often a response to the 
failings of state ownership and that low-quality public services will lead to an increased 
provision of private services (Bartolotti & Pinotti, 2008; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002; Megginson & 
Netter, 2001). This is supported by recent literature on low-cost private schooling in developing 
countries, which shows that private schooling is on the rise due to shortcomings of the public 
education sector (Heyneman & Stern, 2013; Srivastava & Walford, 2007). Although some of this 
expansion is driven by the entry of private proprietors into the market, there are also broader 
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political implications to consider. While some argue that politicians in support of privatization 
must be assumed to have the greatest public welfare in mind, others believe that politicians in 
many developing countries often have less altruistic motives. In a comprehensive study on the 
recent trend toward privatization in sub-Saharan Africa, Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2002) offers that 
“privatization is directly related to the shares that politicians or their relatives can fetch in the 
privatized firms to compensate themselves for the loss of rents previously enjoyed under state 
ownership” (p. 2). Seconding these concerns about bureaucratic collusion, Andersen (1992) 
claims that the pursuit of self-interest is a strong motivation for political action toward 
privatization. Studying the timing of privatization via survival analysis, Bartolotti & Pinotti 
(2008) additionally find that political fragmentation is the biggest predictor of delays in the 
privatization of failing services. Boehmer, Nash & Netter (2005) further that government 
stability, political risk and accountability of the government to the public are significant political 
factors for privatization. Christensen & Laegreid (2005) also claim that government effectiveness 
and trust in political leaders are likely to be negatively correlated with private provision of 
services. These arguments offer strong support for the inclusion of measures of government 
corruption, political stability and governmental effectiveness as predictors for increased 
privatization across countries. 
While political factors are undeniably important for understanding privatization, many 
studies argue that economic factors are more important than political or ideological ones. This is 
based on the argument that saving money is the ultimate reason behind all privatization 
(Andersen, 1992). Bel & Fageda (2009) further in their meta-analysis of studies examining 
factors that impact privatization, that the conventional hypothesis states that there is a positive 
relationship between fiscal constraints and the private provision of services. As Boehmer et al 
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(2005) argue, in order to understand privatization, one must examine the strength of the broader 
economy, as opposed to just those factors specific to a given sector. For example, several studies 
use GDP per capita, income levels per household and/or unemployment rates to explain changes 
in privatization (Bel & Fageda, 2009; Boehmer et al, 2005). Kayizzi-Magerwa (2002) 
additionally claims that much of the movement toward privatization in sub-Saharan Africa came 
from donor pressure and increased aid to the private sector. In addition to these economic 
factors, population, urban density and the size of the sector being privatized are often used as 
additional demographic predictors of privatization (Bel & Fageda, 2009; Boehmer et al, 2005). 
Prior Work on Educational Privatization 
Estelle James produced the first and arguably last comprehensive study on why countries 
have different mixes of public and private educational services (James, 1993). Using data from 
1975-1981, James examined the factors that led to different public-private mixes of educational 
services among 12 advanced industrial societies and 38 developing countries. Her main research 
questions were: a) What demand and supply factors account for private provision differences 
across societies? b) How does the process of economic development affect the role of the private 
sector in education? c) To what degree can government policies influence the outcome? More 
specifically, the study sought to explain the systematically higher proportion of secondary school 
private enrolment in developing countries (as compared with advanced countries), as well as the 
apparently random variation across countries, holding level of education and development (i.e. 
advanced v developing) constant. The models developed for this study were based on two main 
hypotheses: 1) limited public spending at the secondary level creates excess demand and leads to 
larger private enrolments in developing countries (as compared with advanced countries); 2) 
Differentiated demand explains variation within educational levels and stage of development -- 
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e.g. cultural heterogeneity (specifically, religious and linguistic heterogeneity). While these 
hypotheses were confirmed by James’ study, much has changed over the past 20 years in terms 
of educational spending and provision at both the primary and secondary level. Therefore, I 
argue that James’ findings are no longer relevant today and that a new understanding of the 
factors impacting educational privatization is needed. This study has been designed to address 
this need.  
Conceptual framework 
One of the foundational elements of James’ work is that excess demand is not relevant in 
advanced countries because of their “open access schools where a space is guaranteed for 
everyone” (James, 1989, p. 63). Developing countries on the other hand, are subject to excess 
demand concerns due to their limiting of school spaces. Therefore, the claim is that public 
spending would be the most specific predictor of systematically higher private enrolment rates in 
developing countries. There arise, however, two concerns with this claim in today’s educational 
climate. First, the systematic differences in secondary school private enrolment rates found in 
James (1993) no longer exist today. While James found that developing countries had 
significantly higher secondary school private enrolments than advanced countries, the average 
ratio of public to private enrolments between countries at these two levels of development have 
become nearly equal in the past 15 years. According to James (1993) the mean private secondary 
enrolment rate across advanced countries was 21.4%, while it was 31.3% in developing 
countries. By 2009, the gap was narrowed to approximately 4% (i.e. 20.5% developing; 16.4% 
advanced). This 4% difference was found to be statistically insignificant based on a two-sample t 
test. In other words, although advanced countries continue to spend more money per pupil (as a 
percent of GDP) than their developing counterparts, there is no longer a significant difference 
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between private secondary enrolment rates. Factors other than public spending on education 
must then be considered as potential predictors of private provision of education. These 
predictors will be discussed later in this section. 
The second issue with James’ claim about public spending stems from an examination of 
the private primary education sector in developing countries over the past two decades. The 
primary level is hypothesized to tell a different story than that of the secondary level, especially 
since the majority of public spending on education occurs at the primary level. At this level, 
there has been increased public spending on education in recent years in the majority of 
developing countries, yet the proportion of private enrolments has also increased. For example, 
while James (1993) found slightly higher private enrolment rates in advanced countries (18%), as 
compared with developing countries (16.1%), by 2009 private primary enrolments in advanced 
countries (10.8%) were marginally statistically significantly lower than that of developing 
countries (17.2%).  With regard to funding, developing countries have increased the proportion 
of spending on education from 2.9% in 1999 to 3.8% in 2011 and aid to basic education has 
doubled since 2002 (UNESCO, 2012). While the increases in public spending have come as a 
result of commitments made at the Education For All conferences in Jomtien (1990) and Dakar 
(2000), I hypothesize that the increased private school enrolments are due in large part to the rise 
of a low-cost private schooling sector that has been seen in nearly all developing countries. The 
statistics cited above indicate that the rise of private schools in this sector is driven by different 
factors than just those hypothesized by James. Recent research has shown that factors such as 
low-quality public education are likely to be more influential than simple excess demand 
(Phillipson, 2008; Srivastava & Walford, 2007; Tooley, 2009).  
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In other words, while differentiated demand (as characterized by religious and linguistic 
heterogeneity) may potentially remain a significant predictor of private enrolments, public 
spending is no longer likely to have a significant effect. Additionally, other factors must be 
related to the concomitant increases in public spending and private primary enrolment rates in 
developing countries. For example, increases in per capita income, distribution of wealth and 
economic growth are all hypothesized to have a positive effect on low-fee private enrolment 
rates due to an increase in the number of buyers for a purportedly superior product (Bel & 
Fageda, 2009; Boehmer et al, 2005; Dinavo, 1995; James, 1989; Tan, 1985). Once these 
characteristics are controlled for, population growth is also likely to have a positive effect on 
private enrolments. As the population of school age children increases, the public schooling 
sector may be unable to accommodate this expansion, thus forcing children into the private 
sector. Conversely, international aid to education is hypothesized to have a non-significant effect 
on private enrolment rates—based on the same argument as that of public spending (with the 
majority of international and bilateral aid to education flowing through the government). Cowan 
(1990) additionally posits that a country’s political environment is key to privatization. This 
could impact private enrolments in one of two ways. While Cowan argues that stable 
governments are more likely to endorse privatization, it is also possible that less politically stable 
and/or more corrupt governments will be unable to provide efficient, high-quality public 
education therefore driving more students to the private sector. Also, primary and secondary 
enrolment ratios must be included in these models due to the fact that high spending per pupil 
could simply be the result of low enrolments across the board. Additionally, the impact of urban 
density is assessed due to the fact that rapid urban growth is likely to be a significant predictor of 
increased private schooling options. Finally, it’s possible that lagged spending may have a 
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significant impact on private enrolment rates, as current values are likely to be a response to the 
previous year’s enrolment patterns. Therefore I run models with current and lagged spending as 
independent variables.  
Model Specification 
While James (1993) conducted a cross-sectional analysis focused primarily at the 
secondary level, this study will take advantage of the increased availability of data in order to 
provide cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses for both primary and secondary schools. For 
the cross-sectional analyses this study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) models. These 
models are first run with a dummy variable for “advanced” country status and subsequently run 
as separate models for developing and advanced countries. The first approach provides 
information on the impact of country status on private school enrolments while the second allows 
for an examination of differing predictors by status (without having to use interactions for each 
covariate in the model). Unlike James (1993), which uses dummy variables for secondary school 
in a pooled model, the cross-sectional models in this study are run separately for primary and 
secondary schools. This choice was made in order to be able to examine factors that influence 
each of these sectors independently, since there are significant differences in the governmental 
approach to supporting primary and secondary schools. 
When using panel data there are several issues that must be considered in order to find 
the most appropriate approach for conducting longitudinal analyses. The three econometric 
approaches that are most commonly used are: pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects. Let 
us first consider the basic unobserved effects model:  
Yit = xitβ + vit,     (1) 
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 Where xit contains a vector of covariates that vary by country (i) and time (t). The error 
term vit is made up of an idiosyncratic error (uit) as well as an unobserved country effect (ci). The 
idiosyncratic errors, uit, also change across country and time and are assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the vector of covariates x. The country effect, ci is the unobserved effect that presents the 
key issue with analyzing panel data. The concern revolves around whether or not ci is 
uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables xit. Typically, a random effects framework 
is used if ci is assumed to be uncorrelated with xit, while the fixed effects framework is employed 
when one wants to allow ci and xit to be arbitrarily correlated. There are, however, drawbacks to 
each of these approaches.  
 The fixed effects framework deals with the potential endogeneity of xit (i.e. the fact that 
some covariates may be correlated with unobserved factors that do not change over time for the 
same country (ci)) by subtracting within-group averages. For example, let us rewrite equation (1) 
with an expanded error term and the inclusion of a time-invariant country-specific covariate W: 
Yit = xitβ + Wiδ + ci + uit           (2) 
 Now, let  denote the average of the Yit for country i, while denotes the average of the 
xit and  the average of the uit. Inherently, Wi and ci already represent the country average 
values because they do not vary over time. We now subtract the within-group averages from (2): 
 
Yit -  =  xitβ - +  uit -             (3) 
 Although we have now removed one source of endogeneity from our equation, this 
approach only uses within country variation in x to estimate β and drops all time-invariant 
covariates. Therefore, not only can we no longer identify effects of covariates that do not change 
over time (some of which may be of interest), but by removing all of the variation between 
iY xi
ui
iY xi ui
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country means we use up many degrees of freedom and may ultimately produce estimates that 
are far less precise than OLS (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 One way to recover the time-invariant covariates is to use a random effects model. In 
addition to identifying estimates of time-varying and time-invariant covariates, the random 
effects framework uses a generalized least squares estimator (GLS) by transforming the data so 
that transformed errors are uncorrelated and homoscedastic. Under ideal circumstances, this 
approach is more efficient than applying OLS to the non-transformed data. However, GLS is 
only guaranteed to be more efficient than OLS when we know the exact structure of the error 
terms and all relevant variances. Since this is almost never true, we instead use assumptions 
about the structure of the error terms coupled with estimates of the variances. The resulting 
estimator, known as feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), is not necessarily more efficient 
than OLS. As a matter of fact, FGLS estimates may actually provide biased estimates of standard 
errors and test statistics if the error structures are misspecified in our assumptions—and there is 
no way to ever be fully confident about these assumptions without having full knowledge of the 
exact structure of the error terms. Therefore, some researchers argue that the best approach is 
simply to use pooled OLS (Wooldridge, 2010).  
 Pooled OLS estimates from equation (1) are assumed to be unbiased if xit is exogenous 
but the approach will still be inefficient with standard OLS errors. This is due to the fact that 
OLS programs for statistical packages (such as STATA) are written based on the assumptions 
that standard errors are uncorrelated and homoscedastic. We know, however, that this is not true 
with the panel data discussed in equations (1) and (2) above. We assume that errors for each 
country are correlated with one another but that there is no correlation of errors across countries. 
With a large number of individuals and timepoints, we would be able to obtain a consistent 
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estimate of the standard errors by clustering at the country level, regardless of the underlying 
structure of dependence within each cluster. However, due to the fact that I have 60-100 
countries and approximately ten timepoints in any given model, panel-corrected standard errors 
are used to mitigate against concerns of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations in the initial 
regression models (Beck & Katz, 1995).  
 Ultimately, given the strengths and weaknesses of each, all three approaches are used in 
this study and compared with one another. While OLS and random effects models will be used to 
assess which provides greater efficiency based on these data, the fixed effects model is used to 
test against potential bias in the first two models. In order to determine whether or not the fixed 
effects framework needs to be used, a Hausman test will be conducted. This is accomplished by 
estimating both a fixed and random effects model and then comparing the results. While a bias in 
the random effects model will cause the coefficients to be significantly different from the fixed 
effect model, an insignificant difference will allow us to be confident that there is no bias and 
that we can use the more efficient random effects model.  
Data 
Data for this study were collected from a variety of sources. The majority of data on 
expenditures (public, private and international), enrolment rates, economic growth and level of 
development came from World Bank Data Centre and UNESCO (UIS) databanks. Additional 
variables were collected and/or calculated from the OECD, Transparency International, the 
Center for Systemic Peace, Ethnologue, the Economic Intelligence Unit and the CIA World 
Factbook. 
The final longitudinal dataset contains information on 128 countries at the primary level 
(28 advanced; 100 developing) and 123 countries in secondary (29 advanced; 94 developing) 
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from 2002 to 2009. As for the cross-sectional analyses, there are 90 countries in primary (26 
advanced; 64 developing) and 77 in secondary (23 advanced; 54 developing) in 2008. This year 
was chosen because it is the most recent year with the highest level of non-missing data for the 
dependent variable but additional years will also be tested as sensitivity analyses.  
Additionally, there is missing data for a number of variables in each of the samples 
tested. While missing data was minimal for the majority of covariates, it was extensive for 
several variables in the longitudinal model, such as the GINI index (73%).  Therefore, the GINI 
index is dropped from longitudinal models. For the cross-sectional analyses, the majority of 
variables were complete although there was up to 28% missing data on public spending 
(depending on the year and level of schooling). In order to avoid the bias that might be induced 
by casewise deletion, I multiply impute all missing data and re-estimate the results for all models 
(Little & Rubin, 2002).  
Dependent Variable 
Two dependent variables are used for this study: percent of private primary enrolments 
and percent of private secondary enrolments. As previously noted, these variables come from 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). It is important to discuss what is meant by “private” in 
these data. Does it mean privately financed? Privately managed? Can a school still be considered 
private if it receives public funding? While there is an entire literature on the definition of 
privatization (as discussed previously), for this study I rely on the definition set forth by 
UNESCO. This decision was made as a result of data availability—as no other comprehensive 
measures of privatization exist for such large-scale cross-country comparisons. “UNESCO 
regards as ‘private’ any educational institute that is either controlled and managed by a non-
government organization (e.g. religious group, association, enterprise) or its governing body 
 30 
consists mainly of members not selected by a public agency” (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007). 
Although UNESCO assumes that all countries use this definition when reporting their private 
school data, there may be variability across countries. These country-varying definitions 
resulting from the self-report nature of these statistics are a concern with regard to 
generalizability but it is ultimately a necessary risk in order to be able to take advantage of large-
scale cross-country datasets. In addition to the reliance on available data, perhaps an even more 
important reason to choose the UNESCO definition is that these same data are used to influence 
donor decisions worldwide and to assess progress toward EFA goals (in UNESCO’s annual 
Global Monitoring Reports). Since all bilateral and multilateral aid organizations, as well as the 
majority of international education researchers use the UNESCO definition it is the most 
appropriate choice for a study that examines the factors impacting enrolment rates across 
countries. 
More specifically, it should be noted that the dependent variables for this study are 
specified as the share of private enrolments by sector. Although this specification forces a 
commitment to a specific model, it was ultimately chosen because of the interpretation of overall 
enrollment increases. For example, if a country increases enrolments in both public and private 
schools but the share of each remains constant, alternative specifications (such as log enrollment) 
would treat the dependent variable as increasing. However, since the purpose of this study is to 
determine the factors impacting private enrolments (as compared with public enrolments) it is 
only appropriate to measure the dependent variable as a share (as opposed to log or overall).  
Independent Variables 
In order to reanalyze models similar to those of James (1993) with updated data, this 
study initially uses five independent variables to assess their effect on private enrolments. The 
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main variable of interest is public spending on education. This variable is operationalized as 
public spending per pupil as a percentage of gdp per capita.  Lagged spending variables are also 
tested across models. Secondly, the “replication” model incorporates gdp per capita. 
Additionally, the Gini index for national income distribution is used in order to assess the impact 
of distribution of wealth on private enrolments. The hypothesis is that as inequality decreases 
(when controlling for gdp per capita) in developing countries, more people will have fungible 
wealth to put toward private educational services.  
I have also calculated a religious diversity index using the CIA World Factbook. This 
index is calculated using the following formula (developed by James): ΣRi ln 1/Ri, where Ri is 
the proportion of each religion in a given country. The higher the index, the larger the number of 
“strong” religions in the country. This makes intuitive sense based on the fact that a country with 
one very strong religion will likely have influences of that religion in the public school sector 
and will not necessarily have a large need for private schooling based on religious needs. 
However, there are countries such as Indonesia which belie this assumption. While Islam is a 
major focus even in public schools, private schools are used specifically to train Islamic leaders. 
In this situation, the religious diversity index would be quite low but the impact of religion on 
private school enrolment rates would likely be quite high. In order to account for this concern, I 
will run separate models with the inclusion of a flag (i.e. dummy variable) for countries with a 
predominance of Muslim citizens. There is no evidence from the literature to suggest that other 
dominant religions would have the same impact on private enrolment rates. 
A linguistic diversity index was retrieved from Ethnologue. Using Greenberg’s diversity 
index, the linguistic measure is calculated such that it provides the probability of two people of 
the country selected at random having different mother tongue languages. 1 indicates total 
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diversity (i.e. no two people with the same language), 0 indicates no linguistic diversity at all. 
The hypothesis once again being that higher linguistic diversity would lead to higher private 
enrolment rates.  
In order to expand the model proposed in James (1993) to account for recent changes in 
the educational landscape as noted in the conceptual framework section, I include various 
additional covariates which are hypothesized to effect private enrolments at both the primary and 
secondary level. For example, political factors such as a state fragility index and a political 
stability measure are entered as controls. The state fragility index was calculated by the Center 
for Systemic Peace and it ranges on a 25-point scale to signify the level of fragility for a 
government across eight indicators (with higher levels on the index meaning a more fragile 
state). “A country’s fragility is closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict; make 
and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in 
maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges 
and crises, and continuing progressive development” (Marshall & Cole, 2011, p. 7). The political 
stability measure comes from the World Bank governance data.  It is operationalized as the 
likelihood that a government will be overthrown by violence and ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 (with -
2.5 signifying the most likely governments to be overthrown).  
This study also incorporates the corruption perceptions index as developed by 
Transparency International. This index is on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means that a country is 
perceived to be highly corrupt in its public sector, while 10 means that a country is perceived to 
be very “clean”. This measure has been introduced to the model in order to account for 
government influence on the provision of educational services. Think of two countries with 
identical measures of per pupil public expenditures on education. If we had reason to believe that 
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one of these countries was highly corrupt and that government funding was not actually reaching 
its intended target, we may expect to see very different educational landscapes. My hypothesis is 
that government corruption would have a negative impact on the quality of public schooling—
thus causing more people to move to the private sector. Therefore, this index is expected to have 
a negative impact on private enrolment rates (i.e. less corrupt countries (higher on this scale) will 
have lower private enrolment rates, holding all else constant).  
Finally, demographic variables are included in the model. These covariates include total 
population, population growth, population density, percent rural population, the number of 
official school age children by level of schooling and the total number public and private 
enrollees by level of schooling.  
Results 
 By examining both primary and secondary schools cross-sectionally and longitudinally, 
this study contains five main sets of analyses. In order to simplify the presentation of these 
results for the reader, this section will be divided into three parts: primary school analyses, 
secondary school analyses, and analyses assessing the impact of the level of economic 
development on private enrolments. Results from the cross-sectional model at the primary level 
will be presented first, followed by results from the longitudinal model. The same pattern will 
then be followed for analyses at the secondary level. Results from the level of development 
analyses will be presented at the end. 
Primary School Analyses 
 In 2008, developing countries had a slightly higher proportion of their primary school 
students enrolled in private schools than did advanced countries (15% v 11%). This difference, 
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however, was not statistically significant. Conversely, advanced countries spent a statistically 
significant 38% more on primary school students (as a percentage of GDP per capita) than 
developing countries. Based on these numbers, we would expect a naïve estimate of the impact 
of public spending on private enrolments to be negative (i.e. higher spending leads to lower 
private enrolments). However, there are many other significant differences in the demographic 
and economic characteristics of developing and advanced countries that must be accounted for in 
order to understand the true impact of spending on enrolments. For example, Table 2 shows that 
advanced countries have less fragile and corrupt governments, higher political stability and GDP 
per capita with a better human development index and less wealth inequality, smaller rural 
populations and less annual population growth, as well as less linguistic diversity. All of these 
variables are therefore used to predict differences in the private provision of primary education 
across countries. 
      Table 2: Mean Descriptives by Country Type: Primary Schools in 2008 
 (1) (2) 
 Developing Advanced 
 Mean Mean 
Private Primary (%) 15.23 10.92 
Per Pupil Expend (% GDP/percap) 14.87* 20.60* 
State Fragility 8.80* 0.96* 
GINI 44.03* 30.65* 
Religious Diversity 0.74 0.71 
Linguistic Diversity 0.47* 0.27* 
GDP Per Capita (USD) 7223.38* 37447.15* 
Corruption 3.48* 7.38* 
Pop. Rural (%) 48.33* 21.49* 
Pop. Growth Rate (annual %) 1.56* 0.84* 
Political Stability -0.26* 0.90* 
Pop. Total 22856306.84 34670931.85 
Pop. Density (per sq.km) 135.02 180.57 
Primary Enrolment 2868966.25 2332766.12 
HDI 0.60* 0.88* 
N 64 26 
       * p<0.05 (Mean difference) 
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 As assumed above, a naïve analysis (in which private schooling rates are regressed on per 
pupil expenditures with no additional controls) shows that increases in public spending lead to 
significantly lower rates of private enrolments (Table 3, model 1). More specifically, the naïve 
model shows that increasing spending from the average developing country level to the average 
advanced country level would mean an approximate 4% decrease in the private primary 
enrolment rate. However, prior research has shown that wealth (total and distribution), linguistic 
and religious heterogeneity and country status are all important predictors of educational 
privatization, so a ‘basic’ model was run to account for these covariates in addition to spending 
(Table 3, model 2).  The basic model shows that while linguistic diversity has a strongly 
significant positive impact on private enrolment rates, per pupil expenditures continue to have a 
significant negative effect (only marginally smaller than in the naïve model).  
 The last column in Table 3 shows the results of the ‘final’ model, which includes 
additional economic and demographic covariates from the broader privatization literature. By 
including these controls, the coefficient on spending is further reduced by approximately 25% to 
a non-significant -0.45. The coefficient on linguistic diversity, on the other hand, actually 
increases to 18.6 in this model—which means that a 1/5 of a standard deviation increase in 
linguistic diversity would lead to a 1 percent increase in private primary enrolments. 
Additionally, population density is found to have a significant positive impact on private 
enrolments, while population growth and state fragility both have marginally significant effects. 
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Table 3: OLS Models Predicting Private Enrolments: Primary Schools in 2008 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Naive Basic Final 
Per Pupil Expenditure -0.669* -0.591* -0.448 
 (0.262) (0.289) (0.302) 
GINI  0.243 0.112 
  (0.242) (0.245) 
Religious Diversity  0.899 4.329 
  (3.537) (3.865) 
Linguistic Diversity  14.642* 18.604** 
  (5.771) (6.417) 
Advanced (dummy)  2.631 -2.938 
  (7.520) (8.199) 
GDP Per Capita  0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Corruption   0.094 
   (1.922) 
State Fragility   -1.324t 
   (0.758) 
Pop. Rural (%)   -0.145 
   (0.120) 
Pop. Growth (%)   4.630t 
   (2.523) 
Political Stability   -4.779 
   (3.622) 
Pop. Density   0.020* 
   (0.008) 
Primary Enrolment   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Constant 25.051 5.153 13.863 
 (4.657) (12.534) (15.339) 
R2 
N 
.07 
90 
.16 
90 
.28 
90 
t p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
 In addition to the use of a large number of important covariates, this study has another 
advantage over prior work on the subject: the ability to analyze longitudinal data in order to 
examine effects over time. Table 4 shows that while the percent of private primary school 
students was the same across developing and advanced countries in 2002, by 2009 the gap had 
widened to more than 3.5%. This was due to both a decreasing rate in advanced countries and an 
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increasing rate in developing countries. During this same time, per pupil expenditures increased 
across all countries. Why, therefore, does it seem that spending decreased private enrolments in 
advanced countries but increased them in developing countries? 
Table 4: Mean Descriptives by Country Type: Primary Schools (By Year) 
 (1) (2) 
 Developing Advanced 
 Mean Mean 
Private Primary (%)   
2002 12.93 12.44 
2003 11.81 11.33 
2004 14.09 12.48 
2005 12.05 10.42 
2006 13.85 9.36 
2007 13.94 10.27 
2008 15.11 10.92 
2009 14.75 11.12 
Per Pupil Expenditure   
2002 12.91 19.37 
2003 13.81 20.05 
2004 13.35 20.00 
2005 14.56 19.86 
2006 14.28 20.09 
2007 14.69 20.04 
2008 14.73 20.60 
2009 14.73 22.80 
N 482 204 
 
 The naïve and OLS estimates in the basic longitudinal model are similar to those of the 
cross-sectional model, as shown in Table 5. On the other hand, the random effects model (which 
is assumed to be more efficient than pooled OLS) shows that the effect of per pupil expenditures 
disappears entirely and actually becomes positive (although statistically insignificant). The 
concern with panel data, however, is that there may be unobserved country effects that are 
constant over time and correlated with the observed covariates in the model, thus causing 
endogeneity bias. Therefore, a fixed effects model was also used. While a hausman test showed a 
significant difference in the models when run on the non-imputed data (providing evidence that 
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the random effects model is biased), the two models provide strikingly similar results on the 
imputed data4. The results from this approach show non-significant coefficients on all variables 
in the basic model. 
Table 5: Basic Models Predicting Private Enrolments: Primary Schools (2002-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Naive OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Per Pupil Expenditure -0.561* -0.557* 0.041 0.048 
 (0.138) (0.145) (0.037) (0.037) 
GDP Per Capita  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GINI  0.085 0.042 0.037 
  (0.198) (0.095) (0.099) 
Religious Diversity  1.780 1.314 0.066 
  (3.095) (1.387) (0.299) 
Linguistic Diversity  12.702* 11.015*  
  (4.747) (4.839)  
Advanced (dummy)  -3.251 -4.388  
  (4.428) (4.147)  
Constant 21.908 8.351 5.792 8.556 
 (2.814) (11.155) (5.169) (4.140) 
N 686 686 686 686 
Clustered standard errors in OLS/RE models. Robust standard errors in FE model. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 While these basic models are illustrative, it is important to also examine the results of the 
final models in Table 6. These models include the additional demographic and political 
covariates noted above, as well as dummy variables for each year in order to account for year 
effects. As with the basic models, some of the significant effects in the pooled OLS model are 
attenuated in the random and fixed effects models. Ultimately, in the more advanced longitudinal 
analyses (equations 6 and 7) there is only evidence of two significant predictors: population 
growth and linguistic diversity—both of which have positive effects on percent of private 
primary school enrolments. 
 
                                                      
4 A hausman test cannot be run on imputed data. Note that linguistic diversity and the advanced dummy are dropped 
from the fixed effects model because they do not vary over time. 
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Table 6: Final Models Predicting Private Enrolments: Primary Schools (2002-2009) 
 (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Per Pupil Expenditure -0.502* 0.012 0.010 
 (0.151) (0.038) (0.038) 
GINI -0.037 0.030 0.024 
 (0.162) (0.081) (0.087) 
Religious Diversity 4.027 1.720 0.143 
 (2.662) (1.702) (0.700) 
Corruption 1.609 -0.119 -0.197 
 (1.141) (0.216) (0.219) 
State Fragility -1.293* -0.092 -0.037 
 (0.566) (0.145) (0.153) 
Primary Enrolment -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. Rural (%) -0.140 -0.116 0.055 
 (0.094) (0.075) (0.131) 
Pop. Growth 4.480* 0.960* 0.862t 
 (1.828) (0.451) (0.462) 
Political Stability -5.660* 0.071 0.032 
 (1.897) (0.550) (0.532) 
Pop. Total 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. Density 0.018* 0.013 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.022) 
Linguistic Diversity 16.859* 12.736*  
 (5.219) (5.102)  
Advanced (dummy) -6.648 -2.765  
 (4.541) (4.092)  
Constant 15.664 10.188 12.395 
 (9.350) (5.523) (7.007) 
N 686 686 686 
Clustered standard errors in OLS/RE models. Robust standard errors in FE model.  
Year dummies included in all models (output surpressed)  
* p < 0.05 
 
Secondary School Analyses 
 In 2008, developing countries had a slightly higher proportion of their secondary school 
students enrolled in private schools than did advanced countries (20% v 16%). This difference, 
however, was not statistically significant. Conversely, advanced countries spent a statistically 
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significant 40% more on secondary school students (as a percentage of GDP per capita) than 
developing countries. Based on these numbers, we would expect a naïve estimate of the impact 
public spending on private enrolments to be negative (i.e. more spending leads to lower private 
enrolments). However, as with the analyses of the primary schools, there are many other 
significant differences in the demographic and economic characteristics of developing and 
advanced countries that must be accounted for in order to understand the true impact of spending 
on enrolments. For example, Table 7 shows that advanced countries have significantly less 
fragile and corrupt governments, higher political stability and GDP per capita with a better 
human development index and less wealth inequality, smaller rural populations, as well as less 
linguistic diversity. All of these variables are therefore used to predict differences in the private 
provision of secondary education across countries. 
Table 7: Mean Descriptives by Country Type: Secondary Schools in 2008 
 (1) (2) 
 Developing Advanced 
 Mean Mean 
Private Secondary (%) 20.17 15.96 
Per Pupil Expenditure (% GDP/percap) 19.00* 26.50 
State Fragility 8.07* 0.91 
GINI 44.13* 30.72 
Religious Diversity 0.77 0.71 
Linguistic Diversity 0.44* 0.28 
GDP Per Capita (USD) 8274.46* 37878.39 
Corruption 3.65* 7.31 
Pop. Rural (%) 42.39* 22.96 
Pop. Growth (annual %) 1.29 0.81 
Political Stability -0.22* 0.87 
Pop. Total 24490102.13 38000832.74 
Pop. Density (per sq.km) 120.80 142.40 
Secondary Enrolment 2019408.96 3038522.39 
HDI 0.64* 0.88 
N 54 23 
 
 Unlike in the primary school model, a naïve analysis (in which private schooling rates are 
regressed on per pupil expenditures with no additional controls) shows that increases in public 
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spending do not lead to significantly lower rates of private secondary enrolments (Table 8, model 
1). Furthermore, the basic model, which includes covariates for income inequality, religious and 
linguistic diversity, country wealth and a flag for advanced countries shows that none of these 
variables significantly impacts the rate of private secondary enrolment.  
 
Table 8: OLS Models Predicting Private Enrolments: Secondary Schools in 2008 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Naive Basic Final 
Per Pupil Expenditure -0.335 -0.357 -0.249 
 (0.256) (0.293) (0.282) 
GINI  0.267 0.226 
  (0.285) (0.294) 
Religious Diversity  -2.559 -3.465 
  (4.752) (4.576) 
Linguistic Diversity  10.755 9.090 
  (7.446) (7.373) 
Advanced (dummy)  11.769 4.724 
  (9.046) (8.008) 
GDP Per Capita  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Corruption   1.780 
   (1.993) 
State Fragility   -0.422 
   (0.748) 
Secondary Enrolment   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Pop. Rural (%)   -0.132 
   (0.156) 
Pop. Growth   8.595* 
   (2.670) 
Political Stability   -1.076 
   (4.522) 
Pop. Density   0.063* 
   (0.011) 
Constant 26.029 14.787 0.120 
 (5.838) (14.956) (17.845) 
R2 
N 
.02 
77 
.09 
77 
.48 
77 
* p < 0.05 
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 The last column in Table 8 shows the results of the ‘final’ model, which includes 
additional economic and demographic covariates from the broader privatization literature. By 
including these controls, the coefficient on spending is reduced by approximately 30% to a still 
non-significant -0.25. There are, however, two variables that are found to have significant effects 
in this final model: population growth and population density. The large coefficient on 
population growth shows that a one percent increase in annual population growth coincides with 
an 8.6% increase in private secondary enrolment rates. To put this into perspective, many 
African countries in this data set have annual population growth rates of 2-3% higher than the 
United States. An increase of this magnitude would mean a 17-25% increase in private 
enrolments.  
 In addition to the cross-sectional models, this section also reports the results from 
longitudinal analyses across 123 countries from 2002 to 2009. Table 9 shows that while there 
was some fluctuation across years, there was no systematic change in the private enrolment rates 
in developing or advanced from 2002 to 2009. During this same time period, per pupil 
expenditures increased across all countries, with more significant increases in advanced 
countries. Since not all countries are consistent across all time points, it is important to use more 
than simple mean differences to assess the impact of public spending on privatization.  
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Table 9: Mean Descriptives by Country Type: Secondary Schools (By Year) 
 (1) (2) 
 Developing Advanced 
 Mean Mean 
Percentage of private 
enrolment in secondary 
  
2002 18.40 16.81 
2003 15.34 17.69 
2004 18.58 17.96 
2005 15.65 15.23 
2006 18.92 14.68 
2007 18.65 15.84 
2008 19.68 15.96 
2009 18.79 17.40 
Public expenditure per 
pupil as percent of GDP 
per capita in secondary 
  
2002 19.38 24.60 
2003 20.35 24.74 
2004 18.23 25.80 
2005 18.92 25.75 
2006 21.36 25.77 
2007 18.90 25.48 
2008 18.76 26.50 
2009 21.15 28.57 
N 419 205 
 
 The naïve and OLS estimates for the basic longitudinal model are shown in Table 10. As 
opposed to the cross-sectional model where spending had no impact on private enrolments, it 
appears that there is evidence of a negative effect of spending on privatization in the panel data 
analyses. This is due in part to the larger number of data points—as the coefficients on spending 
in the first two models in Table 10 are nearly identical to those in Table 8 but they have smaller 
standard errors which now causes them to be significant. On the other hand, the random effects 
model (which, as we have noted previously, is assumed to be more efficient than pooled OLS) 
shows that the effect of per pupil expenditures disappears entirely and actually becomes positive 
(although statistically insignificant). The concern with panel data, however is that there may be 
unobserved country effects that are constant over time and correlated with the observed 
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covariates in the model, thus causing endogeneity bias. Therefore, a fixed effects model was also 
used. While a hausman test showed a significant difference in the models when run on the non-
imputed data (providing evidence that the random effects model is biased), the two models 
provide strikingly similar results on the imputed data5. The results from this approach show non-
significant coefficients on all variables in the basic model. 
Table 10: Basic Models Predicting Private Enrolments: Secondary Schools (2002-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Naive OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Per Pupil Expenditure -0.334* -0.373* 0.028 0.033 
 (0.163) (0.160) (0.025) (0.025) 
GDP Per Capita  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GINI  0.097 0.035 0.030 
  (0.296) (0.042) (0.041) 
Religious Diversity  -0.877 1.168 0.605 
  (3.213) (2.473) (2.706) 
Linguistic Diversity  11.043t 10.051t  
  (6.218) (5.225)  
Advanced (dummy)  6.303 -2.070  
  (5.261) (4.102)  
Constant 24.771 18.371 10.753 13.150 
 (4.488) (18.013) (4.037) (2.573) 
N 624 624 624 624 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 While these basic models are illustrative, it is important to also examine the results of the 
final models in Table 11. These models include the additional demographic and political 
covariates noted above, as well as dummy variables for each year in order to account for year 
effects. As with the basic models, a marginally significant public spending coefficient in the 
pooled OLS model is attenuated in the random and fixed effects models. Ultimately, in the fixed 
effects model (which is most appropriate due to concerns about country effects over time), there 
is evidence of only one significant predictor: population density. This coefficient shows that as 
                                                      
5 A hausman test cannot be run on imputed data. Note that linguistic diversity and the advanced dummy are dropped 
from the fixed effects model because they do not vary over time. 
 45 
population density within a country rises, private enrolment rates actually decrease—which is the 
opposite direction of the between-country coefficient in the cross-sectional model.  
 
Table 11: Final Models Predicting Private Enrolments: Secondary Schools (2002-2009) 
 (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Per Pupil Expenditure -0.265t 0.024 0.020 
 (0.157) (0.025) (0.024) 
GINI 0.140 0.023 0.027 
 (0.193) (0.049) (0.046) 
Religious Diversity 1.984 1.532 0.572 
 (2.875) (2.557) (2.708) 
Corruption 1.053 -0.246 -0.301 
 (1.145) (0.394) (0.393) 
State Fragility 0.225 0.259 0.241 
 (0.442) (0.157) (0.153) 
Secondary Enrolment -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. Rural (%) -0.129 -0.067 -0.105 
 (0.102) (0.090) (0.301) 
Pop. Growth 2.952* 0.112 0.306 
 (1.269) (0.307) (0.304) 
Political Stability -4.379t -1.227t -1.098 
 (2.459) (0.673) (0.609) 
Pop. Total 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. Density 0.040* 0.017 -0.070* 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.033) 
Linguistic Diversity 4.124 7.555  
 (6.577) (5.627)  
Advanced (dummy) 7.225 0.515  
 (5.102) (4.161)  
Constant 4.335 11.407 31.366 
 (9.411) (5.373) (13.218) 
N 624 624 624 
Clustered standard errors in OLS/RE models. Robust standard errors in FE model.  
Year dummies included in all models (output surpressed)  
* p < 0.05 
 46 
Level of Development  
Preliminary analyses showed the possibility of “cut-offs” at particular levels of 
development for certain predictors in the primary school model. In other words, while some 
predictors were significant for developing countries, they were statistically insignificant for 
advanced countries. As a result of these findings, I hypothesize that while public spending on 
education does not impact private enrolment rates across all countries, there may be a certain 
subset of countries for which increases in spending could decrease private enrolment rates. This 
is similar to the work of Heyneman & Loxley (1983) who found that the effect of school quality 
on student achievement was moderated by level of economic development. This type of work 
however, requires a definition of “development.” While the IMF does not use a specific metric 
for assigning development status to countries (IMF, 2012 – World Outlook), in my analyses I use 
the United Nations Development Programme’s human development index (HDI). This index is 
unique in that it combines indicators of health (i.e. life expectancy), educational attainment (i.e. 
mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling), and living standards (i.e. gross 
national income per capita). HDI was chosen over other measures because of its policy relevance 
and measurement of both social and economic development. 
Table 12 shows the results from these analyses. In the first model, which uses the 25th 
percentile of HDI as a cutoff for being considered “Low HDI”, we see that public spending on 
primary education has a significant negative effect on private primary enrolments. More 
specifically, a 1% increase per pupil expenditures as a percent of GDP per capita corresponds to 
an approximate 1% decrease in private enrolment rates. Model two shows that when using mean 
HDI as the cut-off, per pupil expenditures continue to have a significant negative impact on 
private enrolments. However, in the third model, which includes all 64 developing countries, the 
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coefficient decreases by approximately 40% and becomes non-significant. In other words, while 
spending was not found to have a significant impact on private enrolment rates across all 
countries (or even within developing countries), it appears that there is an effect for those 
countries with the lowest levels of development as measured by HDI. This finding is important 
for policy makers and aid organizations who are interested in increasing public primary 
enrolments in countries facing some of the most difficult economic hardships.   
Table 12: Private Primary Enrolments by Level of Development: 2008 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Low HDI Mean HDI Developing 
Per Pupil Expenditure -1.095* -1.056** -0.634 
 (0.385) (0.325) (0.384) 
GINI -0.547 -0.119 0.093 
 (0.418) (0.256) (0.286) 
Religious Diversity -18.670* -10.743* 2.989 
 (6.945) (4.872) (5.117) 
Linguistic Diversity 50.652** 28.263** 15.834t 
 (14.678) (7.543) (8.362) 
Corruption 3.116 -2.067 -1.371 
 (6.915) (3.830) (2.980) 
State Fragility 0.586 0.369 -1.222 
 (1.195) (0.919) (1.110) 
Primary Enrolment -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita -0.003 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pop. Rural (%) 0.184 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.250) (0.160) (0.164) 
Pop. Growth (%) -5.140 -2.359 4.877 
 (3.891) (2.983) (3.166) 
Political Stability 5.019 3.199 -2.962 
 (4.922) (3.992) (4.659) 
Pop. Density 0.061* 0.019t 0.014 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.013) 
Constant 29.040 37.415 13.821 
 (38.806) (17.779) (20.877) 
N 23 39 64 
t p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Sensitivity Analyses 
 Although there is no variable in this dataset to account for public spending for private 
education, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently 
produced a report that provides a breakdown of the share of public support to private schooling 
for OECD (and OECD partner countries) who took the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) exam in 2009 (OECD, 2012). Separate analyses were run for these countries 
in the 2009 data set, with the inclusion of the public assistance variable. While the amount of 
public spending on education was found to be a significant predictor of PISA achievement in 
naïve models, neither overall spending nor public spending on private education were found to 
have significant effects on test scores or private enrolment rates. This result was consistent for 
primary and secondary schools.  
 A second concern is with regard to inaccurate private enrolment data. Much recent work 
has shown not only that low cost private school enrolments are on the rise in developing 
countries but that their numbers are regularly underestimated by governments. This is due in 
large part to the fact that many low-fee schools are either unregistered entirely or registered as 
something other than a standard school with the Ministry of Education. In order to account for 
this concern, I ran sensitivity analyses in which I artificially increased private enrolment rates to 
assess the robustness of the initial findings to variations in underestimated private enrolment 
rates. While this approach has the limitation of assuming that all developing countries 
underreport in the same manner (and to the same extent), it provides one avenue of assessing the 
issue of underreporting. By artificially increasing private enrolment rates across developing 
countries (and separately for those with lowest levels of HDI) by as much as 25%, some 
coefficients changed in certain models but the substantive findings remained consistent. 
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 Additional sensitivity analyses were run to test the impact of lagged spending on private 
enrolments—with the hypothesis that changes in private enrolment rates may actually be a 
response to increases or decreases in spending from prior years. However, there was no evidence 
of additional effects from these lagged spending variables. Finally, all longitudinal models were 
re-estimated after accounting for singletons (i.e. countries that appear in the dataset for only one 
time period). Both the coefficients and standard errors changed slightly across models but once 
again, the substantive findings remained consistent.  
Discussion 
 Nearly 13 years ago, more than 100 countries met in Dakar, Senegal in order to sign a 
pledge to provide high-quality basic education for all children by the year 2015. As a result of 
this Education For All framework, governments and aid organizations in the majority of 
developing countries have increased their share of spending on public education since 2000. 
However, recent studies have found that despite these increases in spending, private schooling 
rates are on the rise across developing countries. Therefore, this study was undertaken to 
challenge the conventional understanding of the interplay between public funding and private 
provision of education (i.e. that higher levels of public funding will lead to lower levels of 
private enrolments). I hypothesized that while public spending on education is undoubtedly 
important, it should no longer be considered a significant predictor of differences in private 
schooling rates across countries. Ultimately, this study posits a new model for understanding 
educational privatization in primary and secondary schools, by incorporating traditional 
predictors such as spending, linguistic and religious heterogeneity and income distributions, with 
new measures such as political stability, corruption, population growth, population density and 
state fragility. This study is timely due to the fact that many education researchers and aid 
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organizations are currently debating the role of private education in developing countries. While 
some believe that private schools provide a complement to an overburdened public sector, others 
argue that the provision of basic educational services (particularly for those most in need) is the 
sole responsibility of the state and that the focus of aid and innovation should be on increasing 
public enrolments. For those in this latter category, it is important to know if increases in per 
pupil expenditures will effectively increase public enrolments or if other approaches may be 
more appropriate to meet their goals. 
 In the primary school analyses, I find an effect of public spending on private enrolment 
rates for both the naïve and basic cross-sectional models. However, once a more comprehensive 
set of covariates is included (which nearly doubles the amount of variance explained by the 
model), the effect becomes small and non-significant. This provides the first evidence in support 
of my hypothesis that conventional models of predicting private enrolment rates are no longer 
valid in today’s educational climate. This is further supported by similar non-significant 
coefficients on public spending across all final models (for both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analyses of primary and secondary schools). While the cross-sectional models show null effects 
of public spending on private enrolment rates across countries, the fixed effects models show 
that there is no evidence that increases in public spending over time within countries impact 
private enrolments. These results are due to both the availability of more extensive national-level 
data as well as recent changes in the provision and structure of private education in developing 
countries. These findings are groundbreaking in that they contradict the results of previous 
studies on educational privatization. 
 While public spending was once predictive of private enrolments, this study finds 
population growth and population density (as well as linguistic diversity) to be more appropriate 
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modern-day predictors. Interestingly, while population growth has a positive effect on private 
enrolment rates in all models (having at least marginal significance in three of four), population 
density has a positive effect in the cross-sectional models but a negative effect in the fixed 
effects model for secondary schools. In other words, increases in population always tend to be 
associated with increased private enrolments. This follows basic economic theory, which states 
that an oversupply of students will lead to an increased demand for schooling (much of which 
will be offered by the private sector when holding spending constant). However, while increased 
population density leads to increased privatization across countries (which follows the same 
explanation of supply and demand), it appears that increases in population density over time 
within countries actually leads to decreased rates of private schooling. One potential explanation 
for this phenomenon is that within a country’s borders, increased population density results from 
families moving from rural to urban areas where there are more public schooling options.  
 The final set of analyses for this study attempted to examine whether or not the effect of 
spending on private enrolment rates was moderated by economic development. In other words, 
despite the fact that there is no overall effect, is it possible that there is a particular level of 
economic development below which public spending on education is predictive of private 
enrolment rates? Since the coefficients on spending in the overall secondary school models were 
so far from significant, it was likely that if a moderated effect existed, it would only be found for 
primary schools. The natural first step was to see if there was an effect for developing countries. 
However, much like in the overall model the coefficient on spending was negative but 
insignificant. In order to further limit the sample based on level of development, I examined 
countries based on their human development index (HDI). Ultimately, when using mean HDI as 
the cut-off for economic development, per pupil expenditures had a significant negative impact 
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on private enrolments. Therefore, I find that while spending was insignificant across all countries 
(or even within developing countries), there is an effect for those countries with the lowest levels 
of development. This finding is critical for policy makers and aid organizations interested in 
increasing public primary enrolments in countries facing some of the most difficult economic 
hardships. While increased spending alone will not have a significant impact on public enrolment 
rates in the majority of countries, this is not the case for the most economically disadvantaged 
countries. Therefore, organizations seeking to increase public primary enrolments through 
spending should target their aid on countries with the lowest levels of economic development.  
 This study fills an important gap in the literature and provides policy makers and aid 
organizations with a more complete understanding of the role of spending (as well as many other 
economic and political factors) on educational privatization across the globe, by bringing to light 
new findings that contradict conventional wisdom about spending and public versus private 
schooling. This paper does not, however, make any claims about the relative value of public 
versus private education. While there is no evidence that spending or private enrolment rates 
have an impact on student achievement as measured by PISA reading and math assessments, 
these should be considered only preliminary findings. Much work is still needed on the impact of 
spending on educational attainment, as well as the quality of educational opportunities provided 
by private primary and secondary schools in developing countries. The next two chapters of this 
dissertation have been designed to address this latter issue. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE 
STATE OF SAO PAULO: HOW IMPORTANT IS TUITION? 
 
 Privatization has grown substantially in the developing world over the past few decades. 
Beginning in the 1980s as a result of mounting financial problems and increased pressure from 
bilateral and international aid organizations, increased use of non-government industries for the 
provision of historically government-provided services became a common theme across 
developing countries (Cowan, 1990). Initially, much of this growth began in the health and 
transportation sectors with the non-government provision of the education sector lagging behind. 
This primary focus on non-merit goods (i.e. goods that are provided based on an individual’s 
ability and willingness to pay (Musgrave, 1959)), followed the pattern of privatization in 
advanced countries that began decades, and in some cases centuries, earlier. However, while 
many economists argue that the private sector should not and cannot be responsible for the 
provision of merit goods such as education, particularly in developing countries, the rise of low-
fee private schools has been a distinct reality in the majority of developing countries since the 
mid-1990s (Phillipson, 2008; Srivastava & Walford, 2007; Srivastava, 2013). With this rapid 
expansion of low-fee schools, international and bilateral aid agencies have recently begun to 
evaluate the role of the sector in assisting countries to meet their Education for All goals. 
Ultimately, the decision about whether or not to assist private schools is based not only on the 
extent to which the public sector is failing but also on the belief that private schools can provide 
superior education with the benefits outweighing the costs (Tan, 1985). Therefore, this study has 
been designed to assess the quality of the private schooling sector (with a particular focus on 
low-tuition schools) in one of the world’s most rapidly developing countries. Using data from the 
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state of Sao Paulo, Brazil, this paper answers the question: What is the impact of private school 
enrolment on educational attainment in Brazil? Does this differ by level of tuition? Furthermore, 
do these results help to explain the country’s demand for private education in the face of 
increased government support for public education?  
Previous Studies on Private School Quality 
Many high-quality studies have been conducted on the impact of private schools in 
developing countries. On average, these studies have consistently found evidence of private 
school advantages on academic outcomes when compared with public schooling opportunities 
(Alcott & Ortega, 2009; Angrist et al, 2002; Asadullah, 2009; August & Valenzuela, 2003; Bedi 
& Garg, 2000; Cox & Jimenez, 1990; Das et al, 2006; Gallegos, 2004; Sapelli, 2003; Sapelli & 
Vial, 2002; Vandenberge & Robin, 2004). Although there have been exceptions to these 
findings, private schools in developing countries are typically purported to produce increased 
academic achievement, often with additional claims of greater efficiency (Bray, 1997; James et 
al, 1996; Lassibille & Tan, 2001; Lassibille & Tab, 2003; Tan & Sumra, 2000). However, while 
the literature on the private sector in general is vast, far fewer studies have specifically examined 
the impact of schools established to serve students from low-income families. This is due in large 
part to the relatively recent expansion of the sector, as well as difficulties in accessing accurate 
data. While the perceived quality of private low-cost schooling is high (which is the underlying 
assumption on which the majority of the school choice literature is based), there is little rigorous 
empirical evidence of the sector’s quality with regard to educational attainment.  
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Low-cost private school quality 
The majority of studies that have been conducted on the quality of low-cost private 
schools are either observational in nature or use convenience sampling from an existing list of 
schools in order to assess the impact of enrolment on educational outcomes. These studies are 
therefore illustrative but do not provide unbiased estimates of private school effects due to 
student self-selection into schools. For example, Fennell (2013) uses a non-random sample of 
youth and adult interviews in Pakistan in order to gain a better understanding of the perceptions 
of low-fee private schools in Sargodha and Charsadda. She ultimately concludes that private 
schools are perceived as having more dedicated teachers, more individualized attention and more 
accountability, while public schools benefit from better infrastructure and resources. Other 
studies have similarly found that lower teacher absenteeism and smaller class sizes were some of 
the greatest assets of private schools in Pakistan (Alderman et al, 2001; Andrabi et al, 2008). As 
far as school output is concerned, Das et al (2006) found private school students had higher test 
score results in mathematics, Urdu and English (after accounting for observable characteristics). 
Additionally, Asadullah (2009) found that private school students had future earnings advantages 
over public school students. Despite these findings, however, a Save the Children study 
ultimately concluded that while parents perceive private schools to be of higher quality than 
government schools, “on balance, children in private education institutions in Nepal and Pakistan 
are not provided with the quality of education as defined within the CRC6” (Save the Children, 
2002, p. 8). Mixed findings have also been found in Indonesia, where private schools for the 
poor have been argued to provide greater access than the public sector but where concerns are 
often raised about their quality (King, 1997; Heyneman & Stern, 2013). Voicing similar concerns 
                                                      
6 Convention on the Rights of the Child. For an explanation of the CRC’s measures of educational quality, see CRC 
Article 29. 
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about the quality of low-fee private schools in Malawi, Rose (2005) offers that limited 
government control over educational privatization resulted in “the mushrooming of low-cost, 
low-quality unregistered schools” (p. 164). Although this conclusion is based on significant 
differences in test scores, it is important to note that these were simple mean differences with no 
additional covariates in the model.  
On the more positive end of the quality spectrum, Tooley and Dixon (2005) found 
achievement gains for low-cost private school students when compared with similar public 
school students in India, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, after controlling for a variety of background 
characteristics. In India, Tooley and Dixon (2005) found that private schools had lower teacher 
absenteeism and ultimately concluded that there were significant gains in math, English and 
Hindi for private, unaided students. Similar results were found in Nigeria for math, English and 
social studies. Based on work conducted in Ghana’s Ga district, they found that raw test scores 
for private school students (in both registered and unregistered schools) were higher than their 
public school counterparts in mathematics, English and religious/moral education. Once again, 
however, it should be noted that such mean differences in test scores (even with controls for 
student backgrounds) do not account for the fact that there are likely to be differences between 
those students who choose to enroll in private schools and those who decide to remain in the 
public system. While the authors offer that there is forthcoming work using a Heckman selection 
procedure to account for selection bias, eight years later no such results are available. In a more 
recent re-analysis of Tooley and Dixon’s 2005 study in Kenya, Dixon et al (2013) find that 
private school students scored better in math and Kiswahili than their public school counterparts, 
based on a multilevel model (which provides some benefits over their original analyses but still 
neglects to take selection into account). Stern and Heyneman (2013) also offer that low-fee 
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private schools throughout Kenya appear to be performing at least as well as their nearby public 
school counterparts on national exams. Heyneman and Stern (2013) assert that similar results 
were found in Jamaica—although both papers are based on a larger study that used convenience 
sampling and are therefore subject to the same concerns about selection as the rest of the studies 
in this section.  
Ultimately, while these studies have been important for examining low-cost private 
schools in developing countries, none have provided rigorous enough sampling or analyses to 
convincingly find unbiased private school effects. It is this gap in the literature that this study 
seeks to address, using a comprehensive, longitudinal dataset on secondary students in the state 
of Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
Private schools in Brazil 
Although no studies have been conducted to assess the quality of low-cost private schools 
in Brazil, several important studies on private school quality do exist. In 1990, Lockheed and 
Bruns used a multilevel modeling procedure to examine achievement differences between public 
and private secondary school students. They ultimately found that private school students 
outperformed public school students in mathematics and concluded that this was in large part a 
result of peer composition and self-selection into high-SES private schools (Lockheed & Bruns, 
1990). This study was, however, undertaken at a time when funding for public schools was 
extremely low and only the wealthiest of students could afford to attend private school. This is 
quite a departure from Brazil’s modern educational make-up.  
Somers et al (2004) used a 1997 UNESCO assessment of nationally representative third 
and fourth grade students to assess the impact of private schools on language and mathematics 
achievement in Brazil. While they initially found significant advantages for private school 
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students in both subjects, they concluded that after accounting for peer characteristics, the private 
school effect became negative (and non-significant).  This finding was consistent across ten of 
the thirteen countries studied and it provides further support to a relatively large literature on the 
importance of peer effects for educational attainment.  
Another more recent high-quality study on private schools in Brazil came from 
Vandenberghe & Robin (2004). Using PISA 2000 results, this study employed three methods to 
account for selection bias (instrumental variables, Heckman’s two-stage approach and propensity 
score matching). While they found a consistently positive private school advantage on 
mathematics, the results were mixed for science and reading (with insignificant differences in the 
propensity matching models).  
While all three of these studies provide high-quality assessments of the private schooling 
sector in Brazil, there are significant limitations with regard to their relevance for today’s 
educational climate. First,, all of these studies used external assessments from 2000 or earlier. 
Additionally, none of the studies used high-stakes examinations or assessments that would be 
tied to public or private school curricula. Lastly, these studies examine the overall impact of 
private schools but do not provide any information about the quality of the burgeoning low-cost 
private sector. The current study serves as an important addition to the literature by addressing 
all three of these issues.  
Brazilian Context 
Located in eastern South America, Brazil is the fifth most populous country in the world 
with over 200 million residents. The official and most widely spoken language is Portuguese and 
approximately 90% of the population self-identify as Christians (CIA, 2012). While Brazil saw a 
yearly decrease in GDP of approximately 4% and an unprecedented inflation rate of over 4000% 
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in 1990, its economy has made an impressive recovery over the past two decades and the country 
is now considered to be South America’s leading economic power (Triami, 2012).  
The largest city in Brazil (and in the Americas) is Sao Paulo. With a municipal 
population of over 11 million and a metropolitan population of nearly 20 million, Sao Paulo 
ranks seventh in the world by population (IBGE, 2010). As of 2011, there were 5,500 schools 
and 7 million students enrolled in primary and secondary schools in Sao Paulo, making the 
student body roughly the same size as the entire population of Hong Kong (Menezes-Filho & 
Tavares, 2011).  
Education – Structure 
Education in Brazil is highly centralized and overseen by the federal Ministry of 
Education. More specifically, all schools must meet the rules and regulations set out in the 1996 
national education law. This law, which was created in order to “establish the guidelines and 
bases for national education” provides detailed information about the structure of school 
leadership, educational goals, guidelines for establishing and registering a new school and rules 
regarding monitoring and reporting (Cardoso, 1996, p.1). Although private schools do not 
receive public funding in Brazil, they are required to follow the national education law, which 
offers the coexistence of public and private schools as one of its founding principles. 
Accordingly, unlike in many other countries, teachers and school leaders are required to have the 
same training and qualifications as public school teachers in order to gain employment in private 
schools. However, there are several ways in which private schools are considered to have more 
flexibility than public schools. Aside from charging tuition (which is actually regulated by the 
MOE), they are also able to define their own pedagogical approach and can accept any students 
who wish to attend—unlike the public sector, where students are required to attend the school 
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located nearest their home (AngloINFO, 2012). Additionally, private school students are not 
required to take the same national or state examinations as public school students7.  
In the state of Sao Paulo, there are two main examinations that are taken by primary and 
secondary school students enrolled in public schools: the Sistema de Avalaiacao de Rendimento 
Escolar do Estado de Sao Paulo (SARESP) and the Exame Nacional do Ensino Medio (ENEM). 
Both will be used for this study and therefore will be discussed in detail. 
Introduced initially in all grades in 2005, the SARESP is a high-stakes exam (i.e. used for 
grade advancement) that has been given to public school students in grades 2, 4, 6, 8 and 11 
since 2007. It is possible for a student to take the exam a second time if they do not make a 
proficient score (i.e. 50 percent), although this is at the discretion of the school (Ferrer, 2006). 
The exam originally tested students in reading, mathematics and Portuguese language although it 
has tested reading, math, science and humanities since 2008. Lastly, SARESP results are 
publicized by the state government and are used to calculate each school’s IDESCP, which is the 
official quality index that is used in the state’s pay for performance program instituted in 2008 
(Menezes-Filho & Tavares, 2011). 
The ENEM is an end of high school exam that was introduced by the Ministry of 
Education in 1998. Although some refer to this as a high school exit exam, I prefer the term “end 
of high school exam” because it is voluntary and not an actual requirement for graduation from 
secondary school. While the ENEM started as a low-stakes exam, this began to change in 2004 
with the introduction of the ProUni (College for All) federal scholarship program—as ENEM 
became the main criterion for scholarship award. This award is only available to students 
attending tuition-free high schools. However, many universities in the country began to use 
                                                      
7 This has, not surprisingly, made it difficult for researchers to undertake studies that assess the quality of the private 
school sector in Brazil. 
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ENEM scores as part of the application/decision process for university acceptance. While paying 
to attend a private high school will exclude a student from receiving the ProUni, the choice is 
likely made in the hopes of raising test scores and securing a place in a more prestigious 
university. ENEM results are public and highly publicized—increasing the need for private 
schools to keep scores up (at least relative to their competitors and nearby public schools). The 
exam is comprised of two sections: an “objective” (i.e. multiple choice) section and a writing 
section. 
Education – Secondary Schools 
Regardless of private/public status, the education system is broken down into four 
sections: pre-school (educacao infantil), primary (ensino fundamental), secondary (ensino 
medio) and higher education (ensino superior). Under the current structure, secondary schools 
consist of grades 9-11 and are typically for students aged 15 to 18.  
Less than twenty five years ago, secondary school in Brazil “was considered to be the 
most forgotten education level…[and] geared for the education of the elites” (Brock & 
Schwartzman, 2004, p. 89). Accordingly, the secondary gross enrolment rate was only 33.3 in 
1980 and private school enrolments accounted for nearly half of the overall secondary school 
enrolments in that year. With large investments by the Brazilian government throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the proportion of private secondary school students dropped to 12% by 1999 
and the country’s gross enrolment rate reached 100% by 2003 (UNESCO, 2012). These 
investments in secondary education continued to increase over the next decade, when the 
government increased public spending per pupil as a percent of GDP per capita from 9.5% in 
1999 to 19.5% in 2008 (World Bank, 2012). Private secondary enrolment rates grew slightly 
during that time from 12% to 13%. 
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Overall, Brazil has relatively low private secondary school enrolments compared to the 
rest of Latin America but the sector has steadied over the past decade and remains an important 
option for both high and low-income families who feel that the public sector is not meeting their 
needs. Also, unlike its South American neighbors, private secondary schools in Brazil are not a 
purely urban phenomenon. However, private secondary enrolment rates are higher in Sao Paulo 
than they are in the country as a whole. According to INEP data from 2006, the national private 
secondary enrolment rate was approximately 12% while 14% of Sao Paulo’s secondary students 
were enrolled in private schools (INEP, 2012). While there have been increasing numbers of 
low-tuition private primary and secondary schools in Brazil over the past few decades, no studies 
have examined the impact of these schools. 
Theory and Model Specification 
 
 As expected, simple mean comparisons of achievement test results between public and 
private school secondary students in Brazil demonstrate that, on average, those attending private 
schools achieve at higher levels than their public school counterparts (INEP, 2012). Although 
this difference could be the result of greater efficiency and test preparation by private schools, it 
is also possible that there are other factors impacting both private school enrolment and academic 
achievement. For example, students who choose to enroll in private schools may have more 
highly motivated and/or involved parents, which would also likely be associated with higher test 
scores. Therefore, a naïve comparison between these two groups may well be picking up inherent 
differences in the student populations that are unrelated to the effectiveness and preparation of 
the private schools themselves. This self-selection concern holds for both traditional private 
enrollees, as well as public to private transfer students. Accordingly, I compare achievement 
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results for public to private transfer students with scores of very similar public school stayers in 
order to find an accurate estimate of the effect of private schooling on academic achievement in 
Brazil.  
  Using a standard counterfactual model, there are two potential outcomes for any 
individual: Y1 and Y0 (Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1974). In this model, Y1 represents the outcome for 
students who transfer to a private school, while Y0 represents the outcome for that same student 
if he/she were unable to transfer (i.e. remained a public school stayer). The causal impact of 
private school transfer, therefore, is simply the difference between these two outcomes (Smith & 
Todd, 2001): 
Δ = Y1 – Y0 
 Unfortunately, we can never observe both of these outcomes for the same individual. 
While causal inference is based on the difference between what happened to an individual 
compared with what would have happened had that individual been in the other group, I can only 
observe students who transferred to a private school and those who remained in the public sector. 
Accordingly, I will let z = 1 represent those students who transferred, while z = 0 represents 
those who did not. However, there are likely to be factors beyond the simple act of transfer (or 
enrolment in private schools) that explain the academic outcomes for these students. These 
additional factors can be summarized as a vector of student characteristics, x. The mean impact 
of the average treatment on the treated (ATT) estimates the effect for those receiving treatment 
(i.e. private schooling) compared with what the outcome for these individuals would have been 
had they not received treatment. ATT (Smith & Todd, 2001) can be expressed as: 
ATT = E(Δ | x, z = 1) = E(y1 – y0 | x, z = 1) = 
E(y1|x, z = 1) – E(y0|x, z = 1) 
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 While I have complete data on the mean outcomes for the treated group [E(y1|x, z=1)], I 
am unable to obtain data on the counterfactual outcome for this same group [E(y0|x, z=1)]. In a 
randomized study, these data are provided in the control group, assuming randomization across x 
(Heckman et al., 1998). In a non-randomized study such as this one, researchers have 
implemented several different approaches such as instrumental variables, Heckman’s model for 
accounting for selection in treatment, and regression discontinuity designs (Heckman, 1979; 
Imbens & Lemieux, 2008).  
 For this study, I employ matching techniques, which involve a comparison of the treated 
group with a selected subset of the control group (i.e. those who did not receive treatment). The 
basic idea behind matching is to replace the average outcome of the counterfactual group [E(y0|x, 
z=1)] with outcomes from a subset of the untreated population whose observable characteristics 
(x) are as close as possible to those of the treated group. In essence, the following assumption is 
being made: 
Δ = E(y1 – y0 | z = 1) = 
E(y1 | z = 1) – Ep|z=1Ey(y | z = 1, p) = 
E(y1 | z = 1) – Ep|z=1Ey(y | z = 0, p) 
 Where p is defined as the propensity to receive treatment, or in the case of this study, the 
probability that a student transfers to a private school. The propensity p is defined as a function 
of x (Smith & Todd, 2001): 
PR(z = 1 | x) ,     0 < p < 1     ∀x 
 There is one final assumption that needs to be met in order for this approach to be valid. 
The observed information about individuals contained in x must be sufficient to support the 
following assertion:  
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Y ⊥ z | x 
 The basic idea behind this conditional independence assumption is that once the 
information from x is taken into account, there is no additional information about the outcome 
that can be obtained simply from knowing whether or not an individual was in the treatment 
group. This is a strong assumption but it can and will be tested. Once this assumption is met, it is 
possible to use the outcome of the untreated group (conditional on x) as the equivalent of the 
counterfactual outcome: 
E(y0 | z = 1, p) ≡ E(y0 | z = 0, p) 
 In this study, I utilize four different methods to estimate the treatment effect. First, I 
estimate a standard OLS regression, controlling for a set of covariates. Since these estimates do 
not meet the assumptions noted above, they are used primarily as baseline estimates for the 
models which incorporate matching techniques.  
 Due to the large sample and abundance of covariates, exact matching is not feasible for 
this study. Therefore, the second estimate of the treatment effect employs a matching method 
that uses a Mahalanobis metric. The Mahalanobis method was invented prior to the method of 
propensity score matching and is a multivariate method of measuring the distance between two 
matrices (Guo et al, 2005). In this approach, I have combined the Mahalanobis metric with a 
caliper from the propensity score. The first step is to run a logit model with treatment as the 
dependent variable. This provides a probability (or propensity) for being in the treatment group. 
Calipers are then established for the purpose of designating how close probabilities should be in 
order for a match to be made. According to the literature, an appropriate caliper is ¼ of a 
standard deviation of the propensity score (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). In this method, all 
subjects are randomly ordered and the first treated subject is selected. Non-treated subjects 
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within the predefined caliper are then selected and the subject with the minimized Mahalanobis 
distance is then selected as a match. In other words, students who transferred to private school 
are matched with public school stayers who have the smallest Mahalanobis distance between 
them within a given caliper. This method is argued to produce the best balance of covariance 
between the two groups (Guo et al, 2006).  
The third method used to estimate a treatment effect is a nearest neighbor propensity 
score matching approach. Once again a propensity score is calculated and a caliper is 
determined. This time, however, each treated subject is matched with a predetermined number of 
non-treated subjects. I begin by matching each transfer student with five public stayers (which 
has become the industry standard) but I also run analyses for single matches and ten matches in 
order to assess the impact of choosing the “correct” number of matches. 
The fourth and final method used for this study is kernel matching. Unlike the 
mahalanobis and nearest neighbor approaches, which use calipers to determine a small number 
of matches (as few as one per treated case), the kernel matching algorithm is based on a 
nonparametric regression model and therefore allows for the use of as many of the control cases 
as possible. By calculating a weighted average of the outcome for all non-treated participants and 
differencing it from the outcome of the treated case, a treatment effect is estimated across all 
treated and non-treated cases (with the latter being down-weighted based on their distance from 
each treated case).  
Finally, it should be noted that all analyses use standard errors that are clustered at the 
school level (using the school in which students are tested). This is done because there is reason 
to believe that errors within schools are likely to be dependent on one another. 
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Data 
The data used for this study were obtained from a variety of restricted-use, longitudinal 
datasets for primary and secondary school students in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Specifically, 
four datasets on secondary school students and schools from 2005-2007 were used for the 
purpose of this investigation. The first dataset included pre-test scores (SARESP), as well as 
demographic and background information on all public school students throughout the state. This 
dataset was combined with matriculation data, which provided demographic information for 
private school students. Additionally, I incorporated ENEM scores for all students (public and 
private) from a third dataset and merged it with the final dataset which included tuition data for 
private schools in Sao Paulo.  
Sample 
 While various samples are used throughout the analyses, the most comprehensive sample 
consists of public school students enrolled in ninth or tenth grade in 2005. These students were 
then followed for two years in order to assess drop-outs, repetition, transfers to private schools 
and ENEM test takers in 2006 and 2007. Ninth and tenth grade public school students in 2005 
were chosen because only these students could provide baseline data and still be followed 
through the 11th grade ENEM. Final analyses are conducted on a sample of 137,012 students 
with objective outcome test score data (1527 of whom are transfer students; 110 low-fee) and 
129,915 students with writing outcome test score data (1476 of whom are transfer students; 109 
low-fee). The control groups in these final samples consist only of students enrolled in public 
schools from which students transferred to private schools in 2006 or 2007. This decision is 
supported by previous work on charter schools by the Center for Research on Education 
Outcome (CREDO) at Stanford University (CREDO, 2009). In order to account for year effects, 
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an overall model is run with dummy variables for year and individual models are run by grade 
(which is a proxy for year based on the setup of the data). Sensitivity analyses are also run for 
more comprehensive and restricted samples—all of which are discussed later in this paper. 
Additionally, although there was missing data for a number of variables in each of the samples 
tested, it was minimal for each individual variable. In order to avoid the bias that might be 
induced by casewise deletion, I re-estimate all models after multiple imputation of the missing 
data (Little & Rubin, 2002). 
Dependent Variable(s) 
The dependent variable for these analyses is an optional end of high school exam that is 
available to all graduating secondary school students. The ENEM is intended to measure five 
different competencies (among them language fluency, problem fluency and building arguments) 
but there is little information on these competencies and typically only overall scores are 
reported.  There are, however, two main sections of the exam: writing and “objective” (i.e. 
multiple choice). While treatment and independent variables are the same across models, 
separate models are run for each section of the ENEM. Although the models for each dependent 
variable are identical, sample sizes do change slightly across models, as some students only take 
the writing or objective section. Since no comparisons are being made across models, different 
samples are not problematic for drawing any conclusions in this study.  
Treatment Variable 
 Most broadly, the treatment variable for this study is transfer from a public to private 
secondary school. Any student enrolled in ninth or tenth grade in a public school in 2005 who 
transferred to a private school in 2006 or 2007 was be placed into the treatment group (regardless 
of whether or not they transferred back to a public school in a later year). This provides us with 
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intent to treat effects. In order to answer the question about the impact of low-tuition private 
schools, separate analyses were run with a treatment group consisting only of those students who 
transferred to a private school with tuition below the 50th percentile of the tuition distribution. 
This cutoff was chosen because it equals the monthly minimum wage in Sao Paulo and it 
provides a large enough treatment group to conduct the same analyses as those conducted on the 
full sample.  
Control Variables 
 After conducting naïve analyses, control variables are introduced into the OLS and 
matched models in order to obtain more accurate estimates of the impact of private schools on 
academic achievement.  
 Three pretest measures are used for this study. In 2005 all public school students in Sao 
Paulo took the SARESP exam, which consisted of separate tests in mathematics, writing and 
Portuguese language. While the math and Portuguese exams were scored continuously (on a 
scale of 1 to 100), the writing test was scored by level of proficiency (from 0 to 3—with 0 being 
insufficient and 3 signifying advanced status). All three tests are used as baseline achievement 
across all models. 
 Income data was not collected for students in Sao Paulo until 2007. Therefore, the main 
socio-economic measures for this study consist of race, parental education and a variety of 
household characteristics. Although race in Brazil is much more closely related to skin color than 
ethnicity, the SARESP questionnaire only provided the options of white, black, brown, Asian, 
indigenous and no race. Approximately 90% of the final sample self-identified as white or brown 
with an additional 8% identifying as black. Parental education was recorded separately for 
mothers and fathers and was operationalized as a categorical variable with the following levels: 
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no school, primary education (or less), secondary education, college and beyond. Family size is 
also included as a demographic control (i.e. number of people living in the student’s house, 
including the student). Additionally, there are a number of household items which are used as a 
proxy for income: number of tvs, dvd players, computers, washing machines, cell phones and 
bathrooms, as well as the availability of piped water, electricity, newspapers/magazines, 
dictionaries and internet access at home. Also, car ownership is used as an excluded instrument 
in a Heckman selection model that is run as a sensitivity analysis.  
 The final demographic controls used for this study are gender and age (as well as age-
squared). Additionally, grade repetition, number of years in a private school (which can only be 
one or two for treatment group members) and year dummies are used in some models. Several of 
these controls become irrelevant when analyses are conducted by cohort (e.g. year/grade).  
Results 
 By separately examining the effects of all private schools and low-fee private schools on 
two different outcomes (i.e. objective and writing scores), this study contains four main sets of 
analyses. In order to simplify the presentation of these results, this section will be divided into 
two parts: overall private school analyses and low-fee private school analyses. Results from the 
objective test for overall private schools will be presented first, followed by results from the 
writing exam. The same pattern will then be followed for analyses of low-fee private schools. 
Private Schools (All) - Objective 
 On average, private school students scored about 14 points (or nearly a full standard 
deviation) higher on the Objective section of the ENEM exam than their public school 
counterparts. However, we would expect much of the difference in test scores to be accounted 
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for by factors such as prior achievement, parental education and home resources. For example, 
Table 13 shows that private school students tended to perform better on all three pre-tests (i.e. 
Portuguese, math and writing), are more likely to have internet in their homes and have 
significantly higher levels of both maternal and paternal education.  
Table 13: Descriptives by Private School Status: Objective Exam8 
 Public Private Total 
Objective 40.15 54.29 40.31 
 (14.26) (16.35) (14.36) 
Portuguese 61.51 69.55 61.60 
 (13.08) (11.85) (13.10) 
Math 36.45 43.46 36.53 
 (10.05) (12.55) (10.11) 
Writing 1.596 1.911 1.600 
 (1.016) (1.001) (1.016) 
Age 15.62 15.14 15.61 
 (1.339) (0.634) (1.334) 
Male 0.395 0.403 0.395 
 (0.489) (0.491) (0.489) 
White 0.611 0.754 0.613 
 (0.487) (0.431) (0.487) 
Black 0.0735 0.0257 0.0730 
 (0.261) (0.158) (0.260) 
Brown 0.286 0.168 0.285 
 (0.452) (0.374) (0.451) 
Asian 0.0198 0.0435 0.0201 
 (0.139) (0.204) (0.140) 
Indigenous 0.00814 0.00642 0.00812 
 (0.0899) (0.0799) (0.0898) 
Internet 0.409 0.716 0.413 
 (0.492) (0.451) (0.492) 
Mother Ed 1.618 2.102 1.623 
 (0.743) (0.782) (0.745) 
Father Ed 1.633 2.125 1.639 
 (0.757) (0.783) (0.759) 
Grade Repeat 0.0259 0.0193 0.0258 
 (0.159) (0.138) (0.158) 
N 121586 1401 122987 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses  
 
                                                      
8 Many covariates have been suppressed in this table in order to save space. Internet has been included as a proxy for 
home resources. A full table can be found in the appendix. 
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 In order to account for these differences, an OLS regression was run with a large set of 
controls (see appendix for full list). These results are shown in Table 14, model 2. By adding 
controls to the model, the private school effect is reduced from 14.14 to 4.99 points. However, 
due to self-selection into private schools, it is likely that there are some unobserved 
characteristics (such as motivation) that are correlated with both selection into private schools 
and a student’s score on their end of high school exam. One way to mitigate against this bias is to 
balance treatment and control samples through propensity score matching.  
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Table 14: Models for All Private Schools: Objective  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Nearest 
Neighbor 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Kernel Kernel 
Private 14.143*  4.658*  4.416*  4.766*  
 (0.384)  (0.610)  (0.481)  (0.443)  
Private  4.993*  4.742*  4.530*  4.425* 
  (0.352)  (0.455)  (0.369)  (0.345) 
Controls  X  X  X  X 
Observations 122987 2758 7784 122954 
R2 0.563 0.532 0.541 0.548 
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.527 0.540 0.548 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05 
 
 
 
Table 15: Models for All Private Schools with Interactions by Year: Objective  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Nearest 
Neighbor 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Kernel Kernel 
Private 14.143*  4.658*  4.416*  4.766*  
 (0.384)  (0.610)  (0.481)  (0.443)  
Private  2.373*  3.255*  3.133*  3.041* 
  (0.500)  (0.691)  (0.547)  (0.506) 
Private*2007  3.768*  2.130*  1.995*  1.998* 
  (0.630)  (0.893)  (0.699)  (0.641) 
Controls  X  X  X  X 
Observations 122987 2758 7784 122954 
R2 0.563 0.533 0.542 0.549 
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.528 0.540 0.548 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05 
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 The results from three different matching methods are presented in Table 14, models 3 
through 8. Specifically, models 3, 5 and 7 provide a standard estimate of the average treatment 
effect on the treated for the mahalanobis, nearest neighbor and kernel matching models, 
respectively. These three methods each begin with the calculation of a conditional probability of 
being in a private school (for all students) but differ in the algorithm that is ultimately used for 
matching private (treatment) and public (control) students. Next, t-tests of group equivalence 
were run in order to assess balance across matched samples (the full results of which can be 
found in Appendix A at the end of this chapter). Balance was found across all but one variable in 
the Mahalanobis model and across all variables for the other two balancing metrics. Models 4, 6, 
8 provide the corresponding estimates for each matching algorithm after re-running a regression 
with the inclusion of all covariates. While we would not expect these models to differ greatly 
from one another, the additional step of adding covariates back into the model is taken in order to 
ensure balance across treatment and control groups. This allows us to have the greatest assurance 
of bias reduction. Table 14 shows a slight reduction in the private school effect for all matching 
methods, as compared with the original OLS model (column 2). However, all models still show a 
statistically significant private school effect of approximately 4.5 points. In other words, 
attending a private school is found to increase objective test scores by about 4.5 points (which is 
nearly 1/3 of a standard deviation).  
 More interesting than the overall effect, however, is the fact that the effect is moderated 
by year. Table 15 shows that the effect of attending a private school on objective scores is 
estimated to be approximately 3 points in 2006 but that there is an additional 2 point effect for 
private school students in 2007. Further analyses indicate that the interaction effect is more than 
just the effect of being in a private school for an additional year. While the inclusion of a dummy 
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variable for those students enrolled in a private school for two years is significant (and does 
reduce the interaction term slightly), the additional effect of taking the exam in 2007 remains 
positive and significant. This provides some evidence that private schools may have altered their 
pedagogy or approach to test preparation for the 2007 school year. Possible explanations and 
implications are offered in the discussion section.  
Private Schools (All) - Writing 
 The large difference in test scores for public and private school students that was so 
apparent on the objective exam, appears to be much smaller for the writing exam. Table 16 
shows that the mean difference on the writing exam between public and private school students 
is approximately 4.5 points. While there is slightly less variation in writing scores overall, this 
seems insufficient to explain the significantly smaller mean difference—especially since the 
differences across the other covariates in Table 16 are strikingly similar to those in Table 13. 
Therefore by adding pre-test, demographic and economic controls to our regression model, we 
would expect a similarly large reduction in the effect from the naïve estimate. 
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Table 16: Descriptives by Private School Status: Writing Exam 
 Public Private Total 
Writing 54.88 59.28 54.93 
 (12.15) (12.31) (12.16) 
Portuguese 62.00 69.69 62.09 
 (12.92) (11.85) (12.93) 
Math 36.66 43.46 36.74 
 (10.10) (12.52) (10.16) 
Writing 1.622 1.907 1.625 
 (1.012) (1.002) (1.012) 
Age 15.58 15.13 15.58 
 (1.279) (0.624) (1.275) 
Male 0.387 0.397 0.387 
 (0.487) (0.489) (0.487) 
White 0.614 0.750 0.616 
 (0.487) (0.433) (0.486) 
Black 0.0727 0.0266 0.0722 
 (0.260) (0.161) (0.259) 
Brown 0.285 0.171 0.284 
 (0.452) (0.377) (0.451) 
Asian 0.0193 0.0435 0.0196 
 (0.138) (0.204) (0.139) 
Indigenous 0.00799 0.00664 0.00798 
 (0.0890) (0.0813) (0.0890) 
Internet 0.411 0.714 0.415 
 (0.492) (0.452) (0.493) 
Mother Ed 1.621 2.094 1.627 
 (0.742) (0.781) (0.745) 
Father Ed 1.638 2.120 1.643 
 (0.757) (0.785) (0.759) 
Grade Repeat 0.0247 0.0199 0.0247 
 (0.155) (0.140) (0.155) 
N 115727 1355 117082 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses  
 As expected, column 2 from Table 17 shows that the addition of these control variables 
reduced the private school effect to approximately 1.7 points. Unlike in the objective analyses, 
however, the propensity score matching models do not provide a further reduction of the 
treatment effect for writing scores. Although samples for each method are balanced across all 
variables based on post-estimation bias reduction (see Appendix A), these matching models do 
no appear to provide any further reduction of bias as compared with the OLS model. One 
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possible reason for this result is that there is a significant amount of ‘overlap’ in the sample. 
Prior research has shown that when there is a large amount of overlap (i.e. many subjects with 
similar conditional probabilities in both treatment and control), pooled OLS estimates can 
actually be more efficient than propensity score matching models. This is due to the fact that 
propensity scores are based only on observed covariates and that overlap causes OLS samples to 
be balanced (on said covariates) even without matching. Ultimately, all models show that there is 
a private school effect of approximately 1.7-1.8 points on the writing exam. Although a 
moderation model similar to the one used for the objective analyses was tested, there were no 
significant interaction effects by year. It should be noted, however, that while the variables 
included in the objective analyses accounted for more than half of the variance in objective test 
scores, these same variables only appear to account for approximately 12-13% of the variation in 
writing scores. In other words, more than 85% of the variation in writing test scores cannot be 
accounted for with the variables in these models.   
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Table 17: Models for All Private Schools: Writing  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Nearest 
Neighbor 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Kernel Kernel 
Private 4.399*  1.868*  1.849*  1.834*  
 (0.332)  (0.477)  (0.372)  (0.340)  
Private  1.682*  1.965*  1.864*  1.740* 
  (0.335)  (0.456)  (0.364)  (0.335) 
Controls  X  X  X  X 
Observations 117080 2668 7469 117051 
R2 0.135 0.141 0.126 0.128 
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.132 0.122 0.128 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05 
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Low-fee Private Schools  - Objective 
 Although a private school effect was found for both the objective and writing exams 
across all private schools, one of the main contributions of this paper is an examination of the 
low-fee private schooling sector. Table 18 shows that while students in low-fee private schools 
do not perform as well on the objective exam as students across all private schools (see table 13), 
they outperform public school students by more than 10 points. As with the overall private 
school sample, low-fee private school students tend to have higher pre-test scores in Portuguese, 
mathematics and writing. They also tend to be slightly wealthier (with regard to home resources) 
with higher levels of parental education. Lastly, low-fee private schools tend to be 
disproportionately white and Asian, as compared with the public sector.  These factors are all 
expected to impact objective scores and are therefore hypothesized to reduce the low-fee private 
school effect when added as controls in a regression model. However, it should be noted that the 
sample for the low-fee private school analyses is considerably smaller than that of the overall 
sample—with just under 100 low-fee private school students for both the objective and writing 
exams. There are two potential implications of the reduced sample size: 1) the students in this 
sample may be unique (and not representative of average students in the low-fee sector); 2) 
variance of the estimates could be increased in the matching models (making it even more 
difficult to find an effect). The generalizability implication is not as large a concern in this study 
because the appropriate comparison group is students who remain in the public sector. The latter 
implication is problematic and does impact the findings (particularly in the mahalanobis model, 
which uses only one match per treated student). 
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Table 18: Descriptives by Low-fee Private School Status: Objective Exam 
 Public Low-Fee Private Total 
Objective 40.82 51.47 40.87 
 (14.48) (16.03) (14.51) 
Portuguese 61.36 68.12 61.39 
 (13.21) (12.32) (13.21) 
Math 35.18 39.09 35.19 
 (9.033) (10.48) (9.043) 
Writing 1.438 1.760 1.439 
 (0.985) (0.891) (0.984) 
Age 15.66 15.13 15.66 
 (1.562) (0.679) (1.560) 
Male 0.387 0.323 0.387 
 (0.487) (0.470) (0.487) 
White 0.566 0.635 0.567 
 (0.496) (0.484) (0.496) 
Black 0.0955 0.0312 0.0952 
 (0.294) (0.175) (0.293) 
Brown 0.303 0.250 0.303 
 (0.460) (0.435) (0.459) 
Asian 0.0231 0.0625 0.0233 
 (0.150) (0.243) (0.151) 
Indigenous 0.0111 0.0208 0.0112 
 (0.105) (0.144) (0.105) 
Internet 0.495 0.698 0.496 
 (0.500) (0.462) (0.500) 
Mother Ed 1.713 2.031 1.714 
 (0.748) (0.746) (0.748) 
Father Ed 1.732 2.167 1.734 
 (0.773) (0.763) (0.774) 
Grade Repeat 0.0317 0.0312 0.0317 
 (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) 
N 22226 96 22322 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses  
 As expected, the introduction of a large set of control variables reduced the low-fee 
private school effect from 10 points to fewer than 3 points (see Table 19, below). However, this 
OLS estimate may still be biased due to self-selection into low-fee private schools. In order to 
account for this bias, propensity score matching models have been designed to estimate a low-fee 
private school effect while using balanced samples. Three different approaches are used 
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throughout these analyses: mahalanobis metric, nearest neighbor and kernel matching. As with 
the overall private school sample, balance was found across all but one variable in the 
Mahalanobis model and across all variables for the other two balancing metrics (see Appendix 
A). Models 4, 6 and 8 (in Table 19) show the low-fee schooling effect for each of these three 
methods, respectively. All three models show a reduction in the treatment effect, as compared 
with the OLS model. The model using the mahalanobis metric (model 4) shows a non-significant 
treatment effect of just over 2 points, while the nearest neighbor and kernel matching models 
find significant effects of between 2.2 and 2.5 points. The non-significant effect in the 
mahalanobis model is likely a result of the small treatment sample and the use of only one 
matched control per treatment subject (hence the corresponding standard error that is nearly 50% 
larger than any of the other models). Overall, these models provide strong evidence of a low-fee 
private school effect of slightly more than 2 points (which is approximately 1/6 of a standard 
deviation).  
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Table 19: Models for Low-fee Private Schools: Objective  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Nearest 
Neighbor 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Kernel Kernel 
Low-Fee  10.048*  2.332  1.986  2.664  
 (1.384)  (2.180)  (1.782)  (1.668)  
Low-Fee  2.795*  2.136  2.223*  2.462* 
  (0.997)  (1.529)  (1.119)  (0.950) 
Controls  X  X  X  X 
Observations 22291 191 553 16195 
R2 0.568 0.601 0.585 0.598 
Adjusted R2 0.568 0.526 0.561 0.598 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05 
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Low-fee Private Schools  - Writing 
 While the mean difference in writing scores between low-fee private and public schools 
is smaller than that of objective scores, the distribution of the remaining variables in Table 20 are 
strikingly similar to those in Table 18. Accordingly, we would expect a similar reduction in the 
low-fee private school effect when these variables are added into our regression model as 
controls. The results shown in Table 21 confirm this hypothesis. 
Table 20: Descriptives by Low-fee Private School Status: Writing Exam 
 Public Low-Fee Private Total 
Writing 55.16 60.24 55.18 
 (12.19) (10.36) (12.19) 
Portuguese 61.83 68.10 61.86 
 (13.05) (12.38) (13.05) 
Math 35.37 39.13 35.39 
 (9.097) (10.52) (9.107) 
Writing 1.459 1.768 1.461 
 (0.982) (0.893) (0.982) 
Age 15.62 15.12 15.62 
 (1.477) (0.673) (1.475) 
Male 0.381 0.316 0.381 
 (0.486) (0.467) (0.486) 
White 0.569 0.632 0.569 
 (0.495) (0.485) (0.495) 
Black 0.0946 0.0316 0.0943 
 (0.293) (0.176) (0.292) 
Brown 0.302 0.253 0.302 
 (0.459) (0.437) (0.459) 
Asian 0.0227 0.0632 0.0228 
 (0.149) (0.245) (0.149) 
Indigenous 0.0112 0.0211 0.0113 
 (0.105) (0.144) (0.106) 
Internet 0.498 0.695 0.499 
 (0.500) (0.463) (0.500) 
Mother Ed 1.718 2.021 1.719 
 (0.747) (0.743) (0.747) 
Father Ed 1.737 2.158 1.739 
 (0.772) (0.762) (0.773) 
Grade Repeat 0.0303 0.0316 0.0303 
 (0.171) (0.176) (0.171) 
N 21179 95 21274 
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses  
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Table 21: Models for Low-fee Private Schools: Writing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS Mahalanobis Mahalanobis Nearest 
Neighbor 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Kernel Kernel 
Low-Fee 4.248*  1.064  2.152  2.480*  
 (1.171)  (1.739)  (1.214)  (1.107)  
Low-Fee  2.370*  1.488  2.743*  2.654* 
  (1.208)  (1.981)  (1.339)  (1.176) 
Controls  X  X  X  X 
Observations 21247 188 555 14738 
R2 0.143 0.153 0.172 0.160 
Adjusted R2 0.142 -0.009 0.125 0.159 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05 
 
 85 
 The basic OLS model with controls (Table 20, column 2) shows an approximate 40% 
reduction in the treatment effect from the naïve estimate. As with all previous analyses, however, 
the treatment effect is re-estimated via a variety of matching models in order to account for 
selection bias. Additionally, as with the overall private school sample for writing, balance was 
found for all variables across all three matching models (see Appendix A). While the 
mahalanobis metric matching model shows a non-significant effect for low-fee private schooling, 
this is likely due (once again) to the small sample and relatively large standard error of the 
estimate. Interestingly, the nearest neighbor and kernel matching approaches both provide 
evidence of a slight increase in the low-fee private school effect for writing scores. This is 
similar to the finding for the overall private school effect on writing, although the increase is 
even more apparent in this set of analyses. While this finding is somewhat surprising, it 
nevertheless provides consistent evidence of a low-fee private schooling effect of approximately 
2.7 points on the writing exam (which is the equivalent of nearly ¼ of a standard deviation). 
Additional modeling decisions  
 As previously noted, there were several ways in which the final sample could have been 
created for this study. While the final sample consists of a control group limited to those students 
who began in a public school from which a student transferred to a private school in either 2006 
or 2007, all models were re-estimated using alternative samples. First, a “full” sample was 
tested—which included all control students, not just those who began in schools that had a 
student transfer to a private institution in 2006 or 2007. Additionally, a more restricted sample 
was used in which all students were required to have outcome data for both the objective and 
writing sections of the ENEM. While the results from these alternative samples did not change 
any of the substantive findings of this study, the “full” model did produce some slight changes in 
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the coefficients that are worth discussing. Most notably, both the overall and low-fee private 
school effects for objective and writing scores were larger in the full sample than in the final 
sample. While the ultimate decision to use only control students from schools with transfer 
students was based on the theoretical hypothesis that these students serve as more appropriate 
controls, it is worth noting that the private school effects presented throughout this paper should 
be seen as conservative estimates (i.e. lower-bound estimates as compared with alternative 
sampling options).  
 Another modeling decision that needed to be made was whether to conduct analyses for 
overall samples with year dummies or to design the study as a cohort analysis—where cohorts 
are defined by grade in the baseline year (2005). Ultimately, the combined approach was chosen 
for the main analyses due to concerns about sample size in the cohort models. However, private 
school effects were re-estimated using a cohort design for the overall and low-fee analyses. 
While the low-fee cohort analyses produced no significant results (due to extremely small 
samples), the cohort design did provide interesting results for the overall private school effect. 
For the objective test, a significant private school effect was found for both cohorts (with a 
slightly larger effect for the 9th grade cohort—which is not surprising due to the significant 
interaction effects presented in Table 15). For the writing exam, on the other hand, a significantly 
positive private school effect was only found for the grade 9 cohort, with non-significant results 
in the 10th grade cohort. This provides clear evidence to support  the hypothesis that the overall 
private school effect was largely driven by the students taking the ENEM in 2007. The 
implications of this will be discussed further in the following section. 
Although five neighbors were selected for primary analyses in the nearest neighbor 
matching approach, alternative numbers are tested as well: namely one and ten. The main impact 
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of altering the number of matches was on the standard errors. Ultimately, using one match 
provided estimates that were similar to the mahalanobis metric models (which also used only one 
match), while using ten matches provided estimates quite similar to the five match estimates 
presented above. 
All analyses were conducted as intent-to-treat. In other words, if students transferred to a 
private school in 2006 but then back to a public school in 2007, they were considered a part of 
the treatment group for all analyses. This decision was made because the transfer back to the 
public sector could still be considered an impact of the private school itself. Although this only 
accounts for a small number of students, analyses are also run in two alternative ways: 1) with a 
dummy variable for those who transfer back; and 2) by dropping students who transfer back to 
the public sector. Neither method provided any significant changes to the estimates or resulting 
conclusions. 
Finally, while little information was available in these data regarding the peers of 
students in the transfer school, it was possible to examine average income by school. For 
example, while public school students did not have family incomes that differed from their 
school means, overall private school students in this sample (i.e. those who transferred from a 
public school) tended to move to private schools with higher mean income levels than their own 
level of family income. This provides some evidence that part of the private school effect may be 
the result of a peer effect. However, while those students transferring to low-fee private schools 
did have higher incomes (on average) than their public school counterparts, they did not tend to 
transfer to schools with mean family income levels above their own income level.  
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Sensitivity Analyses 
 Due to concerns about selection bias, two additional sensitivity analyses were conducted 
above and beyond the variety of matching strategies. First of all, propensity score matching can 
only account for differences based on observed covariates. Although the matched treatment and 
control groups are balanced across covariates based on their propensities (to be in private 
school), it is possible that there is still some unobserved characteristic that impacts both selection 
into treatment as well as eventual outcome scores. Let’s take the example of two students who 
had the same conditional probability of enrolling in a private school based on all of our observed 
covariates. One of these students was actually enrolled in a private school while the other was in 
a public school. Therefore, these two students would be matched based on the assumption that 
the only difference between them is that one happens to be in a public school and one happens to 
be in a private school. However, what if the reason they were in different schools was motivation 
(i.e. the more highly motivated student enrolled in the private school). This motivation would 
also likely cause this student to perform better on the ENEM, regardless of which school he was 
in. Now let’s extend this scenario to all students. That is, students who enroll in private schools 
are more motivated than their matched public school counterparts. An estimation of the private 
school effect would then be larger than it would if we could account for motivation in our model. 
Fortunately, Inchino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) developed a method of estimating the impact 
of unobserved confounders on treatment effects. By introducing a potential binary confounder 
into the model, they found it is possible to examine the impact of an unobserved characteristic 
such as motivation on achievement. This confounder can either be created to mimic an existing 
variable (e.g. if the confounder behaved similarly to gender, what would it do to the treatment 
effect?) or it can be defined by its relative impact on selection into treatment and on the outcome. 
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In this section, I simulate an unobserved covariate that mimics a set of binary covariates that I 
already have in the original models (namely, internet access, car ownership, computer 
ownership, race and year). Table 22 shows the results for the impact of these simulated 
confounders on the private school effect for writing scores. The first row in the table shows the 
nearest neighbor estimate of the treatment effect (ATT) with no confounder. The remaining rows 
each show the newly estimated treatment effects with the introduction of binary confounders 
mimicking the corresponding covariates in column 1. For example, the row that begins with 
“Black” shows that this variable is positively associated with the objective scores (i.e. outcome 
effect) but that the odds of being in a treatment school are low (i.e. selection effect). If our 
unobserved factor followed this same pattern, it would provide only a slight reduction in the 
ATT estimate. This is true across all simulated confounders. In other words, even if our 
unobserved confounding variable (e.g. motivation) were equal to our current covariates with 
regard to its impact on selection into treatment and increased objective scores, it would have 
little impact on our treatment effect. Therefore, we can be confident that our treatment effects for 
both objective and writing scores are robust to omitted variable bias. 
Table 22: Sensitivity Analysis Introducing Unobserved Binary Confounder: Writing 
 p11 p10 p01 p00 Outcome 
Effect (Γ) 
Selection 
Effect (Λ) 
ATT SE 
No Confounder 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -- -- 1.904 0.399 
 
Confounder-Like 
Black 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.08 1.028 0.302 1.689 0.495 
Brown 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.30 1.051 0.437 1.710 0.500 
White 0.77 0.74 0.58 0.59 0.933 2.358 1.750 0.496 
Repeat 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.03 6.144 0.914 1.784 0.499 
Cell Phone 0.67 0.64 0.46 0.46 1.006 2.313 1.658 0.498 
 
 
 Additionally, a Heckman selection model was run by using car ownership as the excluded 
instrument to predict self-selection into having an observable outcome. In other words, we can 
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initially only test the impact of a private school on achievement for those students with outcome 
data but there is reason to believe that there are factors that lead to this final sample being 
different than the original sample. This is especially important in a situation where the outcome 
of interest is a voluntary exam. In these data, we can use car ownership to predict whether or not 
students took the exam (since exams are given off-site and those with cars are more likely to be 
able to make it to the exam, after controlling for wealth) and re-estimate the private school effect 
for all students. Table 23 shows the Heckman selection models for the overall private school 
models. We can see from this table that the private school effect on objective scores does not 
change from previous models and that the effect on writing is slightly smaller. Table 24, on the 
other hand, shows that low-fee private school effects for both objective and writing scores were 
potentially biased downward in the original models. This provides evidence that the marginal 
effect of low-fee private schools may actually be larger than original estimates if we were to 
observe outcome scores for all students in the sample. 
 
Table 23: Heckman Selection for all Private Schools (Selection = Car Ownership)  
 (1) (2) 
 Objective  Writing 
Private 4.606* 1.256* 
 (0.281) (0.325) 
Rho 0.719 0.448 
 (0.007) (0.025) 
χ2 1283.65* 60.08* 
Observations 631029 631029 
Censored Obs 407002 419003 
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05 
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Table 24: Heckman Selection for Low-Fee Private Schools (Selection = Car Ownership)  
 (1) (2) 
 Objective  Writing 
Low-Fee Private 4.627* 3.414* 
 (1.071) (1.212) 
Rho 0.724 0.462 
 (0.006) (0.023) 
χ2 1331.30* 59.13* 
Observations 628066 628066 
Censored Obs 405256 417213 
Standard errors in parentheses: *p < 0.05 
 
Discussion 
 Despite recent increases in public educational spending, private schools have been on the 
rise in developing countries for the past decade. In recent years, much of this increase has been 
driven by the expansion of a low-fee private schooling sector for primary and secondary school 
students. However, little research exists on the quality of these educational opportunities. 
Therefore, this study was designed to answer two main research questions: What is the impact of 
(low-fee) private school enrolment on educational attainment in Brazil? Furthermore, do these 
results help to explain the country’s demand for private education in the face of increased 
government support for public education?  
 Based on data from the state of Sao Paulo, I find that private school students (across all 
levels of tuition) perform better than their public school counterparts on both the objective and 
writing portions of the ENEM high school exit exam. This private school effect remains positive 
and significant after accounting for sample selection bias via a variety of propensity score 
matching models. Additionally, sensitivity analyses show that these results are robust to the 
possibility of potential unobserved confounding variables (such as motivation). Ultimately, this 
leads me to conclude that both low-fee and high-fee private secondary schools in Brazil provide 
significant achievement gains as compared with public schools. However, the data used for this 
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study did not allow for an in-depth exploration of the reasons for these achievement gains—be it 
teacher preparation, resources, peer effects, autonomy, et cetera. This is an area of study that 
requires future attention. While it is important for policy makers and researchers to know 
whether or not low-fee private schools are providing high-quality educational opportunities in 
developing countries, it is arguably even more important to understand why/how these schools 
are able to provide these achievement gains with minimal resources (at least with regard to 
tuition/fees). The only evidence as to what might be driving the private school effects in Brazil 
comes from a cursory examination of school mean incomes and the moderation analyses 
conducted for the overall private school sample. More specifically, some evidence of a peer 
effect (and/or resource effect) surfaced when it was found that students were transferring into 
private schools with peers who were, on average, wealthier than themselves, although this was 
not found to be the case for students in low-fee private schools. With regard to the moderation 
analyses, it was found that much of the private school effect was driven by the 2007 exam-taking 
cohort. This cohort effect appears to be the result of two factors: 1) enrolling in a private school 
for two years (as opposed to just one); and 2) the adaptability of private schools to prepare their 
students for an exam that started to become more important for access to college in 2007 than it 
was in 2006. Additionally, it should be noted that the private school effect for writing scores was 
smaller than for objective scores. One hypothesis for this finding is that it is easier in the span of 
only one or two years to improve a student’s skills and/or preparation for a multiple choice exam 
than it is to improve their writing skills.  
 Ultimately, this paper provides two important contributions to the literature. First, the 
findings support the hypothesis that despite increases in government support for public 
education, private educational opportunities are still chosen (at least in part) by an increasing 
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number of students/families because of their promise to provide gains in academic achievement. 
Second, this study provides some of the first evidence of achievement gains for low-fee private 
schools in a developing country via rigorous quantitative analyses that account for bias due to 
self-selection. This is essential information for policy makers, researchers and aid organizations 
considering the role and impact of low-fee private schools in Brazil (and across developing 
countries, in general). While these results and conclusions should not be interpreted as advocacy 
for the expansion of low-cost private schooling, they do offer some explanation for the rationale 
behind this expansion and further provide some credence to recent hypotheses that low-cost 
private schools may indeed serve as useful complements to over-burdened public schooling 
sectors. It should be understood, however, that these results pertain to a singular exam for 
secondary school students in a specific country and that much research is still needed in order to 
fully understand the comprehensive benefits and drawbacks to private schooling for low-income 
children.   
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CHAPTER IV 
PRIVATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN INDONESIA: PERFORMANCE VERSUS 
DEMAND 
Private schooling for the poor has been on the rise in developing countries over the past 
two decades. While some contend that private schools provide a necessary complement to the 
overburdened public education sector, others argue that the disenfranchised should never be 
forced to use scarce private resources in order to obtain a public good (Lewin, 2007; Roth, 
1987). This paper provides an examination of the private secondary education sector in a country 
that appears, on the surface, to provide a compromise between these competing ideologies. With 
a decentralized education sector in which private schools receive a significant proportion of their 
funding directly from the central government, Indonesia offers the assurance of state regulation 
with the purported flexibility of private provision. Furthermore, private schools accepting 
government operational funding in Indonesia are not permitted to charge tuition, which should 
alleviate concerns about drawing down on the wealth of poor families. Despite this unique 
approach to privatization, however, a recent OECD report found that private secondary school 
students in Indonesia tend to perform significantly lower on the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) than their public school counterparts (OECD, 2012). Yet, more than 
40% of students at the secondary level continue to enroll in private schools. This leads us to ask 
why they attend. By supplementing information from interviews recently conducted in Indonesia 
with analyses of PISA 2009 data for public and private school students, this paper answers the 
questions: What factors can explain the differences in performance between public and private 
schools in Indonesia? Why are private secondary schools in Indonesia in such high demand 
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despite concerns about quality and academic preparedness? Additionally, what implications does 
this have for international education policy? 
Background 
In many countries around the world, there is a distinct divide between the public and 
private education sectors. However, privatization can take many forms, with a mix of public and 
private funding, management and/or oversight (Roth, 1987). In Indonesia, private schools are run 
by non-governmental organizations but many still receive government funding. While the unique 
nature of the Indonesian educational system often causes the line between public and private 
education to be blurred from a traditional standpoint, private schools have historically played an 
important role in improving access to education for underserved communities—and their future 
role in assisting the country in meeting its universal basic education goals and expanding 
secondary school access for those in need has become a reality that is apparent based on the 
government’s support for this sector. Prior to examining the state of private education in 
Indonesia, however, it is first necessary to understand the underlying educational context in 
which it functions.  
Universal Basic Education 
Much like the education systems in other developing countries, basic education in 
Indonesia is comprised of nine years of compulsory schooling—incorporating both primary 
(grades 1-6) and junior secondary education (grades 7-9). While the Government of Indonesia 
(GoI) was able to achieve nearly universal primary education by the 1970s, in 1994 efforts were 
turned toward achieving Nine Year Universal Basic Education (NYUBE). With significant 
support from the Indonesian government and numerous aid organizations, they were able to 
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increase the gross enrolment rate for NYUBE to 92.5% by 2008. However, this rate was not 
consistent by region or level of schooling. For example, 111 of Indonesia’s 440 districts were 
still below the minimum GER district target of 80% by 2008 and only about half of the students 
from the country`s poorest economic quintile complete basic education (Weston, 2008). 
Additionally, the transition rate of primary school graduates to junior secondary school actually 
dropped to just under 76% by 2008, from 82% the year before (Cannon and Arlianti, 2009). With 
junior secondary enrolment rates continuing to lag behind the universal rates at the primary level, 
it is not surprising that a large proportion of private secondary schools in the country are found in 
the secondary schooling sector. For example, Figure 1 shows that while only about 16% of 
schools at the primary level are private, more than 37% of junior secondary schools are private. 
Furthermore, according to a recent OECD report on PISA results, the percentage of students 
attending privately managed secondary schools may be as high as 43% (OECD, 2012). 
Combined with the recent focus on increasing junior secondary enrolments, this points to the 
growing importance of the private sector in assisting Indonesia to achieve its goal of universal 
basic education. 
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Figure 1: Number of schools by sector, ministry and level
 
 
Regulations, Monitoring and Support 
The structure of the Indonesian educational system is unique in that it is both monitored 
and managed by two separate ministries: the Ministry of National Education (MONE) and the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). The majority of schools under MONE are characterized 
as public, non-religious schools and the majority of MORA institutions are private madrasahs9. 
More specifically, approximately 8% of MONE schools are private, while around 88% of 
MORA schools are private. In other words, despite the prevalence of private schools in MORA 
(and public schools in MONE), both ministries are responsible for the registration and oversight 
of public and private schools. Regardless of the ministry with which a private school registers, it 
is required for all private schools to be run by a private foundation (known as a yayasan). These 
foundations provide varying amounts of support to their schools, which can lead to disparities in 
                                                      
9 A madrasah differs from an Islamic school only in that it is registered with MORA, as opposed to MONE.  
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private school funding and infrastructure. This issue will be discussed further in the final section 
of this paper.  
As a result of the National Education System Law (20/2003), public and private schools 
under both MONE and MORA are subject to the same regulations (i.e. registration and 
accreditation procedures, following the national curriculum, provision of textbooks to all 
students, etc.) and are even supported by many of the same government programs. This does not 
mean, however, that the two sectors are entirely indistinguishable from one another or that they 
are equivalent in all aspects of management, funding, support and production. For example, 
while all schools are required to follow the national curriculum, private religious schools can 
supplement the curriculum with additional religious education. Additionally, while both MONE 
and MORA are subject to the same regulations, funding channels and administrative authority 
for the two ministries have remained separate under the aforementioned national education law 
(RTI, 2009). This separation is readily apparent with regard to the recent government policies 
and development projects working toward decentralized basic education. Although these policies 
and programs are intended to affect both public and private schools, this is complicated by the 
fact that decentralization has occurred for MONE but not for MORA. For instance, while the 
enforcement of minimum service standards (MSS) takes place at the district level for both 
MONE and MORA schools, the majority of administrative procedures and funding structures for 
MORA still operate in a hierarchical, centralized system.  
While funding channels remain distinct between the two ministries, funding sources for 
basic operating costs have, to some extent, been unified. For example, the School Operational 
Funding subsidy (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah/BOS) is a government program that is available 
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to all public and private secondary schools offering basic education (including pondok pesantren, 
a.k.a. religious boarding school). According to RTI (2009): 
It was explicitly stated that BOS would ``free students from the burden of school 
operational costs … [for] registration, tuition, examination fees and materials and 
costs of laboratory and workshop sessions.'' The goal of BOS was to provide 
assistance to schools in order to “permit them to eliminate student fees while still 
maintaining the level of educational quality” (p. 89). 
 
By accepting the BOS, schools agree to relieve low-income students of all costs and fees. 
Those schools without low-income students must use the funds to reduce fees. In practice, 
however, it is not often possible for schools to fully operate on BOS funds alone, so fees or 
community donations may still be expected by some primary or junior secondary schools. Since 
2009, all government schools have been required to accept the BOS, while private schools still 
have the opportunity to opt out—as long as they can ensure that poor students will be able to 
attend their school. 
While the level of the BOS is equal (per student) across public and private schools, 
teacher salaries in public schools are mainly paid for by the government while those in private 
schools are mainly covered out of each school’s individual budget. An exception to this pattern is 
the professional allowance available to certified teachers in both public and private schools. 
While many schools serving low-income students have little choice but to pay their teachers 
relatively low salaries out of the BOS, a recent investment has been made by the Government of 
Indonesia to certify all 2.7 million teachers by 2015. All teachers, whether in a public or private 
school are expected to become certified and supplemental salaries (or professional allowances) 
will be paid to them by the government. These allowances can double the salary of teachers in 
public schools and increase the salaries of teachers in private schools by more than 10 times. 
Aside from concerns about the government’s ability to pay the professional allowances of so 
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many additional teachers, many see this as an important step toward equity. However, these 
allowances still remain hypothetical at this time. As a matter of fact, a recent World Bank report 
on spending trends in Indonesia claims that converting all teachers to civil servants and 
providing certification allowances would be fiscally unfeasible (World Bank, 2013). Therefore, it 
is necessary to examine the effectiveness of the private sector as it currently functions. 
Accordingly, the following section provides a brief overview of the literature pertaining to the 
effectiveness of the private schooling sector in Indonesia.  
Private School Quality 
The intended purpose of nine-year universal basic education is not only to provide 
students with access to a desk, chair and teacher but to provide all children with an opportunity 
to obtain a high-quality education (Cannon and Arlianti, 2009). In recent years, several 
researchers have attempted to assess the relative quality of public versus private schools in 
Indonesia. This section examines some of the widely held beliefs about private schools and 
provides a summary of the most relevant empirical studies to-date, the results of which have 
been mixed. 
Much of the work published on private-public schooling comparisons in Indonesia 
concludes that from the provision of textbooks to the education level of teachers, public schools 
have higher quality inputs (often with more funding) than do private schools (Newhouse and 
Beegle, 2006; Strauss et al, 2004; World Bank, 1998).  
However, while there is a general belief in Indonesia that private schools are of lower 
quality than public schools, in terms of inputs and outputs, two of the earliest empirical pieces on 
educational effectiveness in Indonesia found results more in favor of private schools. Using an 
instrumental variables approach to examine the impact of spending on sixth grade national 
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examination results in math and Indonesian language, James, King and Suryadi (1996) found 
that increased spending lead to gains in performance across subjects. More interestingly, 
however, James et al conclude that private schools were more efficient with their spending than 
public schools. However, there is a selection bias concern in this study, based on the fact that 
madrasahs were excluded from the survey on which the analyses were based—thereby limiting 
the sample of private schools. Specifically, private schools serving poorer students (i.e. those 
with which most current researchers are concerned) were not examined in this study. This is 
likely to have provided a positive bias in the effectiveness of private schooling. Additionally, this 
study is subject to potential selection bias from parents making a choice to send their children to 
private schools. 
Complementing James et al’s (1996) work, Bedi and Garg (2000) used household survey 
data to find that after controlling for (observable) student characteristics, including prior test 
scores (to account for school selection effects), non-religious, private secondary school graduates 
actually performed better in the labor market than public school graduates and that students who 
attended Islamic private schools performed worse. These results show that while public 
secondary school students tend to be more advantaged than their private school counterparts, 
selection-corrected earnings differences tended to favor private non-religious schools in terms of 
efficiency. There are also potential problem with sample selection bias in this study. Specifically, 
Bedi and Garg examine the economic returns to schooling for students who have between 7 and 
12 years of education, thus ignoring those who attend higher education. If public schools 
students (who are found to be of higher ability and better family background) are more likely to 
enroll in institutions of higher education than private school students, Bedi and Garg’s (2000) 
findings would be biased toward finding favorable results for private schools. The results also 
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have limited generalizability to the current Indonesian education system, where the vast majority 
of private schools are madrasahs (managed by MORA) or independent private schools run by a 
religious organization (managed by MONE). Additionally, Fahmi (2009a) re-estimated Bedi and 
Garg’s estimation (on the same Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data) and found 
contradictory effects when using a different sample selection correction method (see 
Bourguignon et al. (2007), with public school graduates receiving higher labor market returns 
than their private school counterparts. 
In yet another study using the IFLS, Newhouse and Beegle (2006) find that junior 
secondary public school graduates scored between 0.17 and 0.3 standard deviations higher on the 
Ebtanas national exam than did private school students, after controlling for family background, 
location and student characteristics (e.g. gender, work status, prior scores). Furthermore, while 
they find no significant difference between public madrasah students and public secular students 
(nor between private madrasah and private secular), students in non-Muslim private schools 
performed better than those in madrasahs. Similarly, Fahmi (2009b) uses the IFLS 2000 to 
estimate the effectiveness of junior secondary education in Indonesia. Ultimately, he finds that 
students from public schools receive 25% and 35.2% higher future earnings than private non-
religious and madrasah students, respectively. Private Christian school students, however, had 
slightly higher returns to education than public school students. This once again speaks to the 
mixed evidence on the effectiveness of public versus private schools depending on sector. 
In 2010, Ali et al conducted a study on the quality of madrasah education in Indonesia 
and found that teacher qualifications and certification levels were highly correlated with student 
achievement. Additionally, school resources (defined as the number of resources such as science 
labs, staff rooms, first aid kits, electricity, etc.) were found to have significant effects on between 
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school achievement in English across a sample of 150 secondary-level madrasahs, even after 
controlling for student background characteristics in an HLM. 
 Finally, the OECD’s most recent report on PISA examined the differences in 
achievement for public and private schools across all tested countries. While they found that 
nearly all countries showed higher PISA scores for private school students, there were a few 
countries where the opposite was true. Indonesia was one of those countries. Ultimately, they 
found that private school students in Indonesia were outperformed by public school students on 
the PISA reading exam by approximately 18 points, or nearly 1/5th of a standard deveiation 
(OECD, 2012). However, this finding was simply based on mean test score differences, with no 
controls—and is thus subject to selection bias. Additionally, they found that Indonesia was one 
of only a few countries in which private school students were not more socio-economically 
advantaged than their public school counterparts. Therefore, it is likely that this finding is biased 
and that effectively controlling for background characteristics and self-selection will provide a 
more accurate overall public school effect. Finally, it is important to note that the OECD report 
treats all private schools equally—whereas prior research has shown that there are distinct 
differences in resources, student selection and achievement across types of private schools. 
The current study was undertaken in order to rigorously examine the private secondary 
sector in Indonesia in order to fill two gaps in the literature. First, by using OLS regression and 
propensity score matching, this study will attempt to return less biased estimates of the effect of 
private schools on academic achievement. Secondly, while it is apparent that private secondary 
schools in Indonesia are in high demand, none of the previous studies have attempted to address 
the question of why so many students choose to enroll (particularly in light of the fact that 
private madrasahs in particular tend to produce lower achievement than their public school 
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counterparts). Therefore, this study will provide a qualitative explanation for why private schools 
continue to be in such high demand despite concerns of poor academic performance. 
Data 
Data for the quantitative analyses were obtained from the 2009 Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA). The final dataset available for Indonesia contains 
4,652 students in 180 schools. These data contain 2,555 students in 85 public schools and 2,097 
students in 95 private schools. The private school data can actually be broken down one step 
further into private independent and private dependent schools. The former receive less than 50% 
of their funding from public sources, while the latter receive between 50% and 100% of their 
funding from public sources. There are 1,422 private independent students in 60 schools and 675 
private dependent students in 35 schools in the final dataset. 
Dependent Variables 
 There are three dependent variables for this study: mathematics, reading and science 
scores from the PISA 2009 exam. All models are run separately for each of these three 
dependent variables. PISA uses plausible values for their cognitive assessments. In other words, 
each student actually has five outcomes scores for each exam. While conducting analyses on one 
plausible value will provide unbiased estimates, the standard error will be underestimated. 
Therefore, all models are run on all five plausible values and standard errors are calculated 
accordingly. Specifically, the coefficients are averaged across all plausible value estimates while 
the standard errors are computed by taking the square root of the sum of the sampling variance 
and the imputation variance. This is done with the pv command in Stata for means and simple 
regressions but it had to be calculated independently for more advanced models. 
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Independent Variables 
 The main independent variable of interest for this study is a dummy variable for private 
school enrolment (i.e. private = 1; public = 0). This is sometimes referred to as the ‘treatment’ 
variable in the results section. Models are initially run with all private school students but 
additionally analyses are conducted for independently for private-dependent school students.  
 A large number of student-level covariates are used across models as controls. These are 
standard covariates in educational achievement literature and include such variables as: gender, 
age, grade, parental education (i.e. highest grade finished by either parent), wealth, home 
educational resources (international index), joy of reading (self-reported), as well as indices of 
economic, social and cultural status.  
 Additional analyses on school-level covariates are conducted in order to examine the 
extent to which they can explain the effect of private school enrolment on PISA scores. These 
variables are: student-teacher ratio, proportion of teacher shortages, school size, school location 
(categorical: 1 village; 2 small town; 3 town; 4 city; 5 large city), use of resources (international 
scale of efficiency), percent of female students, proportion of certified and qualified teachers, 
computer access and the number of nearby schools (i.e. within 1km).  
Qualitative Data 
The data for the qualitative portion of this study come from the interviews conducted in 
Indonesia during July 2010. We interviewed principals, school committee heads and teachers 
from 28 non-government schools (16 of which were junior secondary; 11 primary and 1 full 
basic). This represented schools registered with both MONE (7) and MORA (21). The schools 
were located across the country in East Java (Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Bangkalan and Bojonegoro) 
and Banten (Lebak). Although we obtained lists of private schools in each district from USAID, 
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UNICEF and/or RTI officials, due to limited time and resources we ultimately had to settle for 
convenience sampling to choose which schools to interview. Therefore, the qualitative analyses 
in this study are not purported to be nationally representative but instead provide findings that 
should be considered illustrative for a more nuanced understanding of the system than can be 
provided through the quantitative analyses alone, particularly with regard to the demand for 
private secondary schools.  
 For the purposes of this study, the most pertinent questions from our school interview 
protocol come from the governance and funding/support sections. More specifically, we asked 
questions about registration (i.e. MORA or MONE), BOS funding, parental fees (as well as 
assistance to very poor children), teacher credentials and certification, school resources and 
donor support.10  
Methodology 
 This study incorporates two distinct methodologies: quantitative analyses of PISA 2009 
data and qualitative analyses of interviews conducted during recent fieldwork in Indonesia.  
Quantitative – PISA 2009  
 The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an international study 
that was introduced by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 
in 2000. In 2009, PISA conducted its 4th survey in 74 countries (including all OECD countries 
along with various partner countries and economies). PISA consists of a student questionnaire, a 
parent questionnaire, a school questionnaire and a cognitive assessment. The cognitive 
assessment tests skills in reading, mathematics and science for 15 year olds. This age, which was 
chosen because it represents the upper end of compulsory education in many countries, falls right 
                                                      
10 Specific questions are available upon request. 
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at the end of junior secondary school in Indonesia—making it an ideal measure of academic 
performance for this study. Although it should be noted that while some students will be in 9th 
grade for this exam, others will likely have already started 10th grade (i.e. senior secondary 
school).  
 PISA provides test data and questionnaires for a nationally representative sample of 15 
year old students in both public and private schools in Indonesia. The questionnaires will first be 
used to examine demographic and socioeconomic differences between public and private school 
students. Subsequently, these variables will be used as controls in models that will regress test 
scores on public/private enrolment status.  
Theory and Model Specification 
In addition to using ordinary least squares (OLS), this study will also use propensity 
score matching in an effort to reduce the effect of selection bias and to obtain a more accurate 
estimate of public/private school effects. For this study, we employ matching techniques, which 
involve a comparison of the treated group with a selected subset of the control group (i.e. those 
who did not receive treatment). The basic idea behind matching is to replace the average 
outcome of the counterfactual group [E(y0|x, z=1)] with outcomes from a subset of the untreated 
population whose observable characteristics (x) are as close as possible to those of the treated 
group.   
 Ultimately, we utilize four different methods to estimate the treatment effect. First, we 
estimate a standard OLS regression, controlling for a set of covariates. These estimates are then 
compared against the models that incorporate matching techniques in order to determine whether 
or not we can reduce the amount of bias by using balanced samples.  
 108 
 Accordingly, the second estimate of the treatment effect employs a matching method that 
uses combines the Mahalanobis metric with a caliper from the propensity score. The first step is 
to run a logit model with treatment as the dependent variable and all aforementioned independent 
variables as predictors. This provides a probability (or propensity) for being in the treatment 
group. Calipers are then established for the purpose of designating how close probabilities should 
be in order for a match to be made. According to the literature, an appropriate caliper is ¼ of a 
standard deviation of the propensity score (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). In this method, all 
subjects are randomly ordered and the first treated subject is selected. Nontreated subjects within 
the predefined caliper are then selected and the subject with the smallest Mahalanobis distance is 
then selected as a match. In other words, students in private schools are matched with public 
school students who have the smallest Mahalanobis distance between them within a given 
caliper. This method is argued to produce the best balance of covariates between the two groups 
(Guo et al, 2006).  
The third method used to estimate a treatment effect is a nearest neighbor propensity 
score matching approach. Once again a propensity score is calculated and a caliper is 
determined. This time, however, each treated subject is matched with a particular number of 
nontreated subjects. We begin by matching each private school student with 10 public school 
students but we also run analyses for alternative numbers of matches in order to assess whether 
or not differences in estimates occur across the number of matches.  
 The fourth and final method used for this study is kernel matching. Unlike the 
mahalanobis and nearest neighbor approaches, which use calipers to determine a small number 
of matches (as few as one per treated case), the kernel matching algorithm is based on a 
nonparametric regression model and therefore allows for the use of as many of the control cases 
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as possible. By calculating a weighted average of the outcome for all non-treated participants and 
differencing it from the outcome of the treated case, a treatment effect is estimated across all 
treated and non-treated cases (with the latter being down-weighted based on their distance from 
each treated case). 
 Additionally, PISA sampling and replicate weights are used across all models. Final 
student weights are used for all analyses. Since PISA uses a two-stage sampling procedure, the 
Fay’s variant of the Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) is used to compute standard errors for 
all population estimates. Specifically, PISA data include 80 replicates and a Fay’s coefficient of 
0.5.  
Qualitative – Fieldwork 
 After conducting an extensive literature review on the country’s private schooling sector, 
Dr. Thomas Smith and I traveled to Indonesia to conduct our fieldwork in July 2010. During this 
fieldwork we interviewed representatives of donor programs and aid organizations, the 
Government of Indonesia, a large private school foundation and private school principals, 
teachers, and committee members. All interviews were semi-structured and our interview 
protocol can be found in the appendix. The names and contact information of representatives 
from donor programs and aid organizations, as well as government officials were provided by 
the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Indonesian country office, 
which was supporting our work there. Ultimately, we interviewed representatives from USAID, 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), The World Bank, United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children and Research Triangle Institute (RTI). Unlike the 
school interviews which were designed to obtain information on the characteristics of schools, 
students and teachers, the purpose of these interviews was to ascertain the perceptions of the 
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business and finance management capacities of schools, as well as the extent to which aid 
organizations and NGOs work with (and/or provide funding to) private schools. 
From the Government of Indonesia, we interviewed members of the Ministry of National 
Education (MONE), Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), as well as several district and sub-
district education officers. In these interviews we asked questions pertaining to: the registration, 
monitoring and inspection of private schools by both MONE and MORA; governmental support 
for private schools; the regulatory framework for private schools (including teacher credentialing 
and professional development) and; data collection for private schools. The private school 
foundation heads that we interviewed were from Jakarta’s largest foundation: Ma’arif NU.11  
Results 
As noted in the OECD’s 2012 report, private school students in Indonesia were outperformed by 
public school students on the 2009 PISA reading exam. The first three rows of Table 25 show 
that in addition to reading, the approximate 15 point (i.e. 23% of a standard deviation) advantage 
for public school students was found on the PISA 2009 math and science assessments as well. 
The remainder of the table shows that public and private school students were quite similar on a 
range of covariates available in the PISA dataset. The only differences appear to come in the 
form of parental education, SES and attitudes toward schooling, all of which tend to be slightly 
higher for public school students. However, this table (and the OECD report) contains students in 
both high-fee private schools which serve students from some of the country’s wealthiest 
families, as well as government subsidized private schools which tend to serve lower-income 
students. Based on the varied private education sector in Indonesia, it is important to examine 
these same test scores and covariates across the different levels of private schooling.  
                                                      
11 A list of interviewees and interview questions can be provided upon request. 
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Table 25: Descriptives by Private School Status: PISA 2009 
 Public Private 
Reading 412.52 
(63) 
396.91 
(66) 
Math 381.19 
(69) 
366.11 
(70) 
Science 393.93 
(66) 
376.40 
(66) 
Age 15.74 15.77 
Home Possessions -1.85 -1.88 
Wealth -1.75 -1.78 
Attitude (School) 0.54 0.47 
SES Index -1.47 -1.60 
Home Ed Resources -1.04 -1.07 
Joy of Reading 0.43 0.44 
Grade 9.43 9.50 
Male 0.47 0.50 
Preschool 0.56 0.52 
Parental Education 10.15 9.66 
N 2555 2097 
  
As seen in Table 26, there is a large divide between the reading, math and science scores in 
private government dependent schools and private independent schools. Test scores of private 
independent school students and public school students are very similar, whereas the test score 
difference between private dependent and public school students ranges from 40 to 48 points, 
which is 2.5 to 3 times greater than the overall difference between public and private school 
students. Additionally, while there was little difference in the covariates between public and 
private school students, there are some large differences between private dependent and public 
(as well as private independent) school students. For example, private dependent students tend to 
have lower scores on the home possessions, wealth and SES scales, with less favorable attitudes 
toward schooling, lower rates of preschool attendance and less parental education. Although 
students across all three school types are the same age (because of the PISA sampling frame), 
students in private dependent schools average a full year less schooling than their private 
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independent school counterparts (and more than half a year less than public school students). All 
of these variables are therefore included as controls in the following analyses, which were 
designed to examine the factors may explain the differences in achievement on PISA reading, 
math and science scores for public and private school students. 
Table 26: Descriptives by Private School Status: PISA 2009 
 Public Private 
Independent 
Private 
Dependent 
Reading 412.52 
(63) 
413.14 
(65) 
365.13 
(56) 
Math 381.19 
(69) 
381.72 
(70) 
335.56 
(57) 
Science 393.93 
(66) 
390.16 
(67) 
349.45 
(56) 
Age 15.74 
(.27) 
15.80 
(.30) 
15.73 
(.29) 
Home Possessions -1.85 
(1.09) 
-1.65 
(1.12) 
-2.34 
(1.02) 
Wealth -1.75 
(1.21) 
-1.50 
(1.21) 
-2.33 
(1.20) 
Attitude (School) 0.54 
(.85) 
0.53 
(.95) 
0.38 
(.91) 
SES Index -1.47 
(1.07) 
-1.36 
(1.14) 
-2.07 
(.91) 
Home Ed Resources -1.04 
(.97) 
-0.92 
(1.14) 
-1.37 
(.90) 
Joy of Reading 0.43 
(.47) 
0.44 
(.56) 
0.45 
(.49) 
Grade 9.43 
(.71) 
9.86 
(.71) 
8.81 
(.60) 
Male 0.47 
(.48) 
0.48 
(.53) 
0.53 
(.51) 
Preschool 0.56 
(.48) 
0.60 
(.52) 
0.36 
(.49) 
Parental Education 10.15 
(3.30) 
10.24 
(3.61) 
8.52 
(3.32) 
N 2555 1422 675 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 Beginning with standard OLS regressions, Table 27 displays the of overall private school 
enrolment on reading, math and science scores. Column 1 shows the naïve estimate for private 
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schooling on reading scores, while column two shows the same estimate after controlling for 
student level characteristics. Likewise, columns 3-4 and 5-6 provide the same models for math 
and science, respectively. Although there are slight differences across outcome exam, the 
conclusions are ultimately the same for each subject. Therefore, the remainder of this section will 
focus on reading scores.  
 First, it is interesting to note that while the majority of the covariates in the model are 
found to be significantly predictive of PISA reading scores, the coefficient on private schools 
decreases only slightly. In other words, the private school gap on reading scores cannot be 
explained by the variables in this model. There are two potential explanations for this finding: 1) 
there are still unobserved factors that impact both selection into private schools and PISA scores; 
2) private schools provide lower quality educational opportunities and academic training to their 
students than public schools. The first of these explanations will be explored using a variety of 
matching models (with regard to producing balanced samples for analysis); the second will be 
addressed first via an examination of school level covariates in the PISA data and subsequently 
through the qualitative findings resulting from our school interviews (such that we will discuss 
some of the perceived shortcomings and/or quality concerns in the dependent private school 
sector). 
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Table 27: OLS Estimates for Private Schools by PISA Exam 
 Reading 
(1) 
Reading 
(2) 
Math 
(3) 
Math 
(4) 
Science 
(5) 
Science 
(6) 
Private -15.62* 
(6.99) 
-14.48* 
(4.92) 
-15.08* 
(7.70) 
-14.23* 
(5.52) 
-17.54* 
(7.12) 
-17.40* 
(5.42) 
Age  -5.33 
(4.05) 
 -13.12* 
(5.52) 
 -3.03 
(3.89) 
Parental 
Education 
 -0.21 
(0.88) 
 -0.95 
(1.00) 
 -0.53 
(0.92) 
Home 
Possessions 
 -10.03* 
(2.63) 
 -9.53* 
(3.10) 
 -2.63 
(3.22) 
Wealth  10.58* 
(2.42) 
 8.56* 
(2.25) 
 5.13* 
(2.42) 
School 
Attitude 
 7.38* 
(1.52) 
 4.88* 
(1.58) 
 6.78* 
(1.50) 
SES Index  7.45 
(4.23) 
 13.56* 
(4.54) 
 7.07 
(4.52) 
Joy of 
Reading 
 11.83* 
(2.55) 
 9.52* 
(3.13) 
 11.66* 
(2.93) 
Male  -25.66* 
(2.70) 
 8.98* 
(2.66) 
 1.63 
(3.24) 
Grade  24.49* 
(2.97) 
 25.47* 
(3.33) 
 24.54* 
(3.38) 
Preschool  24.58* 
(3.41) 
 28.38* 
(3.87) 
 23.26* 
(3.65) 
R2 0.014 0.303 0.012 0.240 0.016 0.216 
N = 4652 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05 
 
 In order to balance samples for a potential reduction in bias due to selection, three 
matching estimates are calculated: nearest neighbor (with five neighbors), mahalanobis metric 
and kernel matching. As can be seen in the post estimation results for bias reduction, there is 
balance of all covariates across all three matching approaches for the overall private school 
sample (see Appendix B). The results from these models are displayed in columns 3-5 in Table 
28. While the results from the mahalanobis model show a slightly decreased impact of private 
 115 
schooling on reading scores, there is no evidence of selection bias in the other two approaches. 
(As a matter of fact, the private school effect even increases slightly in the kernel matching 
model.) Ultimately, there is still an approximate 13-16 point disadvantage for students attending 
private schools, even after controlling for student level covariates (and attempting to control for 
self-selection). However, as noted in the descriptive statistics above, this effect may be largely 
driven by a particular subset of private schools. Therefore, these models are re-estimated for 
students in government-dependent private schools, as opposed to all private schools.  
 
Table 28: Matching Estimates for Private Schools: PISA Reading 
 Naïve 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
N. Neighbor 
(3) 
Mahalanobis 
(4) 
Kernel 
(5) 
Private -15.62* 
(6.99) 
-14.48* 
(4.92) 
-14.49* 
(4.96) 
-12.94* 
(4.89) 
-16.36* 
(5.71) 
Controls  X X X X 
R2 0.014 0.303 0.308 0.301 0.300 
N  4652 4652 4538 3318 4648 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05 
 
 Column 1 of Table 29 (below) shows once again that the mean difference in reading 
scores between private dependent school students and public school students is nearly 50 points 
(or 3 times greater than the overall private school difference). In column 2 we see that after 
controlling for the same covariates used in all previous regressions, this private school 
disadvantage is decreased to 20 points. Similar to the overall private school models, we find that 
the mahalanobis matching algorithm provides the largest reduction in the coefficient on private-
dependent schooling. This time, nearest neighbor matching also shows a nearly 2 point reduction 
in the impact of private dependent schools. However, it should be noted that the best balance 
across matching methods comes from the kernel model. While the nearest neighbor approach 
provided an unbalanced sample for two covariates, the mahalanobis metric had a lack of balance 
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across six variables (see Appendix B). This points to evidence that the matching models provide 
little reduction in bias over the OLS model. Overall, there is still a disadvantage for private 
dependent school students of about 15 to 19 points on the PISA reading exam. Confirming the 
hypothesis that the overall effect was driven by these government dependent schools, additional 
models were run for only private independent school students. No significant private school 
effect was found in any of these models. 
 
Table 29: Matching Estimates for Government-Dependent Private Schools: PISA Reading 
 Naïve 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
N. Neighbor 
(3) 
Mahalanobis 
(4) 
Kernel 
(5) 
Private -47.39* 
(6.92) 
-19.96* 
(6.66) 
-18.18* 
(6.72) 
-14.82* 
(7.50) 
-19.28* 
(6.45) 
Controls  X X X X 
R2 0.082 0.335 0.228 0.203 0.198 
N  3230 3230 1969 1164 3151 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05 
 
 One potential explanation for these findings comes from an examination of school level 
covariates across schooling types. Table 30 shows that despite being significantly smaller 
institutions, private dependent schools have higher student-teacher ratios, greater teachers 
shortages and a smaller proportion of qualified and certified teachers than both public and private 
independent schools. Additionally, they have lower quality educational resources (which is 
scaled across PISA countries) and they are more likely to be found in villages and small towns, 
as opposed to large cities. The school location variable is categorical on a scale of 1-5 (where 1 
equals village; 2 small town; 3 town; 4 city; 5 large city). Furthermore, by introducing these 
variables into our OLS model, we find that the private school effect disappears entirely. The 
most significant school-level predictors become school size and educational resources, while the 
percent female and proportion of certified teachers are both marginally significant. Although 
these findings provide some evidence of why private dependent school students score lower on 
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the PISA reading exam than their public school counterparts, information obtained from our 
interviews allows us to make more nuanced conjectures and suggests a rationale for why students 
continue to enroll despite this poor performance. 
Table 30: School-Level Covariates by School Status: PISA 2009 
 Public Private 
Independent 
Private 
Dependent 
Student-Teacher Ratio 16.72 17.03 18.09 
Teacher Shortage12 0.11 0.33 0.96 
School Size 708.32 435.31 228.41 
Educational Resources13 -1.09 -1.11 -1.71 
Percent Female 52.66 49.36 48.16 
Certified Teachers (%) 54 46 29 
Qualified Teachers14 (%) 74 68 48 
School Location 2.44 2.69 1.81 
N = 4913 
 
Interview Findings 
 Through our interviews with donor organizations, ministry officials, private school 
foundations and school personnel, we obtained useful information regarding the quality of 
educational inputs in junior secondary schools targeting low-income children (i.e. government 
dependent secondary schools). The issue that became apparent almost immediately was the 
limited access to funding for schools that serve the poorest students. Although the BOS subsidy 
does provide a consistent source of funding for public and government-dependent private 
schools, it often appears insufficient for maintaining a school. For example, while the majority of 
teachers in state schools are civil servants, private schools often resort to using the BOS funds 
for teacher salaries, leaving even less for operating expenses. Coupled with the fact that those 
                                                      
12 Index on teacher shortage was derived from the principal’s perception of a lack of qualified science, math, 
language and ‘other’ teachers that adversely impacts instruction at the school. Higher values indicate higher rates of 
teacher shortage. 
13 Scaled index computed on the basis of seven measures of resource inadequacies that could adversely impact 
instruction. Higher scores indicate higher levels of educational resources. 
14 Certification is obtained from a government authority, while ‘qualified’ refers to UNESCO’s ISCED 5A 
qualification. 
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accepting BOS funding are required to eliminate all school fees for parents, further limits the 
amount of money available for rent, infrastructure and resources. As a result, we found that 20% 
of the schools we visited were continuing to charge school fees, despite their explicit ban. Not 
surprisingly, these fee-charging schools tended to serve slightly more advantaged families and 
had higher accreditation grades than non-fee charging schools. The ‘free’ schools that we visited 
served noticeably poorer populations, paid their teachers less, suffered from shortages of 
educational materials and had more infrastructure issues. This lack of funding in those private 
schools most heavily dependent on government funding also led to concerns regarding teacher 
preparedness.  
 The PISA results suggest that private dependent schools were less likely to have certified 
and qualified teachers than public schools. Accordingly, government dependent private schools 
often paid teachers extremely low salaries (as low as 50,000 Rp. per month, less than $6.00, in a 
school that we visited). Thus, while private schools have the advantage of autonomy in teacher 
hiring, limited budgets for teacher salaries make it difficult for private schools to fill their rosters 
with certified and/or trained teachers. Additionally, pre-service training for teachers in madrasas 
(i.e. the majority of schools we visited) was often in religious rather than academic subjects in 
Islamic colleges or universities. Therefore, while we found no shortage of teachers in the private 
schools that we visited, many principals noted that the content and pedagogical knowledge of 
teachers was inadequate for providing high quality educational opportunities to their students. 
Finally, there was severely limited access to professional development opportunities for teachers 
in private schools serving the poorest students.  While some districts include teachers from 
public and private madrasahs in in-service training, this practice is not consistent across districts 
and professional development opportunities are often limited for private schools and their 
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teachers who cannot afford to pay for these services out of pocket. Among the schools that we 
visited, only those participating in donor funded programs (such as USAID’s Decentralizing 
Basic Education (DBE)) had received any significant professional development. While teachers 
in some schools participated in district sponsored activities, most only participated in training 
offered by NGOs, where the costs were the responsibility of either the school or individual 
teachers.  
 Another important finding from our interviews and school site visits was that while 
student-teacher ratios were relatively low in private schools, class sizes were significantly larger 
than expected. This might seem paradoxical at first but it is the result of inefficient staffing in 
many of the poorer private schools. For example, while public secondary teachers are expected 
to teach only one subject, private schools do not often have enough qualified full-time teachers to 
cover all subjects. Therefore, private schools are actually more likely to hire a large number of 
part-time teachers, some of whom were found to be government teachers (teaching an entire load 
in public schools). By employing a large number of teachers relative to the per student BOS 
subsidy, private schools end up paying even lower teacher salaries—many of whom work 
multiple shifts or other jobs, including working in other schools. 
 Despite these issues with funding, teacher quality, staffing, infrastructure and materials, 
private schools were still found to be in high demand—some of the schools we visited were even 
oversubscribed. The vast majority of the junior secondary private schools that we visited were 
founded to provide families in their community with greater access to education, either for 
students whose primary-level exit examination scores were too low to get them into public 
schools or because there had been no lower secondary options in the community prior to 
establishment of the school.  More than 50% of principals in the schools we visited reported that 
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there was a public school within 1 kilometer of their school. Therefore, perhaps more important 
than the overall issue of access is the fact that many private madrasahs, particularly in rural 
areas, were founded by local religious leaders or groups that have connections to local mosques. 
While a 1989 education law required that all schools, including private madrasahs and other 
religious schools, follow the national curriculum, many parents choose to enroll their children in 
these private schools because of the additional focus on religious education and training that they 
will provide. Additionally, while some principals noted that parents do use information about 
exit exam passage rates when choosing the right school for their children, the reputation of the 
school’s yayasan was also an important factor in this decision. In other words, many parents 
choose to send their children to private madrasahs for reasons other than academic performance. 
Discussion 
 Private schooling accounts for approximately 40% of the secondary school enrolments in 
Indonesia. However, recent evidence from the OECD suggests that students in public schools 
significantly outperform those in private schools (at least with regard to PISA reading scores). 
Therefore, this study was designed to answer two main questions: 1) What factors can be used to 
explain this apparent private school disadvantage? 2) Why are private schools still in such high 
demand despite concerns about school quality?  
 As the OECD report used simple mean differences for their claim of poor private school 
performance, the first step in this study was to determine the impact of private school attendance 
on PISA reading scores, controlling for relevant student-level control variables in an OLS 
regression. Next, matching models were run in order to mitigate against concerns about bias due 
to self-selection into public and private schools. Ultimately, all models still showed a public 
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school advantage of about 15 points on reading scores. However, this finding was driven by 
almost entirely by the poor performance of students in government dependent private schools. 
These schools (in which at least 50% of funding comes from government sources) tend to enroll 
the poorest secondary school students, thus providing educational opportunities to those most in 
need. These analyses were somewhat limited by the fact that the dataset contained no baseline 
achievement or pre-test measures (which are generally the most predictive of future performance 
and could help to provide more balanced groups for analyses). While there was a meta-cognition 
variable in the data (and the inclusion of this variable did cause the private school effect to 
become non-significant across models), this variable is endogenous in that it measures not just 
innate ability but a particular approach to answering questions that is likely to be taught to 
students in higher-performing schools (or those with higher-quality pedagogical approaches). 
Therefore, these analyses were reliant on the demographic and socio economic factors available 
in PISA. Based on these data, our models show that it is more than just students’ socio economic 
status that is causing the gap in achievement between private government dependent and public 
schools. For example, an examination of school level variables in the PISA data showed that 
much of the private school effect was explained by school size (or something correlated with it, 
like the overall resources), the quality of educational resources, percent female and the 
proportion of certified teachers. While the impact of higher quality of educational resources and 
a larger proportion of certified teachers on educational attainment seems intuitive, the other two 
factors seem less straightforward. It is most likely that school size and the percent of female 
students do not directly impact learning but are simply highly correlated with the poorest 
performing schools. As learned through our interviews, these are often small schools (with few 
resources), located in rural areas where females are still likely to enroll in lower numbers. 
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Information obtained from our interviews also helped to further explain why government 
dependent junior secondary schools appear to be providing lower quality educational 
opportunities to their students.  
 Our interviews with principals of schools that charged no fees (and therefore received 
nearly all of their funding from government sources) brought to light the issue of limited access 
to funding for those schools serving the poorest students. While the BOS subsidy provides 
government dependent schools with a steady stream of income it is insufficient to cover all 
teacher salaries and operational costs but comes with a high price tag (i.e. the elimination of 
school fees). Since the majority of schools we interviewed claimed to receive no regular 
assistance from their yayasan (some even noted that their yayasan charged management fees 
and/or rent) it is not surprising that these schools are struggling to meet the educational standards 
of fully-funded public schools. These funding shortages impact schools in a variety of ways. 
First and foremost is the poor infrastructure and shortage of educational materials in many 
private madrasahs. Additionally, inconsistent (and insufficient) income has had a major effect on 
the ability of schools to hire high-quality teachers. Furthermore, teachers in private madrasahs 
are often unable to participate in professional development opportunities due to their inability to 
pay for the services (as opposed to public school teachers who attend for free). Although there is 
a new initiative to certify all teachers in public and private schools by 2015, there are significant 
concerns about the educational backgrounds of teachers in government dependent schools as 
well as concerns about the ability of the government to fund such an initiative. Whether this 
initiative is successful or not, the issues of school funding and teacher quality must be addressed, 
however, if private schools are expected to provide equal educational opportunities to those 
offered in public schools. 
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 The question remains, however, as to why private schools continue to enroll so many 
students when they provide lower quality education. Part of the answer may be obvious: private 
schools have increased access to basic education by providing opportunities for students who 
were unable to enroll in public schools. While this excess demand explanation is useful it still 
only tells part of the story. Although private madrasahs must follow the national curriculum, they 
do have flexibility in their ability to provide additional learning opportunities for students. One 
of the most commonly cited reasons for enrolling children in these schools, therefore, was the 
demand for religious training and education. For example, while parents noted exam scores are 
part of their selection criteria, the reputation of a private madrasah’s yayasan was also found to 
be a factor. Therefore, the idea of what makes a school ‘good’ in the eyes of some Indonesian 
parents may be very different than our traditional view of academic performance above all else. 
 Based on these findings, there are a few main conclusions to be drawn. First of all, there 
is an important distinction to be made in Indonesia between private dependent and private 
independent schools. While the former tend to serve some of the country’s poorest students and 
are outperformed on the PISA exams by public schools, the latter are more likely to provide 
educational opportunities to some of the country’s elite and provide educational opportunities on 
par with the public sector. Accordingly, researchers must always take caution to be clear about 
what is meant by a ‘private’ school—and not just in Indonesia. The sector looks different in all 
settings and therefore must be clearly understood and defined in any examination of its impact 
and approach. Second, one of the largest factors impacting the public-private divide was the 
grade of students sitting for the PISA exam. Despite the fact that all students were 15 years of 
age at the time of the test, those in private independent schools had received a full additional year 
of schooling as compared with students in private dependent schools. While some researchers 
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have voiced concerns about the ability to compare students across countries with PISA (e.g. is a 
15 year old in Japan really the same as a 15 year old in Azerbaijan?), this study takes that 
concern one step further to ask, “Are 15 year olds the same within countries, particularly across 
schooling sectors?”  
 Third, government dependent private schools were found to provide increased 
educational access but relatively low PISA scores. One of the most important policy questions 
that arises from this finding is the importance of access in the short term. While increased 
funding and professional development opportunities for teachers in private madrasahs are 
necessary for long-term academic success (using a metric such as exam scores), the fact that 
these schools are providing educational access to those student without other opportunities 
should be considered an achievement in and of itself—not to mention the fact that there is still 
likely an upward bias in the achievement gap due to a selection problem. Lastly, a focus on 
religious education and training in MORA private schools raises questions about both 
performance and demand. Although these schools are required to follow the national curriculum 
and are therefore supposed to provide additional religious education without sacrificing the 
academic content taught in public schools, this is not always the case. By hiring teachers who 
have had more religious than educational or pedagogical training, private dependent schools are 
often limited in their ability to offer high-quality academic content. Additionally, many parents 
appear to be choosing these schools (at least in part) due to their focus on religious training and 
education. This brings up a question about the appropriateness of using PISA scores as the sole 
assessment of school quality. While it is clear that public school students are outperforming their 
private dependent school counterparts on PISA’s reading, math and science exams, perhaps 
studies of private school quality in Indonesia should also focus on parental satisfaction with 
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moral/religious training as well as religious job placement rates, instead of relying solely on 
academic exams. 
 Whatever the metric, however, one thing is clear: many private schools in Indonesia are 
underfunded with a high proportion of uncertified, underpaid teachers who have little access to 
training and professional development opportunities. If there are to be any expectations for these 
private schools to provide educational attainment on par with public schools, these issues must 
be addressed. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This dissertation is comprised of three distinct but interrelated studies examining the 
provision and quality of non-government schooling (particularly for low-income children) across 
countries. The ordering of these three essays was intentional. The first paper was used to provide 
a broad overview of the changing landscape of non-government schools across countries, at the 
most general level. In order to provide a more nuanced examination of the sector, papers two and 
three were designed to assess the impact of private schools for low-income children on academic 
achievement. Beginning with Brazil, the second paper provides an impact study for a country 
that is in many way representative of a large number of rapidly growing developing countries 
(both in terms of student enrolments and economic development). The third paper uses data from 
Indonesia in order to provide an examination of the private schooling sector in a country with a 
more unique structure of funding and provision. This was done in order to show the importance 
of context in these types of studies and to provide credence to the argument that there is no 
‘silver bullet’ solution to provide high-quality educational services to low-income children 
across countries (whether public or private). In this final chapter, I review the key findings and 
implications for each of these three studies. I then discuss the overall contributions of this work 
to theory and practice before providing some directions for future research. 
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Findings and Implications 
Private Provision of Education Across Countries 
 Contradicting findings from prior work on educational privatization, I find that public 
spending on education is no longer predictive of private enrolment rates. This finding holds for 
both primary and secondary schools across longitudinal and cross-sectional models. Instead, this 
study finds that population growth, population density and linguistic heterogeneity are now the 
most consistently significant predictors of differences in private enrolment rates across (and 
within) countries. This means that private enrolment rates in primary and secondary schools are 
impacted by factors of excess demand (i.e. population growth and population density) as well as 
differentiated demand (i.e. linguistic heterogeneity). More specifically, increases in population 
growth and population density are associated with increases in educational privatization across 
countries because of the oversupply of students for overburdened public schools. Linguistic 
diversity, on the other hand, impacts privatization based on the need for educational services in 
diverse languages in countries with large numbers of speakers of multiple languages. This can 
also be explained as the inability of the public education sector to provide services in a sufficient 
number of languages to satisfy the demand of its diverse student base.  
 Although public spending on education was not found to be predictive of private 
enrolments across all countries in the data set, perhaps the most important finding is that 
spending did have an impact in countries with low levels of social and economic development. 
Using mean HDI as the cut-off for economic development, per pupil expenditures as a percent of 
GDP per capita were founds to have a significant negative impact on private enrolments. This 
finding is critical for policy makers and aid organizations interested in increasing public primary 
enrolments in countries facing some of the most difficult economic hardships. While increased 
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spending alone will not have a significant impact on public enrolment rates in the majority of 
countries, this is not the case for the most economically disadvantaged countries. In other words, 
organizations seeking to increase public primary enrolments through spending should target their 
aid on countries with the lowest levels of economic development. Ultimately, this study fills an 
important gap in the literature and provides policy makers and aid organizations with a more 
complete understanding of the role of spending (as well as many other economic and political 
factors) on educational privatization across the globe, by bringing to light new findings that 
contradict conventional wisdom about spending and public versus private schooling.  
The Impact of Private Schools on Educational Attainment in Brazil 
 Based on data from the state of Sao Paulo, this study finds that private school students 
(regardless of tuition level) perform better than their public school counterparts on both the 
objective and writing sections of the ENEM high school exit exam. This private school effect 
remains positive and significant after accounting for sample selection bias via a variety of 
propensity score matching models. Additionally, sensitivity analyses show that the results for the 
overall private school effect are robust to the possibility of potential unobserved confounding 
variables (such as motivation). This led me to conclude that both low-fee and high-fee private 
secondary schools in Brazil provide significant achievement gains as compared with public 
schools. With these data it was not possible to examine the school-specific factors that cause 
private schools to be more effective, although there is evidence that peer effects are likely to play 
a role (seeing as students were transferring into private schools with peers who were, on average, 
wealthier than themselves). This did not seem to be the case, however, for those transferring to 
schools with tuition in the bottom half of the cost distribution. Therefore, effects of low-tuition 
private schools are assumed to result more from teacher and structural impacts, as opposed to 
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peer effects. When moderation effects were tested, it was found that the much of the private 
school effect was driven by the 2007 exam-taking cohort. This cohort effect appears to be the 
result of two factors: 1) enrolling in a private school for two years (as opposed to just one); and 
2) the adaptability of private schools to prepare their students for an exam that started to become 
more important for access to college in 2007 than it was in 2006. Additionally, it should be noted 
that the private school effect for writing scores was smaller than for objective scores. This is 
likely the result of the fact is that it is easier to improve a student’s skills and/or preparation for a 
multiple choice exam in a year or two than it is to improve their writing skills in such a short 
timespan. 
 In the end, this paper provides two important contributions to the literature. First, the 
findings support the hypothesis that despite increases in government support for public 
education, private educational opportunities are still chosen (at least in part) by an increasing 
number of students/families because of their promise to provide gains in academic achievement. 
Secondly, this study provides some of the first evidence of achievement gains for low-fee private 
schools in a developing country, via rigorous quantitative analyses that account for bias due to 
self-selection. This is essential information for policy makers, researchers and aid organizations 
considering the role and impact of low-fee private schools in Brazil (and across developing 
countries, in general), as they provide credence to recent hypotheses that low-cost private 
schools may indeed serve as useful complements to over-burdened public schooling sectors. 
Private Secondary Schools in Indonesia 
 Private secondary school students in Indonesia underperform on the PISA reading, math 
and science assessments as compared with their public school counterparts. These findings are 
robust to a variety of matching algorithms. Furthermore, the negative private school effect is 
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driven by government dependent private schools (i.e. schools that receive at least 50% of their 
funding from public sources). An examination of school level variables in the PISA data showed 
that much of this private school effect was explained by school size, the quality of educational 
resources, percent female and the proportion of certified teachers. While the impact of higher 
quality of educational resources and a larger proportion of certified teachers on educational 
attainment seems intuitive, the other two factors seem less straightforward. It is most likely that 
school size and the percent of female students do not directly impact learning but are simply 
highly correlated with the poorest performing schools. As learned through our interviews, these 
are often small schools (with few resources), located in rural areas where females are still likely 
to enroll in lower numbers. Information obtained from our interviews also helped to further 
explain why government dependent junior secondary schools appear to be providing lower 
quality educational opportunities to their students. 
 For example, we found that one of the major stumbling blocks of government dependent 
schools is their reliance on the BOS subsidy and subsequent issues with funding shortages. This 
is due to the fact that the BOS is insufficient to cover all operating costs but acceptance of the 
subsidy requires schools to abolish all fees. Therefore, there is often only a small pot of money 
that is expected to cover materials, infrastructure upgrades and perhaps most importantly, teacher 
salaries. In addition to concerns about funding shortages leading to the inability to hire certified 
and qualified teachers, those who are hired by private madrasahs continue to fall behind because 
they are often unable to participate in professional development opportunities due to their 
inability to pay for the services (as opposed to public school teachers who attend for free). While 
there is a new initiative to certify all teachers in public and private schools by 2015, there are 
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significant concerns about the educational backgrounds of teachers in government dependent 
schools as well as concerns about the ability of the government to fund such an initiative. 
 Lastly, this study found that despite poor performance on PISA exams, government 
dependent private junior secondary schools are still in such high demand in Indonesia for two 
main reasons: 1) their ability to increase access to basic education by providing opportunities to 
students who would be unable to enroll in public schools; 2) the demand for religious training 
and education. These findings point to important distinctions that must be made among types of 
private schooling (even within a country’s borders). For example, while private dependent school 
students tend to perform significantly worse than their public school counterparts, private 
independent school students score as well on the PISA exam as public school students. 
Therefore, simply claiming that private schools underperform when compared with public 
schools in Indonesia would be extremely misleading. Additionally, these findings raise questions 
about the importance of access versus performance. If schools are providing access to 
educational opportunities that are otherwise unavailable, should this be seen as a measure of 
success…even if these schools are not performing at the highest standards? Finally, this study 
brings up questions about the appropriateness of using PISA scores as a measure of school 
quality. The first part of this issue comes from differences in the fifteen year old population by 
schooling sector (e.g. those in private dependent schools tend to be a full year behind those in 
private independent schools); the second is the fact that private madrasahs in Indonesia focus 
much of their efforts on religious training and education. Therefore, it may be more appropriate 
to measure quality by parental approval ratings of religious training as well as religious job 
placement rates, as opposed to measures of reading, math and science performance. This is not to 
 132 
say that these subjects are unimportant but simply that using them as the sole outcomes may 
neglect to examine an important aspect of what private madrasahs are seeking to accomplish.  
Contributions and Future Research 
 This dissertation is comprised of three high-quality studies, each of which has potential to 
impact policymakers from governments and aid organizations by addressing questions about 
why private schools, particularly those for low-income students, expand across the globe in spite 
of major increases in funding and access in public schools. With a clearer understanding of the 
factors that impact educational privatization across countries, aid organizations interested in 
increasing public enrolments can more effectively direct their efforts based on these findings. For 
example, contrary to prior research, this study finds increasing spending on education is unlikely 
to impact privatization across all countries. However, focusing educational spending efforts on 
countries with the lowest scores on the human development index may be an effective and 
efficient way to decrease private enrolments at the primary level.  
 Additionally, this dissertation provides some much needed insight into the impact of 
private schools for the poor on educational attainment. This fills an important gap in the 
literature on high-quality studies of low-cost private schools. The structure of the Brazilian 
education system makes it likely that the lessons learned from the examination of schools in Sao 
Paulo will be applicable to other systems as well. Therefore, this study provides evidence of the 
fact that the introduction of low-tuition private schools can serve as a useful complement to an 
overburdened public school sector. Most important of all, this claim is based not on ideology but 
on the impact of low-tuition private schools on academic performance. Indonesia, on the other 
hand, tells a different story. With a unique funding and management structure for private 
schools, the specific results of Indonesia are unlikely to be generalizable but the more general 
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findings have implications for all researchers on this topic. Most directly, this work points to the 
importance of clearly understanding and explaining what is meant by ‘private schooling’ and 
strengthens the argument that PISA scores (while illustrative) may be insufficient measures of 
educational quality in diverse settings. 
 These three studies also pave the way for two key areas of future research. First, the 
quality of educational opportunities provided by low-fee private schools should be assessed in 
other countries. Although the Brazilian findings are likely to be relevant in other settings, not 
two countries are identical. As such a rapidly growing sector, low-cost private schools are 
important in many countries throughout the world and a thorough examination of these 
effectiveness is required. Second, I plan to conduct follow-up work on the findings in Brazil. 
Specifically, it is essential to understand how and why private schools are positively impacting 
educational attainment among their students. Therefore, I plan to examine how public and 
private schools in Sao Paulo differ in school structure, teacher practices and student engagement 
in order to learn why private schools are more effective—and to assess what practices can be 
replicated in the public sector. After all, the ultimate goal of this line of research is not only to 
understand the private schooling sector but also to learn from both public and private schools in 
order to improve education for all students.  
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APPENDIX A 
BALANCE CHECKS FOR MATCHING MODELS: BRAZIL 
Table 31: Private Schools (All) - Objective - Mahalanobis 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
 
white        | .75411   .76555     -2.5 |  -0.71  0.479 
black        | .02573    .0243      0.7 |   0.24  0.809 
brown        | .16869   .17155     -0.7 |  -0.20  0.841 
asian        |  .0436   .03145      7.0 |   1.69  0.091 
indig        | .00643   .00572      0.8 |   0.24  0.808 
portuguese   | 69.538    69.35      1.5 |   0.42  0.675 
math         | 43.428   43.665     -2.1 |  -0.48  0.628 
mother_ed    | 2.1008   2.1044     -0.5 |  -0.12  0.902 
father_ed    | 2.1237   2.1272     -0.5 |  -0.12  0.903 
has1tv       | .22945   .21444      3.3 |   0.96  0.340 
has2tv       | .75482   .77127     -3.6 |  -1.02  0.307 
has1dvd      | .64403   .65547     -2.4 |  -0.63  0.526 
has2dvd      | .25447   .23874      4.0 |   0.96  0.335 
has1pc       | .66619    .6669     -0.1 |  -0.04  0.968 
has2pc       | .12866   .13438     -2.0 |  -0.45  0.655 
has1wash     | .81773   .79056      6.8 |   1.81  0.070 
has2wash     | .10865   .13438     -8.7 |  -2.08  0.037 
has1cel      | .27734   .29092     -2.9 |  -0.80  0.426 
has2cel      | .65118    .6376      2.8 |   0.75  0.453 
has1car      | .56326   .56326      0.0 |  -0.00  1.000 
has2car      | .28878   .29736     -2.2 |  -0.50  0.618 
has1bath     | .35954   .37527     -3.2 |  -0.86  0.388 
has2bath     | .63617    .6183      3.7 |   0.98  0.329 
piped        | .98642   .98999     -2.6 |  -0.88  0.381 
electric     | .99285     .995     -2.2 |  -0.73  0.466 
magpaper     | .58113   .56469      3.3 |   0.88  0.380 
diction      | .97641   .97141      2.6 |   0.83  0.407 
internet     | .71551   .71194      0.8 |   0.21  0.834 
write_prof   | 1.9092   1.8906      1.8 |   0.50  0.620 
age          | 15.141   15.123      1.7 |   0.74  0.458 
repeat       |  .0193   .02645     -4.8 |  -1.26  0.206 
fam_size     | 4.3102   4.3142     -0.3 |  -0.09  0.932 
male         | .40243   .41673     -2.9 |  -0.77  0.442 
y2007        | .69693   .70622     -1.9 |  -0.54  0.591 
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Table 32: Private Schools (All) - Objective – Kernel 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .75411   .74775      1.4 |   0.39  0.697 
black        | .02573   .02903     -1.5 |  -0.53  0.593 
brown        | .16869   .17335     -1.1 |  -0.33  0.744 
asian        |  .0436   .04163      1.1 |   0.26  0.796 
indig        | .00643   .00637      0.1 |   0.02  0.985 
portuguese   | 69.538    69.26      2.2 |   0.62  0.532 
math         | 43.428   43.219      1.8 |   0.43  0.664 
mother_ed    | 2.1008   2.0886      1.6 |   0.41  0.678 
father_ed    | 2.1237   2.1136      1.3 |   0.34  0.732 
has1tv       | .22945    .2348     -1.2 |  -0.33  0.738 
has2tv       | .75482   .74956      1.1 |   0.32  0.747 
has1dvd      | .64403   .64424     -0.0 |  -0.01  0.991 
has2dvd      | .25447     .249      1.4 |   0.33  0.739 
has1pc       | .66619   .65595      2.1 |   0.57  0.567 
has2pc       | .12866   .12769      0.3 |   0.08  0.939 
has1wash     | .81773   .81332      1.1 |   0.30  0.764 
has2wash     | .10865   .11042     -0.6 |  -0.15  0.881 
has1cel      | .27734   .27967     -0.5 |  -0.14  0.891 
has2cel      | .65118   .64541      1.2 |   0.32  0.750 
has1car      | .56326   .55546      1.6 |   0.42  0.678 
has2car      | .28878   .28432      1.1 |   0.26  0.794 
has1bath     | .35954   .36756     -1.7 |  -0.44  0.659 
has2bath     | .63617   .62737      1.8 |   0.48  0.630 
piped        | .98642   .98614      0.2 |   0.06  0.949 
electric     | .99285   .99247      0.4 |   0.12  0.906 
magpaper     | .58113    .5757      1.1 |   0.29  0.771 
diction      | .97641   .97463      0.9 |   0.31  0.760 
internet     | .71551   .70363      2.5 |   0.69  0.489 
write_prof   | 1.9092   1.9008      0.8 |   0.22  0.823 
age          | 15.141   15.161     -1.9 |  -0.74  0.458 
repeat       |  .0193    .0192      0.1 |   0.02  0.985 
fam_size     | 4.3102    4.333     -1.8 |  -0.50  0.620 
male         | .40243   .40426     -0.4 |  -0.10  0.922 
y2007        | .69693   .68858      1.7 |   0.48  0.633 
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Table 33: Private Schools (All) - Objective – Nearest Neighbor 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .75411   .76083     -1.5 |  -0.41  0.679 
black        | .02573   .02759     -0.9 |  -0.31  0.760 
brown        | .16869   .16326      1.3 |   0.39  0.699 
asian        |  .0436   .03817      3.1 |   0.73  0.468 
indig        | .00643   .00758     -1.3 |  -0.36  0.717 
portuguese   | 69.538   69.487      0.4 |   0.12  0.908 
math         | 43.428   43.479     -0.5 |  -0.11  0.915 
mother_ed    | 2.1008   2.0991      0.2 |   0.06  0.953 
father_ed    | 2.1237   2.1324     -1.1 |  -0.30  0.765 
has1tv       | .22945   .22931      0.0 |   0.01  0.993 
has2tv       | .75482   .75425      0.1 |   0.04  0.972 
has1dvd      | .64403   .65147     -1.5 |  -0.41  0.681 
has2dvd      | .25447    .2426      3.0 |   0.73  0.468 
has1pc       | .66619   .67505     -1.8 |  -0.50  0.618 
has2pc       | .12866    .1238      1.7 |   0.39  0.699 
has1wash     | .81773   .80643      2.8 |   0.76  0.445 
has2wash     | .10865   .11494     -2.1 |  -0.53  0.598 
has1cel      | .27734   .27963     -0.5 |  -0.13  0.893 
has2cel      | .65118   .65018      0.2 |   0.06  0.956 
has1car      | .56326    .5664     -0.6 |  -0.17  0.867 
has2car      | .28878   .28549      0.8 |   0.19  0.848 
has1bath     | .35954   .36955     -2.1 |  -0.55  0.583 
has2bath     | .63617   .62573      2.2 |   0.57  0.567 
piped        | .98642   .98728     -0.6 |  -0.20  0.842 
electric     | .99285   .99385     -1.0 |  -0.33  0.745 
magpaper     | .58113   .57241      1.8 |   0.47  0.641 
diction      | .97641    .9757      0.4 |   0.12  0.902 
internet     | .71551   .71122      0.9 |   0.25  0.802 
write_prof   | 1.9092   1.9132     -0.4 |  -0.11  0.915 
age          | 15.141   15.124      1.7 |   0.72  0.474 
repeat       |  .0193   .02102     -1.2 |  -0.32  0.747 
fam_size     | 4.3102   4.3357     -2.0 |  -0.56  0.578 
male         | .40243   .40772     -1.1 |  -0.28  0.776 
y2007        | .69693   .70379     -1.4 |  -0.40  0.692 
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Table 34: Private Schools (All) - Writing – Mahalanobis 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .75018   .76497     -3.2 |  -0.90  0.370 
black        | .02661   .02513      0.7 |   0.24  0.809 
brown        | .17147   .15817      3.2 |   0.93  0.351 
asian        | .04361   .04065      1.7 |   0.38  0.702 
indig        | .00665   .00887     -2.6 |  -0.66  0.511 
portuguese   | 69.681   70.184     -4.1 |  -1.14  0.253 
math         | 43.434    43.66     -2.0 |  -0.46  0.647 
mother_ed    | 2.0931   2.0983     -0.7 |  -0.17  0.863 
father_ed    |  2.119   2.1109      1.1 |   0.27  0.784 
has1tv       | .23134   .24464     -2.9 |  -0.81  0.417 
has2tv       | .75314   .74353      2.1 |   0.58  0.565 
has1dvd      | .64523   .64597     -0.2 |  -0.04  0.968 
has2dvd      | .25203   .24834      0.9 |   0.22  0.824 
has1pc       | .66814   .67258     -0.9 |  -0.25  0.806 
has2pc       | .12417   .10939      5.3 |   1.20  0.231 
has1wash     | .82336    .8337     -2.6 |  -0.71  0.475 
has2wash     | .10347   .08795      5.3 |   1.37  0.170 
has1cel      |  .2816   .29786     -3.5 |  -0.93  0.351 
has2cel      | .64671   .64154      1.1 |   0.28  0.779 
has1car      | .56245   .56393     -0.3 |  -0.08  0.938 
has2car      | .28899   .27568      3.3 |   0.77  0.442 
has1bath     | .36364   .35698      1.4 |   0.36  0.719 
has2bath     | .63267   .64302     -2.1 |  -0.56  0.576 
piped        | .98596    .9867     -0.5 |  -0.17  0.869 
electric     | .99261    .9963     -3.8 |  -1.29  0.196 
magpaper     | .58167   .55728      4.9 |   1.28  0.200 
diction      | .97561   .97118      2.3 |   0.72  0.474 
internet     | .71397   .69771      3.4 |   0.93  0.354 
write_prof   | 1.9054   1.9283     -2.3 |  -0.59  0.552 
age          | 15.129   15.139     -1.0 |  -0.43  0.667 
repeat       | .01996   .02439     -3.0 |  -0.78  0.434 
fam_size     | 4.3245    4.333     -0.7 |  -0.18  0.854 
male         |  .3969   .38877      1.7 |   0.43  0.665 
y2007        | .71101   .69623      3.1 |   0.84  0.400 
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Table 35: Private Schools (All) - Writing – Kernel 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .75018   .74378      1.4 |   0.38  0.702 
black        | .02661   .02987     -1.5 |  -0.51  0.609 
brown        | .17147   .17627     -1.2 |  -0.33  0.742 
asian        | .04361   .04165      1.1 |   0.25  0.801 
indig        | .00665   .00656      0.1 |   0.03  0.977 
portuguese   | 69.681   69.402      2.2 |   0.62  0.536 
math         | 43.434   43.231      1.8 |   0.42  0.677 
mother_ed    | 2.0931   2.0819      1.5 |   0.38  0.707 
father_ed    |  2.119   2.1083      1.4 |   0.36  0.722 
has1tv       | .23134   .23623     -1.1 |  -0.30  0.764 
has2tv       | .75314   .74837      1.0 |   0.29  0.774 
has1dvd      | .64523   .64487      0.1 |   0.02  0.984 
has2dvd      | .25203   .24689      1.3 |   0.31  0.757 
has1pc       | .66814   .65804      2.1 |   0.56  0.578 
has2pc       | .12417   .12317      0.4 |   0.08  0.937 
has1wash     | .82336   .81808      1.3 |   0.36  0.721 
has2wash     | .10347   .10601     -0.9 |  -0.22  0.829 
has1cel      |  .2816   .28347     -0.4 |  -0.11  0.914 
has2cel      | .64671   .64144      1.1 |   0.29  0.775 
has1car      | .56245    .5547      1.6 |   0.41  0.685 
has2car      | .28899   .28487      1.0 |   0.24  0.813 
has1bath     | .36364    .3706     -1.4 |  -0.38  0.707 
has2bath     | .63267   .62501      1.6 |   0.41  0.680 
piped        | .98596   .98581      0.1 |   0.03  0.974 
electric     | .99261   .99229      0.3 |   0.10  0.923 
magpaper     | .58167   .57623      1.1 |   0.29  0.775 
diction      | .97561   .97402      0.8 |   0.26  0.792 
internet     | .71397   .70225      2.5 |   0.67  0.503 
write_prof   | 1.9054      1.9      0.5 |   0.14  0.887 
age          | 15.129   15.147     -1.8 |  -0.69  0.489 
repeat       | .01996   .01964      0.2 |   0.06  0.954 
fam_size     | 4.3245   4.3463     -1.7 |  -0.47  0.640 
male         |  .3969    .3987     -0.4 |  -0.10  0.924 
y2007        | .71101    .7015      2.0 |   0.54  0.587 
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Table 36: Private Schools (All) - Writing – Nearest Neighbor 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .75018   .74797      0.5 |   0.13  0.894 
black        | .02661   .02897     -1.1 |  -0.37  0.708 
brown        | .17147   .17073      0.2 |   0.05  0.959 
asian        | .04361   .04316      0.3 |   0.06  0.955 
indig        | .00665   .00739     -0.9 |  -0.23  0.818 
portuguese   | 69.681   69.902     -1.8 |  -0.50  0.616 
math         | 43.434   43.228      1.8 |   0.42  0.671 
mother_ed    | 2.0931     2.09      0.4 |   0.10  0.917 
father_ed    |  2.119   2.1283     -1.2 |  -0.31  0.754 
has1tv       | .23134   .22055      2.4 |   0.67  0.502 
has2tv       | .75314   .76467     -2.5 |  -0.70  0.483 
has1dvd      | .64523   .64331      0.4 |   0.10  0.917 
has2dvd      | .25203   .25469     -0.7 |  -0.16  0.874 
has1pc       | .66814   .66208      1.3 |   0.33  0.738 
has2pc       | .12417   .12506     -0.3 |  -0.07  0.944 
has1wash     | .82336    .8133      2.5 |   0.68  0.498 
has2wash     | .10347   .11205     -2.9 |  -0.72  0.472 
has1cel      |  .2816   .28751     -1.3 |  -0.34  0.733 
has2cel      | .64671   .64582      0.2 |   0.05  0.962 
has1car      | .56245   .55935      0.6 |   0.16  0.871 
has2car      | .28899   .28943     -0.1 |  -0.03  0.980 
has1bath     | .36364    .3561      1.6 |   0.41  0.683 
has2bath     | .63267   .64139     -1.8 |  -0.47  0.637 
piped        | .98596    .9867     -0.5 |  -0.17  0.869 
electric     | .99261   .99409     -1.5 |  -0.47  0.636 
magpaper     | .58167   .56807      2.7 |   0.72  0.474 
diction      | .97561   .97324      1.2 |   0.39  0.697 
internet     | .71397    .7017      2.6 |   0.70  0.483 
write_prof   | 1.9054   1.9171     -1.2 |  -0.30  0.761 
age          | 15.129   15.121      0.8 |   0.32  0.753 
repeat       | .01996   .01951      0.3 |   0.08  0.934 
fam_size     | 4.3245   4.3492     -1.9 |  -0.53  0.596 
male         |  .3969   .39911     -0.5 |  -0.12  0.906 
y2007        | .71101   .71101      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
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Table 37: Low-fee Private Schools - Objective – Mahalanobis 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .63542   .54167     19.2 |   1.32  0.189 
black        | .03125   .03125      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
brown        |    .25   .35417    -23.3 |  -1.57  0.117 
asian        |  .0625    .0625      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
indig        | .02083   .01042      8.3 |   0.58  0.563 
portuguese   | 68.125   68.611     -3.8 |  -0.29  0.770 
math         | 39.087   37.925     11.9 |   0.81  0.418 
mother_ed    | 2.0313   2.0104      2.8 |   0.19  0.847 
father_ed    | 2.1667   2.1979     -4.1 |  -0.27  0.784 
has1tv       | .21875   .23958     -4.8 |  -0.34  0.733 
has2tv       | .78125   .76042      4.7 |   0.34  0.733 
has1dvd      | .59375    .6875    -19.4 |  -1.35  0.178 
has2dvd      | .29167   .15625     32.1 |   2.27  0.024 
has1pc       | .69792   .70833     -2.2 |  -0.16  0.875 
has2pc       | .13542   .11458      6.9 |   0.43  0.665 
has1wash     |   .875   .88542     -2.8 |  -0.22  0.825 
has2wash     | .04167   .02083      8.7 |   0.83  0.409 
has1cel      | .30208   .28125      4.5 |   0.32  0.752 
has2cel      | .60417   .61458     -2.1 |  -0.15  0.883 
has1car      | .54167   .48958     10.4 |   0.72  0.473 
has2car      |    .25   .22917      5.3 |   0.34  0.737 
has1bath     | .44792   .42708      4.2 |   0.29  0.773 
has2bath     | .55208   .57292     -4.2 |  -0.29  0.773 
electric     | .98958        1    -10.8 |  -1.00  0.319 
magpaper     | .63542   .65625     -4.2 |  -0.30  0.764 
internet     | .69792   .72917     -6.5 |  -0.48  0.634 
write_prof   | 1.7604   1.7708     -1.1 |  -0.08  0.937 
age          | 15.133   15.061      6.2 |   0.78  0.437 
repeat       | .03125    .0625    -18.0 |  -1.02  0.308 
fam_size     | 4.2448   4.2083      2.8 |   0.20  0.839 
male         | .32292   .32292      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
y2007        | .71875   .72917     -2.2 |  -0.16  0.873 
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Table 38: Low-fee Private Schools - Objective – Kernel 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .63542   .63126      0.8 |   0.06  0.953 
black        | .03125   .03414     -1.2 |  -0.11  0.911 
brown        |    .25     .248      0.4 |   0.03  0.975 
asian        |  .0625   .06996     -3.7 |  -0.21  0.836 
indig        | .02083   .01664      3.4 |   0.21  0.831 
portuguese   | 68.125    68.07      0.4 |   0.03  0.975 
math         | 39.087   38.742      3.5 |   0.23  0.819 
mother_ed    | 2.0313   2.0589     -3.7 |  -0.26  0.798 
father_ed    | 2.1667   2.1737     -0.9 |  -0.06  0.949 
has1tv       | .21875   .21536      0.8 |   0.06  0.955 
has2tv       | .78125   .78464     -0.8 |  -0.06  0.955 
has1dvd      | .59375   .61335     -4.1 |  -0.28  0.783 
has2dvd      | .29167   .28463      1.7 |   0.11  0.915 
has1pc       | .69792   .70626     -1.7 |  -0.13  0.900 
has2pc       | .13542    .1408     -1.8 |  -0.11  0.914 
has1wash     |   .875   .88404     -2.5 |  -0.19  0.848 
has2wash     | .04167   .03969      0.8 |   0.07  0.945 
has1cel      | .30208    .3155     -2.9 |  -0.20  0.842 
has2cel      | .60417   .59916      1.0 |   0.07  0.944 
has1car      | .54167    .5651     -4.7 |  -0.32  0.746 
has2car      |    .25   .23105      4.9 |   0.31  0.760 
has1bath     | .44792   .44167      1.3 |   0.09  0.931 
has2bath     | .55208   .55833     -1.3 |  -0.09  0.931 
electric     | .98958   .99158     -2.1 |  -0.14  0.887 
magpaper     | .63542   .63919     -0.8 |  -0.05  0.957 
internet     | .69792   .70821     -2.1 |  -0.16  0.877 
write_prof   | 1.7604   1.7543      0.7 |   0.05  0.964 
age          | 15.133   15.146     -1.1 |  -0.13  0.897 
repeat       | .03125   .03591     -2.7 |  -0.18  0.859 
fam_size     | 4.2448   4.2419      0.2 |   0.02  0.987 
male         | .32292   .32558     -0.6 |  -0.04  0.969 
y2007        | .71875   .71352      1.1 |   0.08  0.936 
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Table 39: Low-fee Private Schools - Objective – Nearest Neighbor 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        | .63542   .60347      6.5 |   0.45  0.651 
black        | .03125   .01875      5.2 |   0.55  0.581 
brown        |    .25   .29635    -10.4 |  -0.72  0.474 
asian        |  .0625   .06059      0.9 |   0.05  0.956 
indig        | .02083   .02083      0.0 |  -0.00  1.000 
portuguese   | 68.125   68.836     -5.6 |  -0.41  0.681 
math         | 39.087   38.484      6.1 |   0.41  0.682 
mother_ed    | 2.0313   2.0778     -6.2 |  -0.44  0.663 
father_ed    | 2.1667   2.1595      0.9 |   0.06  0.949 
has1tv       | .21875   .21302      1.3 |   0.10  0.924 
has2tv       | .78125   .78698     -1.3 |  -0.10  0.924 
has1dvd      | .59375   .63247     -8.0 |  -0.55  0.584 
has2dvd      | .29167   .25087      9.7 |   0.63  0.527 
has1pc       | .69792   .74288     -9.4 |  -0.69  0.490 
has2pc       | .13542   .11337      7.3 |   0.46  0.646 
has1wash     |   .875    .8684      1.8 |   0.14  0.892 
has2wash     | .04167   .05556     -5.8 |  -0.45  0.657 
has1cel      | .30208   .27326      6.2 |   0.44  0.661 
has2cel      | .60417   .62882     -5.0 |  -0.35  0.727 
has1car      | .54167   .56198     -4.1 |  -0.28  0.779 
has2car      |    .25   .23958      2.7 |   0.17  0.868 
has1bath     | .44792   .43594      2.4 |   0.17  0.868 
has2bath     | .55208   .56406     -2.4 |  -0.17  0.868 
electric     | .98958   .99375     -4.3 |  -0.32  0.752 
magpaper     | .63542    .6441     -1.8 |  -0.12  0.901 
internet     | .69792   .75052    -10.9 |  -0.81  0.417 
write_prof   | 1.7604   1.8215     -6.5 |  -0.46  0.648 
age          | 15.133   15.146     -1.1 |  -0.12  0.903 
repeat       | .03125   .03681     -3.2 |  -0.21  0.833 
fam_size     | 4.2448    4.272     -2.1 |  -0.15  0.881 
male         | .32292   .31042      2.6 |   0.19  0.853 
y2007        | .71875   .71563      0.7 |   0.05  0.962 
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Table 40: Low-fee Private Schools – Writing – Mahalanobis 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        |  .6383   .58511     10.9 |   0.75  0.457 
black        | .03191   .04255     -4.4 |  -0.38  0.702 
brown        | .25532    .2766     -4.8 |  -0.33  0.743 
asian        | .06383   .04255     10.5 |   0.65  0.518 
indig        | .01064   .05319    -33.8 |  -1.66  0.098 
portuguese   | 67.953   69.908    -15.4 |  -1.15  0.252 
math         | 39.118    40.51    -14.1 |  -0.85  0.395 
mother_ed    | 2.0426   1.9574     11.4 |   0.79  0.431 
father_ed    | 2.1489    2.117      4.2 |   0.28  0.778 
has1tv       |  .2234   .21277      2.4 |   0.18  0.861 
has2tv       |  .7766   .78723     -2.4 |  -0.18  0.861 
has1dvd      | .58511   .61702     -6.6 |  -0.44  0.657 
has2dvd      | .29787   .25532     10.1 |   0.65  0.517 
has1pc       | .69149   .70213     -2.2 |  -0.16  0.875 
has2pc       |  .1383   .09574     14.1 |   0.90  0.367 
has1wash     | .87234    .8617      2.9 |   0.21  0.831 
has2wash     | .04255   .04255      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
has1cel      | .29787   .34043     -9.2 |  -0.62  0.534 
has2cel      | .60638   .55319     10.8 |   0.74  0.463 
has1car      | .55319   .56383     -2.1 |  -0.15  0.884 
has2car      | .24468   .26596     -5.4 |  -0.33  0.740 
has1bath     | .43617   .42553      2.1 |   0.15  0.884 
has2bath     | .56383   .57447     -2.1 |  -0.15  0.884 
electric     | .98936   .97872     11.0 |   0.58  0.563 
magpaper     | .62766   .62766      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
internet     | .69149   .64894      8.8 |   0.62  0.537 
write_prof   |  1.766   1.7447      2.3 |   0.15  0.877 
age          | 15.124   15.128     -0.3 |  -0.03  0.975 
repeat       | .03191   .03191      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
fam_size     | 4.2606   4.4787    -16.7 |  -1.19  0.235 
male         | .31915   .30851      2.2 |   0.16  0.876 
y2007        |  .7234   .74468     -4.5 |  -0.33  0.743 
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Table 41: Low-fee Private Schools – Writing - Kernel 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        |  .6383   .64074     -0.5 |  -0.03  0.972 
black        | .03191   .03363     -0.7 |  -0.07  0.948 
brown        | .25532   .26106     -1.3 |  -0.09  0.929 
asian        | .06383   .04513      9.3 |   0.56  0.575 
indig        | .01064   .01944     -7.0 |  -0.49  0.622 
portuguese   | 67.953   68.157     -1.6 |  -0.12  0.908 
math         | 39.118   39.041      0.8 |   0.05  0.960 
mother_ed    | 2.0426    2.032      1.4 |   0.10  0.922 
father_ed    | 2.1489   2.1584     -1.2 |  -0.09  0.932 
has1tv       |  .2234   .22149      0.4 |   0.03  0.975 
has2tv       |  .7766   .77851     -0.4 |  -0.03  0.975 
has1dvd      | .58511   .60451     -4.0 |  -0.27  0.788 
has2dvd      | .29787   .28189      3.8 |   0.24  0.810 
has1pc       | .69149   .71361     -4.6 |  -0.33  0.742 
has2pc       |  .1383   .12758      3.6 |   0.22  0.830 
has1wash     | .87234   .88415     -3.2 |  -0.25  0.806 
has2wash     | .04255    .0412      0.6 |   0.05  0.963 
has1cel      | .29787   .29775      0.0 |   0.00  0.999 
has2cel      | .60638    .6089     -0.5 |  -0.04  0.972 
has1car      | .55319    .5685     -3.1 |  -0.21  0.834 
has2car      | .24468   .23628      2.1 |   0.13  0.894 
has1bath     | .43617   .44702     -2.2 |  -0.15  0.882 
has2bath     | .56383   .55298      2.2 |   0.15  0.882 
electric     | .98936   .98883      0.5 |   0.03  0.972 
magpaper     | .62766   .63638     -1.8 |  -0.12  0.902 
internet     | .69149   .70615     -3.0 |  -0.22  0.828 
write_prof   |  1.766   1.7884     -2.4 |  -0.16  0.869 
age          | 15.124   15.124      0.1 |   0.01  0.994 
repeat       | .03191   .02833      2.1 |   0.14  0.886 
fam_size     | 4.2606   4.2473      1.0 |   0.07  0.942 
male         | .31915   .31272      1.4 |   0.09  0.925 
y2007        |  .7234   .72412     -0.2 |  -0.01  0.991 
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Table 42: Low-fee Private Schools – Writing – Nearest Neighbor 
             |       Mean               |     t-test 
    Variable | Treated Control    %bias |    t    p>|t| 
white        |  .6383   .66791     -6.0 |  -0.42  0.672 
black        | .03191   .03404     -0.9 |  -0.08  0.935 
brown        | .25532   .23741      4.0 |   0.28  0.777 
asian        | .06383   .03936     12.1 |   0.76  0.451 
indig        | .01064   .02128     -8.5 |  -0.58  0.563 
portuguese   | 67.953   69.117     -9.2 |  -0.66  0.509 
math         | 39.118   40.015     -9.1 |  -0.56  0.574 
mother_ed    | 2.0426     2.03      1.7 |   0.12  0.907 
father_ed    | 2.1489   2.1363      1.6 |   0.11  0.910 
has1tv       |  .2234   .20248      4.8 |   0.35  0.728 
has2tv       |  .7766   .79752     -4.8 |  -0.35  0.728 
has1dvd      | .58511   .59823     -2.7 |  -0.18  0.856 
has2dvd      | .29787   .29699      0.2 |   0.01  0.989 
has1pc       | .69149   .70337     -2.5 |  -0.18  0.860 
has2pc       |  .1383   .13706      0.4 |   0.02  0.980 
has1wash     | .87234   .88085     -2.3 |  -0.18  0.860 
has2wash     | .04255   .04255      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
has1cel      | .29787   .28457      2.9 |   0.20  0.842 
has2cel      | .60638    .6289     -4.6 |  -0.32  0.752 
has1car      | .55319   .58741     -6.8 |  -0.47  0.638 
has2car      | .24468   .23812      1.7 |   0.10  0.917 
has1bath     | .43617   .44291     -1.4 |  -0.09  0.926 
has2bath     | .56383   .55709      1.4 |   0.09  0.926 
electric     | .98936   .98936      0.0 |   0.00  1.000 
magpaper     | .62766   .63422     -1.3 |  -0.09  0.926 
internet     | .69149   .71436     -4.7 |  -0.34  0.733 
write_prof   |  1.766   1.8092     -4.6 |  -0.32  0.750 
age          | 15.124   15.117      0.6 |   0.07  0.941 
repeat       | .03191   .02766      2.5 |   0.17  0.865 
fam_size     | 4.2606   4.3164     -4.3 |  -0.30  0.763 
male         | .31915   .31578      0.7 |   0.05  0.961 
y2007        |  .7234   .73298     -2.0 |  -0.15  0.883 
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APPENDIX B 
BALANCE CHECKS FOR MATCHING MODELS: INDONESIA 
Table 43: Private (All) – Reading – Mahalanobis 
                Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable      Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
          Age   Unmatched | 15.778   15.738     14.0         |   4.75  0.000 
                 Matched  | 15.778   15.787     -3.2    77.3 |  -1.03  0.304 
                          |                                  | 
        pared   Unmatched | 9.7473   10.289    -15.9         |  -5.40  0.000 
                 Matched  | 9.7505   9.8158     -1.9    87.9 |  -0.61  0.543 
                          |                                  | 
      homepos   Unmatched |-1.8792  -1.8276     -4.7         |  -1.59  0.111 
                 Matched  |-1.8785  -1.8823      0.3    92.8 |   0.11  0.912 
                          |                                  | 
       wealth   Unmatched |-1.7698  -1.7288     -3.3         |  -1.13  0.257 
                 Matched  |-1.7698  -1.7869      1.4    58.3 |   0.45  0.654 
                          |                                  | 
       atschl   Unmatched | .46801   .55694    -10.0         |  -3.39  0.001 
                 Matched  | .46823   .48829     -2.3    77.4 |  -0.73  0.466 
                          |                                  | 
         escs   Unmatched |-1.5816  -1.4334    -13.6         |  -4.63  0.000 
                 Matched  |-1.5808  -1.5644     -1.5    88.9 |  -0.49  0.627 
                          |                                  | 
       hedres   Unmatched |-1.0736  -1.0248     -4.9         |  -1.67  0.096 
                 Matched  |-1.0727  -1.0805      0.8    83.9 |   0.26  0.798 
                          |                                  | 
      joyread   Unmatched | .43492   .44807     -2.6         |  -0.89  0.373 
                 Matched  | .43474   .42433      2.1    20.8 |   0.68  0.500 
                          |                                  | 
         male   Unmatched | .49738   .46732      6.0         |   2.04  0.041 
                 Matched  | .49761   .50429     -1.3    77.8 |  -0.43  0.665 
                          |                                  | 
        grade   Unmatched | 9.5246   9.4399     11.4         |   3.90  0.000 
                 Matched  | 9.5243   9.5262     -0.3    97.7 |  -0.08  0.934 
                          |                                  | 
    preschool   Unmatched | .52265   .56321     -8.1         |  -2.77  0.006 
                 Matched  |  .5229   .52385     -0.2    97.6 |  -0.06  0.951 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q02   Unmatched | 2.2089   2.2434     -5.1         |  -1.73  0.084 
                 Matched  |  2.209   2.2004      1.3    75.2 |   0.41  0.680 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q01   Unmatched | 2.7086   2.7847     -7.4         |  -2.50  0.012 
                 Matched  |  2.709   2.7023      0.6    91.2 |   0.21  0.834 
                          |                                  | 
      st20q12   Unmatched | 1.0553   1.0521      1.4         |   0.49  0.623 
                 Matched  | 1.0549   1.0558     -0.4    70.8 |  -0.14  0.893 
                          |                                  | 
      st19q01   Unmatched | 1.6061   1.6407     -7.1         |  -2.43  0.015 
                 Matched  | 1.6064   1.5926      2.9    60.0 |   0.91  0.361 
                          |                                  | 
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Table 44: Private (All) – Reading – Kernel 
                Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable      Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
          Age   Unmatched | 15.778   15.738     14.0         |   4.75  0.000 
                 Matched  | 15.777   15.778     -0.3    98.1 |  -0.08  0.932 
                          |                                  | 
        pared   Unmatched | 9.7473   10.289    -15.9         |  -5.40  0.000 
                 Matched  | 9.7555   9.7709     -0.5    97.2 |  -0.14  0.885 
                          |                                  | 
      homepos   Unmatched |-1.8792  -1.8276     -4.7         |  -1.59  0.111 
                 Matched  |-1.8785  -1.8793      0.1    98.4 |   0.02  0.981 
                          |                                  | 
       wealth   Unmatched |-1.7698  -1.7288     -3.3         |  -1.13  0.257 
                 Matched  |-1.7702  -1.7754      0.4    87.3 |   0.14  0.891 
                          |                                  | 
       atschl   Unmatched | .46801   .55694    -10.0         |  -3.39  0.001 
                 Matched  | .46842   .47013     -0.2    98.1 |  -0.06  0.950 
                          |                                  | 
         escs   Unmatched |-1.5816  -1.4334    -13.6         |  -4.63  0.000 
                 Matched  |  -1.58  -1.5756     -0.4    97.0 |  -0.13  0.895 
                          |                                  | 
       hedres   Unmatched |-1.0736  -1.0248     -4.9         |  -1.67  0.096 
                 Matched  |-1.0722  -1.0727      0.0    99.0 |   0.02  0.987 
                          |                                  | 
      joyread   Unmatched | .43492   .44807     -2.6         |  -0.89  0.373 
                 Matched  | .43458   .43693     -0.5    82.1 |  -0.15  0.880 
                          |                                  | 
         male   Unmatched | .49738   .46732      6.0         |   2.04  0.041 
                 Matched  | .49809   .49923     -0.2    96.2 |  -0.07  0.941 
                          |                                  | 
        grade   Unmatched | 9.5246   9.4399     11.4         |   3.90  0.000 
                 Matched  | 9.5224   9.5089      1.8    84.0 |   0.59  0.553 
                          |                                  | 
    preschool   Unmatched | .52265   .56321     -8.1         |  -2.77  0.006 
                 Matched  |  .5234   .51527      1.6    80.0 |   0.53  0.599 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q02   Unmatched | 2.2089   2.2434     -5.1         |  -1.73  0.084 
                 Matched  | 2.2096   2.2058      0.6    88.7 |   0.19  0.851 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q01   Unmatched | 2.7086   2.7847     -7.4         |  -2.50  0.012 
                 Matched  | 2.7096   2.6959      1.3    82.0 |   0.43  0.667 
                          |                                  | 
      st20q12   Unmatched | 1.0553   1.0521      1.4         |   0.49  0.623 
                 Matched  | 1.0544   1.0565     -0.9    36.1 |  -0.29  0.768 
                          |                                  | 
      st19q01   Unmatched | 1.6061   1.6407     -7.1         |  -2.43  0.015 
                 Matched  | 1.6065   1.6031      0.7    90.1 |   0.23  0.820 
                          |                                  | 
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Table 45: Private (All) – Reading – Nearest Neighbor 
                Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable      Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
          Age   Unmatched | 15.739   15.738      0.4         |   0.09  0.926 
                 Matched  | 15.739   15.732      2.6  -542.2 |   0.48  0.631 
                          |                                  | 
        pared   Unmatched |  8.563   10.289    -52.1         | -11.94  0.000 
                 Matched  |  8.563   8.2973      8.0    84.6 |   1.53  0.125 
                          |                                  | 
      homepos   Unmatched |-2.3306  -1.8276    -47.9         | -10.74  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.3306  -2.3985      6.5    86.5 |   1.27  0.206 
                          |                                  | 
       wealth   Unmatched |-2.3216  -1.7288    -49.1         | -11.16  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.3216  -2.3397      1.5    96.9 |   0.29  0.772 
                          |                                  | 
       atschl   Unmatched | .37952   .55694    -20.1         |  -4.64  0.000 
                 Matched  | .37952   .38753     -0.9    95.5 |  -0.17  0.867 
                          |                                  | 
         escs   Unmatched |-2.0642  -1.4334    -63.3         | -13.80  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.0642  -2.1461      8.2    87.0 |   1.73  0.083 
                          |                                  | 
       hedres   Unmatched |-1.3504  -1.0248    -34.8         |  -7.81  0.000 
                 Matched  |-1.3504  -1.4333      8.9    74.5 |   1.71  0.088 
                          |                                  | 
      joyread   Unmatched | .44193   .44807     -1.3         |  -0.30  0.768 
                 Matched  | .44193   .43648      1.1    11.2 |   0.22  0.829 
                          |                                  | 
         male   Unmatched | .54519   .46732     15.6         |   3.61  0.000 
                 Matched  | .54519   .55847     -2.7    82.9 |  -0.49  0.624 
                          |                                  | 
        grade   Unmatched | 8.8741   9.4399    -85.4         | -18.87  0.000 
                 Matched  | 8.8741   8.8966     -3.4    96.0 |  -0.68  0.499 
                          |                                  | 
    preschool   Unmatched | .36593   .56321    -40.3         |  -9.24  0.000 
                 Matched  | .36593   .36711     -0.2    99.4 |  -0.05  0.964 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q02   Unmatched | 1.9733   2.2434    -42.7         |  -9.46  0.000 
                 Matched  | 1.9733   1.9908     -2.8    93.5 |  -0.58  0.561 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q01   Unmatched | 2.2652   2.7847    -52.2         | -11.71  0.000 
                 Matched  | 2.2652   2.2282      3.7    92.9 |   0.72  0.472 
                          |                                  | 
      st20q12   Unmatched | 1.0874   1.0521     13.9         |   3.46  0.001 
                 Matched  | 1.0874   1.1031     -6.2    55.5 |  -0.98  0.325 
                          |                                  | 
      st19q01   Unmatched | 1.7319   1.6407     19.7         |   4.46  0.000 
                 Matched  | 1.7319   1.7435     -2.5    87.2 |  -0.49  0.628 
                          |                                  | 
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Table 46: Private (Government Dependent) – Reading – Mahalanobis 
                Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable      Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
          Age   Unmatched | 15.739   15.738      0.4         |   0.09  0.926 
                 Matched  | 15.739   15.732      2.4  -506.5 |   0.46  0.647 
                          |                                  | 
        pared   Unmatched |  8.563   10.289    -52.1         | -11.94  0.000 
                 Matched  |  8.563    8.077     14.7    71.9 |   2.85  0.004 
                          |                                  | 
      homepos   Unmatched |-2.3306  -1.8276    -47.9         | -10.74  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.3306  -2.5107     17.2    64.2 |   3.39  0.001 
                          |                                  | 
       wealth   Unmatched |-2.3216  -1.7288    -49.1         | -11.16  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.3216  -2.4596     11.4    76.7 |   2.20  0.028 
                          |                                  | 
       atschl   Unmatched | .37952   .55694    -20.1         |  -4.64  0.000 
                 Matched  | .37952   .38182     -0.3    98.7 |  -0.05  0.961 
                          |                                  | 
         escs   Unmatched |-2.0642  -1.4334    -63.3         | -13.80  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.0642  -2.2436     18.0    71.6 |   3.88  0.000 
                          |                                  | 
       hedres   Unmatched |-1.3504  -1.0248    -34.8         |  -7.81  0.000 
                 Matched  |-1.3504  -1.4946     15.4    55.7 |   2.99  0.003 
                          |                                  | 
      joyread   Unmatched | .44193   .44807     -1.3         |  -0.30  0.768 
                 Matched  | .44193   .41294      6.1  -372.3 |   1.19  0.235 
                          |                                  | 
         male   Unmatched | .54519   .46732     15.6         |   3.61  0.000 
                 Matched  | .54519   .56741     -4.5    71.5 |  -0.82  0.412 
                          |                                  | 
        grade   Unmatched | 8.8741   9.4399    -85.4         | -18.87  0.000 
                 Matched  | 8.8741   8.9244     -7.6    91.1 |  -1.50  0.134 
                          |                                  | 
    preschool   Unmatched | .36593   .56321    -40.3         |  -9.24  0.000 
                 Matched  | .36593   .36148      0.9    97.7 |   0.17  0.865 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q02   Unmatched | 1.9733   2.2434    -42.7         |  -9.46  0.000 
                 Matched  | 1.9733   1.9689      0.7    98.4 |   0.15  0.885 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q01   Unmatched | 2.2652   2.7847    -52.2         | -11.71  0.000 
                 Matched  | 2.2652   2.1615     10.4    80.0 |   2.03  0.042 
                          |                                  | 
      st20q12   Unmatched | 1.0874   1.0521     13.9         |   3.46  0.001 
                 Matched  | 1.0874   1.1067     -7.6    45.5 |  -1.20  0.232 
                          |                                  | 
      st19q01   Unmatched | 1.7319   1.6407     19.7         |   4.46  0.000 
                 Matched  | 1.7319   1.7585     -5.8    70.7 |  -1.12  0.261 
                          |                                  | 
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Table 47: Private (Government Dependent) – Reading – Kernel 
                Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable      Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
          Age   Unmatched | 15.739   15.738      0.4         |   0.09  0.926 
                 Matched  | 15.739   15.727      4.2  -946.2 |   0.78  0.437 
                          |                                  | 
        pared   Unmatched |  8.563   10.289    -52.1         | -11.94  0.000 
                 Matched  |  8.563    8.391      5.2    90.0 |   0.99  0.321 
                          |                                  | 
      homepos   Unmatched |-2.3306  -1.8276    -47.9         | -10.74  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.3306  -2.3596      2.8    94.2 |   0.54  0.592 
                          |                                  | 
       wealth   Unmatched |-2.3216  -1.7288    -49.1         | -11.16  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.3216  -2.3149     -0.6    98.9 |  -0.11  0.916 
                          |                                  | 
       atschl   Unmatched | .37952   .55694    -20.1         |  -4.64  0.000 
                 Matched  | .37952    .3865     -0.8    96.1 |  -0.15  0.884 
                          |                                  | 
         escs   Unmatched |-2.0642  -1.4334    -63.3         | -13.80  0.000 
                 Matched  |-2.0642  -2.1119      4.8    92.4 |   1.00  0.315 
                          |                                  | 
       hedres   Unmatched |-1.3504  -1.0248    -34.8         |  -7.81  0.000 
                 Matched  |-1.3504  -1.4075      6.1    82.5 |   1.17  0.240 
                          |                                  | 
      joyread   Unmatched | .44193   .44807     -1.3         |  -0.30  0.768 
                 Matched  | .44193   .43607      1.2     4.4 |   0.23  0.816 
                          |                                  | 
         male   Unmatched | .54519   .46732     15.6         |   3.61  0.000 
                 Matched  | .54519   .56958     -4.9    68.7 |  -0.90  0.367 
                          |                                  | 
        grade   Unmatched | 8.8741   9.4399    -85.4         | -18.87  0.000 
                 Matched  | 8.8741   8.8911     -2.6    97.0 |  -0.51  0.612 
                          |                                  | 
    preschool   Unmatched | .36593   .56321    -40.3         |  -9.24  0.000 
                 Matched  | .36593   .36533      0.1    99.7 |   0.02  0.982 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q02   Unmatched | 1.9733   2.2434    -42.7         |  -9.46  0.000 
                 Matched  | 1.9733   1.9969     -3.7    91.3 |  -0.77  0.441 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q01   Unmatched | 2.2652   2.7847    -52.2         | -11.71  0.000 
                 Matched  | 2.2652   2.2435      2.2    95.8 |   0.42  0.676 
                          |                                  | 
      st20q12   Unmatched | 1.0874   1.0521     13.9         |   3.46  0.001 
                 Matched  | 1.0874   1.0981     -4.2    69.7 |  -0.68  0.498 
                          |                                  | 
      st19q01   Unmatched | 1.7319   1.6407     19.7         |   4.46  0.000 
                 Matched  | 1.7319   1.7368     -1.1    94.6 |  -0.21  0.837 
                          |                                  | 
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Table 48: Private (Government Dependent) – Reading – Nearest Neighbor 
                Unmatched |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable      Matched | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
          Age   Unmatched | 15.796   15.738     20.5         |   6.18  0.000 
                 Matched  | 15.796   15.796     -0.3    98.5 |  -0.08  0.936 
                          |                                  | 
        pared   Unmatched | 10.309   10.289      0.6         |   0.18  0.857 
                 Matched  | 10.326   10.644     -9.4 -1476.0 |  -2.50  0.012 
                          |                                  | 
      homepos   Unmatched |-1.6648  -1.8276     15.0         |   4.51  0.000 
                 Matched  |-1.6661  -1.5968     -6.4    57.4 |  -1.68  0.093 
                          |                                  | 
       wealth   Unmatched |-1.5079  -1.7288     18.5         |   5.53  0.000 
                 Matched  |-1.5078  -1.4273     -6.7    63.5 |  -1.82  0.069 
                          |                                  | 
       atschl   Unmatched | .51002   .55694     -5.3         |  -1.59  0.111 
                 Matched  | .50696   .50823     -0.1    97.3 |  -0.04  0.970 
                          |                                  | 
         escs   Unmatched |-1.3525  -1.4334      7.4         |   2.24  0.025 
                 Matched  |-1.3495   -1.254     -8.8   -18.2 |  -2.29  0.022 
                          |                                  | 
       hedres   Unmatched |-.94215  -1.0248      8.2         |   2.50  0.012 
                 Matched  |-.94453  -.90568     -3.9    53.0 |  -1.01  0.312 
                          |                                  | 
      joyread   Unmatched | .43159   .44807     -3.2         |  -0.98  0.325 
                 Matched  | .42864   .41292      3.1     4.6 |   0.81  0.421 
                          |                                  | 
         male   Unmatched | .47468   .46732      1.5         |   0.45  0.656 
                 Matched  | .47383   .46262      2.2   -52.2 |   0.60  0.550 
                          |                                  | 
        grade   Unmatched | 9.8333   9.4399     58.6         |  17.40  0.000 
                 Matched  | 9.8218   9.8361     -2.1    96.4 |  -0.61  0.542 
                          |                                  | 
    preschool   Unmatched | .59705   .56321      6.9         |   2.07  0.039 
                 Matched  |  .5983   .60866     -2.1    69.4 |  -0.56  0.573 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q02   Unmatched | 2.3207   2.2434     11.2         |   3.41  0.001 
                 Matched  | 2.3239   2.3505     -3.9    65.6 |  -1.01  0.314 
                          |                                  | 
      st21q01   Unmatched | 2.9191   2.7847     13.2         |   3.96  0.000 
                 Matched  | 2.9194   2.9707     -5.1    61.8 |  -1.36  0.174 
                          |                                  | 
      st20q12   Unmatched | 1.0401   1.0521     -5.7         |  -1.70  0.090 
                 Matched  | 1.0403   1.0403      0.0   100.0 |  -0.00  1.000 
                          |                                  | 
      st19q01   Unmatched | 1.5464   1.6407    -19.3         |  -5.86  0.000 
                 Matched  |  1.546   1.5425      0.7    96.3 |   0.18  0.853 
                          |                                  | 
